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Wahrnehmung und Governance von Risiken der Ernährungsunsicherheit bei 
kleinbäuerlichen Familienbetrieben im Südwesten Äthiopiens 
 
Zusammenfassung 
In Äthiopien sichert die Familienlandwirtschaft 81 Prozent der Bevölkerung ihren Lebensunterhalt und 
macht über 96 Prozent der gesamten landwirtschaftlichen Produktion aus. Diese Familienbetriebe sind 
jedoch häufig komplexen Bedrohungen und Risiken durch soziopolitische, ökologische, wirtschaftliche und 
institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen ausgesetzt, was zu ihrer strukturellen Ernährungsunsicherheit beiträgt. 
Hauptziel der vorliegenden Studie ist es, empirische Nachweise über Wahrnehmung und Governance der 
sich entwickelnden Risiken der Ernährungsunsicherheit landwirtschaftlicher Familienbetriebe in Äthiopien 
zu liefern. Die Studie wurde in drei Verwaltungsgebieten (Kersa, Omonada und Bako-Tibe) im Südwesten 
Äthiopiens zwischen Mai 2015 und April 2016 durchgeführt. Daten wurden im Form von 
Haushaltsumfragen, Fokusgruppendiskussionen und eingehenden Experteninterviews gesammelt. Die 
Datenanalyse bestand zum einen in einer thematischen Analyse qualitativer Daten und zum anderen aus 
deskriptiven Statistiken, darunter Hauptkomponentenanalysen, multivariater und geordneter Probitmodelle 
für quantitative Daten. Den theoretischen Rahmen für die Analyse und Erklärung der empirischen 
Ergebnisse lieferte die Evolutionäre Governance-Theorie. Die Ergebnisse der Studie offenbaren starke 
Pfadabhängigkeiten in der Bodenpolitik, im Agrarmarketing- und in der Kreditpolitik sowie 
Interdependenzen zwischen diesen Politikfeldern,. Ferner wurden Interdependenzen zwischen den 
unterschiedlichen Entstehungsgründen von Ernährungsunsicherheitsrisiken festgestellt, die ihre Wirkungen 
gegenseitig verstärken. Auch bei Entscheidungen für Strategien der Lebensunterhaltssicherung als 
Reaktion auf Ernährungsunsicherheitsrisiken wurden Interdependenzen beobachtet. Beispielsweise 
ergänzten sich Pflanzenproduktion und Nutztierhaltung mit außerlandwirtschaftlichen 
Einkommensstrategien. Darüber hinaus erhöht die Wahl einer Kombination aus Nutztierhaltung, 
außerlandwirtschaftlichen Einkommensstrategien und Transfereinkommen die Wahl der Strategien des 
Anbaumanagements. In Bezug auf lokalisierte Risiken schätzten unterschiedliche Akteure die gegebenen 
Risiken je nach eigener Perspektiven anders ein, was unterschiedliche riskscapes bildet. Zwischen diesen 
riskscapes können jedoch Abhängigkeiten oder Widersprüche bestehen. Zusammengefasst verdeutlicht die 
Analyse mit Hilfe eines evolutionary risk governance framework das Vorhandensein von Interdependenzen 
in verschiedenen Bereichen. Daher wird empfohlen, bei Plänen und Strategien zur Bewältigung von Risiken 
der Ernährungsunsicherheit ganzheitliche Ansätze in Betracht zu ziehen, um die breitere Perspektive und 
die Vernetzung von verschiedenen Risikofaktoren zu verstehen. Auch sollten Lehren aus dem Handeln 
früherer Regierungen in Äthiopien gezogen werden, um Misserfolge der Vergangenheit nicht zu 
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wiederholen und rechtzeitig angemessene Maßnahmen gegen ähnliche Risiken in der Zukunft zu 
entwickeln. 
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Abstract 
In Ethiopia, family farming provides livelihood for 81 percent of the population, and accounts for 
over 96 percent of total agricultural production. However, family farmers often operate under 
continuous threats of complex sets of risks associated with unfavorable socio-political, ecological, 
economic, and institutional environments. Consequently, family farming households suffer from 
structural food insecurity. The major objective of this study, therefore, was to generate empirical 
evidence on the perception and governance of evolving food insecurity risks among family farming 
households in Ethiopia. The study was conducted in three woredas (Kersa, Omonada and Bako-
Tibe) located in the southwest of the country. Data were collected in May 2015-April 2016 through 
household surveys, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. Data analysis followed 
thematic analysis for qualitative data, and descriptive statistics, principal component analysis, 
multivariate and ordered probit models for quantitative data. Evolutionary governance theory 
provided the framework through which to analyze and explain the empirical findings. The results 
of the study reveal strong path dependencies in land policies, agricultural marketing, and credit 
policies, and interdependences among these policies putting the food security and livelihood of 
family farming households at stake. Interdependencies were found between different sources of 
food insecurity risks, with one exacerbating the effect of the other. Interdependence was also 
observed in the decisions made in relation to major livelihood strategies in response to food 
insecurity risks. For instance, crop and livestock production and livestock and off-farm income 
strategies complemented each other. Moreover, the choice to combine livestock, off-farm, and 
transfer income strategies increased the choice of crop production strategies. Regarding localized 
risks, different actors perceived a given risk differently from their own perspectives, forming 
different ‘riskscapes’, though there could be interdependencies or contradictions among these. In 
a nutshell, results of the analysis using the evolutionary risk governance framework showed the 
presence of dependencies in different aspects. It is thus recommended that design of plans and 
policies in response to food insecurity risks, consider holistic approaches to understanding the 
broader perspectives and interconnectedness of different sources of risk. Lessons from past 
governances should also be taken into consideration, in order not to repeat past failures and instead 
to develop appropriate and timely interventions against similar risks in the future.  
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1. Food Insecurity Risks in Ethiopia 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In Ethiopia, family farming provides livelihood for 81 percent of the total populationand and 
accounts for over 96 percent of total agricultural production (CSA, 2016). Family farming is 
understood as “a means of organizing agricultural, forestry, fisheries, pastoral and aquaculture 
production systems that are managed and operated by a family and predominantly reliant on 
family labor including both women’s and men’s” (FAO, 2013, p.2). However, despite the immense 
socioeconomic changes promoting agricultural transformation in the country (Stellmacher, 2015), 
Ethiopian family farmers are operating under the continuous threats of complex sets of risks, as a 
result of often unfavorable socio-political, ecological, economic, and institutional environments 
(Von Braun & Olofinbiyi, 2009) and leading to hunger and structural food insecurity among these 
households (Dorosh & Rashid, 2012).  
Since the 1960s, Ethiopia has suffered from recurrent droughts, and nearly all famines and 
food insecurity problems have happened in subsequent years following these events. For instance, 
following the regional drought that affected the Sahelian countries, Ethiopia experienced severe 
famines in 1973 and 1984, which resulted in a depletion of the livelihoods of households and 
caused excess mortality, estimated at over 250,000 people in 1973 and about one million in 1984 
(Rahmato, 2009; Webb & Von Braun, 1994). Since recurrent droughts threaten at least one part of 
the country over short intervals (See Annex 1), Ethiopia suffers from more localized and less 
popularized food crises that leave millions in need of emergency food aid.  
 In addition to drought, other factors have contributed to a lack of resilience and the high 
vulnerability of victims of food insecurity. The agricultural marketing policies which were pursued 
by successive governments are among the most important factors in this regard (see Chapter 4), as 
they discouraged farmers’ use of improved agricultural technologies through their effect on output 
and input prices (Desalegn Rahmato, 2008; Rahimato, 2009; Rashid, Getnet, & Lemma, 2010; 
Rashid, Negassa, & others, 2011; Webb & Von Braun, 1994). For example, market restrictions, 
grain supply quotas, and centrally fixed prices, which were obstacles to the inter-regional 
distribution of food within the country, fueled the 1984 famine (Franzel, Colburn, & Degu, 1989; 
Degefe & Tafesse, 1990; Rahmato, 2009). The land policies which kept land in the hands of the 
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Ethiopian states also played key roles in the livelihoods of smallholder family farmers and their 
level of vulnerability to food insecurity risk (Tecle, 1975; Rahmato, 1984, 2009; Cohen, 1987). 
Moreover, disregard for smallholder family farmers during successive governments re-enforced 
food insecurity problems. For instance, the focus of the Dergue government on producers’ 
cooperatives and state farms in supply of agricultural inputs and technical backstopping 
contributed to poor resilience in this regard (Kassa, 2003; Besha & Park, 2014).  
 Family farmers’ perceptions of food insecurity risks are rooted partly in how past generations 
and regimes addressed and managed related shocks, which makes it important to understand how 
the past affects the present and the future. This should enable one to draw lessons from strengths 
and failures of the past, in order not to repeat shortfalls in plans, policies, and strategies, and instead 
build on what was successful. Understanding the past in this context means looking into not only 
these past plans, policies and strategies, but also social organizations and administrative structures. 
Some of the social organizations have endured and been adapted to current situations (see Chapter 
5). Some informal institutions with significant linkages to the past also deserve careful 
consideration, not only because of their influence on current informal institutions, but also because 
of their potential for uptake and influence on formal institutions (Tridico, 2004). Coherence and 
synergies between formal and informal institutions may also help in better understanding the 
governance of food insecurity risks and livelihoods faced by family farming households 
(Stellmacher, 2007).   
 Rural governance is a critical cross-cutting issue in the development discourse in general and 
for farming households in Ethiopia in particular. Family farmers, who make up the vast majority 
of the population in rural Ethiopia, are exposed to diverse sources of risk (Webb & Von Braun, 
1994; Von Braun & Olofinbiyi, 2007; Bewket, 2009; Taffesse et al., 2012; Hill & Porter, 2017), 
and rural governance involves understanding and addressing these webs of risks. However, most 
of these sources of risk have become recurrent and rooted in the past. Therefore, an evolutionary 
dimension of risk is important in helping understand the impact of shocks (risks that affected 
people in the past) and management strategies taken in response to these shocks on their perception 
of similar risks and how they intend to manage them (see Chapter 6). Understanding family 
farming households’ strategies in relation to food insecurity risks, and drawing important 
conclusions and recommendations, requires knowledge of how history and governance have 
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evolved, because risk management derives from risk perception and assessment, which in turn 
come from evolving community narratives and values. Moreover, different actors create risk, 
assess, and manage it in a manner that originates from a particular history in a particular location. 
This means that both problems and their answers are the constructs of a community.  
 Risk management is not only a matter of family choices, but also of larger-scale, current, and 
older interventions and institutions (policies and plans). Old attempts at managing risk do indeed 
shape family farmers’ options in this regard. Moreover, their perception of risk is the result of their 
exposure to different types of shock (Barrett et al., 2000; Doss et al., 2008; Sulewski & Kłoczko-
Gajewska, 2014). Since people behave according to their perceptions, risk assessment and their 
ultimate response to risks are considered for farmers the result of their risk perception. In other 
words, risk perception influences the choice of what livelihood strategy farmers choose, to achieve 
their livelihood goals (see Chapter 8), including ensuring their food security (Jansen et al., 2006; 
Adato and Meinzen-Dick, 2002; DFID, 1999; Ellis, 1998).  
 Food insecurity risk is the result of local, national, and global factors affecting the livelihoods 
of people in different ways. There are different layers of risk in a given space (Müller-Mahn & 
Everts, 2013), and different actors may understand the same source in different ways, depending 
on their own perspectives (see Chapter 7) – often without considering the ‘real cause’ of the 
problem. Such responses may end up creating new risks, the consequences of which might 
outweigh the initial source thereof. Taking this into account, Müller-Mahn & Everts (2013) suggest 
a holistic approach that centralizes the perspectives of local people.  
The purpose of this study is to examine – from an evolutionary perspective – risk governance 
in rural Ethiopia in the last four regimes and reveal its implications on the livelihoods and food 
security of family farmers in southwestern Ethiopia. The study is based on a literature review and 
empirical evidence collected in the field.  
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1.2 Statement of the problem 
Agriculture that depends mainly on family farming is the main driver of the Ethiopian economy. 
However, over 40 percent of the family farming households in the country are food insecure (CSA 
& WFP, 2014). The reasons are manifold, but the literature most often mentions consecutive 
droughts, policy, institutional and organizational failures, and low agricultural productivity. These 
factors limit the capacity of family farmers to cope with different internal and external shocks 
(Dorosh and Rashid, 2012; von Braun and Olofinbiyi, 2007).  
 A review of evolutionary paths in the last five decades in Ethiopia shows that efforts made to 
save lives during incidences of drought and food insecurity have varied among respective 
governments. For instance, the attempt made by the imperial government to ‘hid the news’ about 
the 1973 famine in northern Ethiopia caused the loss of thousands of lives, due to severe delays in 
emergency relief efforts (Pankhurst & Rahmato, 2013; Rahmato, 2009). The Dergue military 
government tried to address the shortfalls of the imperial regime through land reform and efforts 
to increase food production through state farms and producers’ cooperatives (Von Braun & 
Olofinbiyi, 2007). However, these efforts did not bring the desired increase in food production to 
achieve the food-self-sufficiency objective of the government, and the 1984 famine was even 
worse than the crisis in the 1970s. The Dergue government had no better preparation except for an 
early warning system in place to inform the world about the situation (Rahmato, 2009; Van 
Uffelen, 2013). The Dergue government was also blamed for delays in announcing the famine in 
order to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the revolution and the establishment of the Workers Party 
of Ethiopia (WPE). The current government, under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), has implemented different policies and strategies to increase crop 
production and productivity, and to ensure ‘food-self-sufficiency’. However, despite increases in 
crop production and large price falls in high potential areas in 1995/96 and 2002, millions of people 
in drought-prone areas of the country still suffer from frequent and chronic food shortages (Rashid 
et al., 2010). A policy objective to free the majority of beneficiaries from dependence on food aid 
was set after the 2003 food crisis. According to this policy objective, the country was expected to 
be free from foreign food aid in 2015 (MOARD, 2009). However, the most serious drought of 
2015/2016 led to over 10 million people in desperate need of food aid (NDRMC, 2015). The 
challenge here is to understand interdependencies between the food insecurity risks that have 
threatened the country for over the last five decades.  
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As indicated in the previous paragraphs, several studies have been conducted on the cause 
of famines and food insecurity in Ethiopia (Devereux, 2000; Berhanu, 2001; Sisay and Tesfaye, 
2003; Haile et al., 2005; Von Braun, 2007; Von Braun & Olofinbiyi, 2009; Van der veen and 
Tagel, 2011; Dorosh & Rashid, 2012). However, they have focused on prevailing situations and 
the shortcomings of existing or immediate past governments in managing the problem at hand, and 
none of the studies has paid due attention to the role of evolving institutions, actors, narratives, 
and resources in relation to these issues. In other words, there is a gap in studies linking the 
perceptions, assessment, and management of risk to the evolutionary perspective. The evolutionary 
path in the governance of food insecurity risk, and its influence on the perceptions and current 
actions of family farmers in terms of how they manage similar risks, has not been addressed. This 
study employs a mixture of approaches to capture the different dimensions of risk in addressing 
these problems. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the study 
The overarching objective of this study is to generate empirical evidence on the perceptions and 
governance of food insecurity risk among family farming households in Ethiopia.  
The specific objectives are: 
i. To evaluate critically the evolution of rural governance systems in the study areas. 
ii. To analyze how family farming households perceive, assess, and manage different sources 
of food insecurity risks. 
iii. To evaluate the perspectives of different actors in perception of local risks and their 
implications for family farmers’ food security and welfare. 
iv. To investigate the linkages between perceptions on sources of food insecurity risk and the 
choice of livelihood strategies among family farming households. 
v. To contribute to the theoretical approaches used in analyzing the risk perceptions of family 
farmers.  
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1.4 Research questions 
The major research question of this study is: How can the risk that family farmers faced in the 
past, as well as the different policies and strategies implemented in response to these shocks, the 
actions of different actors to overcome these shocks, and the evolving bio-physical and socio-
political environment, influence family farmers’ perceptions of food insecurity risk and their 
response strategies?  
The study addresses the following specific research questions:  
i. How did rural governance evolve in the study areas? What are the implications of this on 
the perceptions, assessment, and management of food insecurity risk among family 
farmers? 
ii. What are the major sources of food insecurity risk to family farming households?  
iii. How do family farmers perceive, assess, and manage sources of food insecurity risk? 
iv. How do different actors perceive different risks? How does this influence the response of 
the different actors? What are the implications of such perceptions of a specified source of 
risk by different actors to its governance? 
v. What is the impact of risk perception on the choice of livelihood strategies of family 
farming households?  
 
1.5 Thesis organization 
The thesis is organized into ten chapters. The introductory chapter provides the overall summary 
of the research so that readers can grasp the core theme of the dissertation. The introductory chapter 
also introduces readers to the problem statement, objectives of the study, and research questions 
addressed throughout the thesis. The second chapter describes the study areas and presents the 
design of the whole research process, including the sampling procedures, the different tools used 
in data collection, and methods of data analysis. The third chapter presents the conceptual and 
theoretical framework used in the research process, which is followed by a review of rural 
development policies and strategies in Chapter 4. The fifth chapter presents the evolution of rural 
governance, focusing on cases from three woredas in southwestern Ethiopia. This is followed by 
analysis of the perceptions and governance of food insecurity risk in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents 
the riskscapes of landlessness, food and energy insecurity, and siltation in the southwest of the 
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country, with special focus on the case of the Gilgel Gibe-I hydroelectricity dam. Chapter 8 
presents the influence of risk perceptions on the choice of livelihood strategies. The synthesis of 
the theoretical contribution of this research is presented in Chapter 9. Finally, the tenth chapter 
presents the conclusions drawn from thesis research and makes a number of overall 
recommendations. 
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2. Methodology and Ethics 
 
2.1.The study areas  
This study is based on an empirical fieldwork conducted in three woredas (districts) in 
southwestern Ethiopia, namely Kersa and Omonada woredas in the Jimma zone and Bako-Tibe 
woreda in the West Shewa zone, all of which 
are located in Oromia Regional State (Figure 
1). The three woredas lie in the focus area of 
the BIOMASWEB1 project. Kersa and 
Omonada woredas host the reservoir for the 
Gilgel Gibe-I hydroelectricity dam. The other 
woredas, whose lands are located in the 
reservoir site of the Gilgel Gibe I hydropower 
project, are Sokoru and Tiro Afata. Households 
relocated from the reservoir site of the GG-I 
project in 2001 were resettled in different 
villages in the Kersa and Omonada woredas. 
Seven out of the nine resettlement villages are 
now located in Kersa woreda, while the 
remaining two villages are found in Omonada 
woreda.  
 
Agro-ecological zones in Ethiopia are traditionally classified into five categories, with 
Amharic names assigned to each one based on altitude, temperature, and rainfall amounts and 
                                                          
1 This study is supported by the interdisciplinary BiomassWeb Research Project: Improving food security in Africa 
through increased system productivity of biomass-based value webs (BiomassWeb) at the Center for Development 
Research (ZEF), University of Bonn, under the work package 2.2: Family farms. (www.biomassweb.org). 
BiomassWeb is financed by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 
Figure 2.1: Map of the study areas 
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distribution. These agro-ecological zones are named berha2, Kola3, weinadega4, dega5, and wurch6 
(Hurni, 1998). The study sites fall under three of these five agro-ecological zones. Kersa woreda 
is located between 1,740 and 2,660 meters above sea level (m.a.s.l.) and consists of 10 percent 
dega (highlands) and 90 percent woinadega (mid-altitude areas). Omonada is located between 880 
and 3,344 m.a.s.l. and consists of 24 percent dega, 63 percent woinadega, and 13 percent kola (hot 
lowlands). The lowlands of Omonada are found in the Gibe valleys and host the reservoir for the 
Gilgel Gibe II and III hydroelectricity dams. The altitude of Bako-Tibe woreda ranges from 1,500-
2,200 m.a.s.l and consists of 51 percent kola, 37 percent weinadega, and 12 percent dega.  
The main rainy season in the Kersa and Omonada areas is from March to September. The 
areas receive an average annual rainfall of 900-1300 mm. Temperatures are moderate, from 20-
28°C, with variations across altitudes. Bako-Tibe receives average annual rainfall of 1,266 mm, 
and its temperature ranges from 13-28°C.  
The main language spoken in the study areas is Afan Oromo, and there is a spatial 
difference in the religious denomination in the study areas. In Kersa and Omonada, almost 99 
percent of the sample households are Muslim, while in Bako-Tibe 75 percent are Protestants, 20 
percent Orthodox Christians, and 5 percent Muslims. The average family size in the study areas is 
seven persons per household.  
Family farmers often face labor shortages, especially during the weeding and harvesting 
seasons. To overcome temporary labor shortages, they use different arrangements to gain access 
to non-family labor. The most common labor arrangements are dado/dugde, debo, and hiring labor. 
Dado/dugde is the labor-pooling arrangement through which farmers help each other to 
accomplish their farming activities in groups of up to eight people on a rotational basis. Debo is 
also a labor-pooling mechanism; however, this might not be reciprocated with labor.  
                                                          
2 Berha is a dry, hot area found at altitudes ranging from 500 to 1500 m.a.s.l. and receives mean annual rainfall of 
less than 900 mm and has an average temperature of about 22ᵒC. 
3 Kola is a sub-moist area found at altitudes ranging from 500 to 1500 m.a.s.l. and receives mean annual rainfall of 
900-1000 mm and has an average temperature of 18-24ᵒC. 
4 Weinadega is a moist-cool area found at altitudes ranging from 1500 to 2300 m.a.s.l. and receives mean annual 
rainfall of over 1000 mm and has an average temperature of 18-20ᵒC. 
5 Dega is a cold area found at altitudes ranging from 2300 to 3200 m.a.s.l. and receives mean annual rainfall of over 
1000 mm and has an average temperature of 10-14 ᵒC. 
6 Wurch is a very cold or alpine area found at altitudes of over 3200 m.a.s.l. and receives mean annual rainfall of 
above 1000 mm and average temperatures below 10ᵒC. 
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Most houses in the study areas are built from wooden walls plastered with mud and covered 
with grass roofs or corrugated sheets of iron, depending on the affluence of the household. The 
floor is usually soil, but some well-off farmers coat the floor and the base of their houses with 
concrete. The most important sources of energy for rural households in the study areas are wood 
for fuel and kerosene for light. Fuel wood is collected either from nearby forests (if available) or 
crop residues (maize and sorghum stover).  
Maize is the dominant crop produced in the study areas, with results from the household 
survey showing that this is the case in Kersa woreda, followed by Omonada and Bako-Tibe 
woredas, respectively, covering 74 percent, 68 percent, and 47 percent of the total cultivated land 
of these areas in the 2014/15 cropping season. The second most dominant crop is Tef (Eragrostis 
tef), followed by sorghum, pepper, khat (Catha edulis), and coffee. Cattle, sheep, goats, donkeys, 
horses, mules, poultry, and honeybees are reared in the study areas. The average livestock holding 
in the study areas is 5.2 Tropical Livestock Units (TLU). Oxen are among the most important 
assets for Ethiopian family farmers; however, over 16 percent of the households in the study areas 
do not own them.  
Family farming households are endowed with different assets, including physical capital, 
financial capital, natural capital, social capital, and human capital. Aggregation of these different 
types of capital can be used as a good indicator of household wealth status. However, they are 
measured in different ways and therefore may not be simply aggregated. With the purpose of 
simplifying the categorization of households according to their wealth endowment, I built a wealth 
index from 24 selected household wealth indicators (the five livelihood capitals), using principal 
component analysis following Filmer and Pritchett (1998), Zeller et al. (2003), Langyintuo et al. 
(2006), and Legese et al. (2011). Those households with a positive wealth index are categorized 
as ‘well-endowed households’, while those with a negative wealth index are categorized as ‘poorly 
endowed households’ (Figure 2). 
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Source: Computed from household survey data 
Figure 2.2: Distribution of households by wealth category 
 
As indicated in Figure 2, about 56 percent of the farm households in the study areas can be 
defined as ‘poorly endowed’, and 44 percent as ‘well-endowed’ households. Evidence obtained 
through focus group discussions and the household survey reveals that well-endowed farmers are 
those that own more than a pair of oxen, cultivate their own land, and tend to receive additional 
parcels of cropland, either through share-cropping or informal lease (rent) from other farmers. 
Well-endowed farmers have better access to extension services and credit, and so they can afford 
to hire non-family labor and buy agriculutural inputs such as fertilizer and improved seeds for 
cash.  
 
2.2. Methods of sampling and data collection 
In this study, I employed a combination of techniques called the ‘mixed methods’ procedure 
(Creswell, 2014), which is defined as an intellectual and practical synthesis based on qualitative 
and quantitative research (Johnson et al., 2007) and involves combining these two strands and data 
in response to respective research questions (Creswell, 2014). Many different terms, such as 
integrating, synthesis, multi-method, and mixed methodology, are used to describe this approach, 
but recent writings tend to use the term ‘mixed methods’ (Johnson, 2007; Creswell, 2014 after 
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Bryman, 2006; Tashakkori & Teddie, 2010). Johnson (2007) reviewed the definition of the 
approach among leading authors in different disciplines and also suggested the use of the term. I 
selected this procedure because it offers a powerful third paradigm choice that often provides the 
most informative, complete, balanced, and useful research results (Johnson et al., 2007).  
As indicated in Figure 2.3, I used the exploratory sequential mixed methods design in the 
collection of the primary data, which begins by exploring and analyzing qualitative data and then 
using these findings in the second, quantitative, phase (Creswell, 2014). The quantitative phase 
then builds on the results of the initial qualitative database.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Creswell (2014) 
Figure 2.3: Exploratory mixed methods 
 
Following the exploratory mixed methods design, the field data collection for this study 
was conducted in four phases. The first phase occurred over a three-month period (May-July 2015) 
as an exploratory phase to understand the study setting and prepare for detailed qualitative data 
collection and analysis. Basically, I started the field research in Ethiopia with a visit to the relevant 
federal, regional, and zonal offices. During these visits, my major task was to explain the purpose 
of my research and seek the support of relevant authorities. Accordingly, I obtained support letters 
from the Oromia Bureau of Agriculture, to agricultural development offices in Jimma and West 
Shewa zones, which in turn did the same to woreda offices of agriculture. This was in order to 
follow proper bureaucratic procedures and avoid potential complications that may arise in the field 
in relation to the legitimacy of my data collection process. In addition to these support letters, I 
obtained some basic information on historical trends in food insecurity and government policy, 
Qualitative 
data collection 
and analysis (in 
two phases) 
Builds to 
Quantitative data 
collection and 
analysis 
Interpretation 
Qualitative data 
collection and 
analysis 
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along with strategy documents from different federal and regional offices. Once I arrived at the 
respective woredas, I discussed my research topic with the heads of the woreda offices of 
agriculture and asked for their assistance in the provision of background information about the 
profiles of the kebeles7 in their woreda. Since it was not possible to reach all the kebeles in the 
woredas, I selected potential kebeles for my research with the assistance of woreda experts and 
researchers from Bako Agricultural Research Center in Bako-Tibe woreda and a researcher from 
Jimma University in Kersa and Omonada woredas. In addition, I made a visit to the selected 
kebeles in the researchers’ respective woreda.  
During the exploratory visits, for two to three days, I had informal discussions with 
different individuals and groups of people to get a general overview of the areas. I also made 
transect walks in the kebeles to observe and take note of general features of the areas. The informal 
discussions, observations, and background information obtained from woreda offices helped me 
in the final selection of my case study kebeles in the three woredas, which were used for qualitative 
and quantitative data collection through a household survey.  
A multi-stage random sampling procedure was used to select kebeles8 from each woreda 
and farming households from each kebele. In the first stage, based on their maize production 
potential, two woredas from Jimma zone and one woreda from West Shewa zone were selected 
from Oromia region within the domain of the BiomassWeb project. Second, using a proportional 
random sampling procedure, three to six kebeles were selected from each woreda, and finally 16-
24 households were randomly selected from each kebele. This made for a total sample of 228 
family farming households in the household survey. It is difficult to get good representation of the 
required types of households through a random sampling procedure. As a result, the focus group 
and semi-structured interviews were conducted with the randomly selected households and other 
households not selected through this method. 
After I selected the case study kebeles, I asked the woreda office heads to provide me with 
support letters that I could take with me to the selected kebeles and different offices I would be 
visiting for my field research. I handed these letters to the respective kebeles and continued with 
my observations and interviews. Finally, I was able to modify my interview guidelines following 
the informal individual and small group interviews and discussions, develop rapport with people 
                                                          
7 The lowest administrative structure in Ethiopia. 
8 The lowest administrative structure in Ethiopia. 
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in the study areas, including extension agents, and select research assistants (one person in Bako 
and two in Jimma areas) for the next detailed works.  
Having modified my discussion guides and semi-structured questionnaires, respectively, 
for the focused group discussions and key informant interviews during the first phase, I conducted 
these in the second phase of data collection (August-mid-October 2015). The selection of people 
for focus group discussions was made with the help of the research assistants, extension agents, 
and knowledgeable people in the area. The criteria for selection of group members were developed 
based on information obtained during the first phase of the data collection. The key informants 
were selected based on the information I obtained during the focus group discussions and with the 
help of knowledgeable people, extension agents, and focus group participants.  
The third phase of data collection (mid-October-mid-November 2015) focused mainly on 
conducting the household survey. I amended the questionnaires based on information generated 
during the first two phases of data collection. Moreover, I repeatedly (three times) pre-tested the 
survey questionnaires in order to come up with a manageable option before hiring enumerators, 
which were selected for this study with the assistance of a CASCAPE project at Jimma University. 
The project staff helped me throughout the whole enumerator recruitment process, starting from 
announcing the position, through screening competent candidates from the large number of 
applicants. The selection process involved both written and oral examinations. I selected five 
Masters students, who were at the stage of completing their thesis work, as enumerators. I trained 
these enumerators for three consecutive days and finally pre-tested the questionnaire in a village 
near to Jimma town. I employed the same enumerators throughout the survey in the three woredas. 
The household survey was conducted over a period of one month (mid-October-mid-November 
2015). Due to a series of mass protests across the Oromia region, starting from mid-November 
2015, it was not possible to return to the study areas for almost four months. However, I used this 
as an opportunity to concentrate on data entry and data cleaning.  
 The fourth phase of data collection (March-April 2016) was conducted to validate some of 
the data collected during the first three phases and to fill the information gap during these phases. 
During the fourth data collection phase, I conducted in-depth interviews with 48 informants and 
11 mini-focus groups (with three to five farmers in a group) involving 35 farmers. I will provide 
details of the data collection process and tools used in the four phases of the fieldwork in the 
following paragraphs. 
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 During the entire fieldwork, I applied different tools, as indicated in Figure 2.3. The first 
phase involved informal individual and group discussions, observations, and transect walks in the 
study areas. According to Bernard (2011), informal group discussions at the beginning of field 
research are useful to building rapport with the local community and understanding local contexts. 
I conducted informal interviews with different people in rural villages, markets, churches, and 
mosques, as well as with farmers while they were going about their daily farming activities. These 
were opportunistic discussions with people whom I met in different scenarios and who were 
willing to talk with me. Since newcomers are usually welcome to  rural Ethiopian villages, it was 
a matter of greeting people in their local language and getting into a discussion about general issues 
with respect to farming, the weather conditions, markets, natural calamities, and other shocks 
observed in their areas. I found it mostly smooth and easy to develop a rapport with people in most 
of the areas, since they readily understood me and were open to sharing their views. My knowledge 
of the local language and prior understanding of the culture also helped me in the process of 
entering into the field. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Besides the informal discussions that I had with different people upon my arrival, I also used 
semi-structured interviews with individuals and groups of people gathered for their own purposes. 
The strategy I used in this regard was to choose places where I could get access to people. One of 
the convenient locations was the office of the rural kebele administration, as there were specific 
dates on which farmers gathered at the kebele office to discuss issues related to peace and other 
Source: Pictures taken during the fieldwork 
Figure 2.4. Discussion with farmers during transect walks in Amerti Gibe kebele, Bako Tibe 
woreda (left) and Bulbul kebele, Kersa woreda (right)  
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community matters. The important thing in this case was to gain permission from the 
administrators, which I managed to do at all the locations I visited. The next step was to choose 
six to ten farmers from different categories. Since it was not easy to identify people or ask them 
directly about his/her wealth status, I relied on the kebele leadership, extension agents, and my 
field assistants. I also used groups of people gathered around churches and mosques and 
marketplaces as well as those who were gathered for their own purposes. In all cases, I tried to get 
a good representation of different types of farmer. I also had opportunities to talk to groups of 
extension agents that were gathered from different stations to meet with their supervisors. In total, 
I conducted 12 semi-structured group discussions involving 60 people. 
 After I developed a good rapport with the local communities and understood the overall 
situation in the area, I started organizing the focus group discussions. According to Krueger (1994), 
focus group discussions are appropriate for collecting in-depth information from past, current, or 
potential participants in social interactions, consumers, and victims of different shocks and 
different activities. Since the focus of my research was past events, shocks, and their governance, 
and their linkage to the present and future, I found this tool very useful to gather appropriate data 
for my research. The members of my focus group discussion were representatives of different 
farmer categories: Youth and elders, model farmers (Type A farmers), intermediate farmers (Type 
B farmers) and poor farmers (Type C farmers). In all study areas, I conducted male and female 
focus group discussions separately. I made the selection of farmers in consultation with research 
assistants, extension agents, and knowledgeable people in the area. Following Krueger (Krueger, 
1994), I made focus group discussion with both small (3-5 farmer ) and larg groups (6-10 farmer). 
The large focus group discussions took place during the second phase of data collection, when I 
was in need of diversified information from the perspective of a larger number of people. However, 
in the latter stage of my field research, when I was at about the saturation stage with most of the 
information (Onwuegbuzie, Dickinson, Leech, & Zoran, 2009), I diverted to small focus groups. I 
conducted small focus group discussions during the fourth phase of data collection, in order to fill 
the information gap from the earlier phases and clarify further any issues before the end of the 
fieldwork.  
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I conducted in-depth interviews throughout the four data collection phases. Indepth 
interviews involved interviewing different people, including knowledgeable farmers (key 
informants), experts, and officials in federal, regional, zonal and woreda government offices, the 
management of the Gilgel-Gibe I hydroelectricity project, kebele leaders, Idir/reji leaders, traders, 
extension agents, leaders of basic cooperative societies, and cooperative unions and elders. In total, 
I conducted in-depth interviews with 60 people throughout the one-year fieldwork in different 
locations. The informants were family farmers and people affiliated to different organizations 
located in different places, including the three study woredas, Addis Ababa, and the Gilgel Gibe-
I project offices in Deneba and Jimma town. Accordingly, I had to travel to the respective locations 
of the informants, in order to conduct the interviews. 
I conducted the household survey from October through November 2015. A structured 
questionnaire was prepared, and experienced enumerators interviewed the sampled respondents 
under my close supervision. The questionnaire was composed of questions focusing on household 
composition, education, household assets, social networks, trusts, major crops produced, inputs 
Source: Pictures taken during the fieldwork 
Figure 2.5: Focus group discussions with women group in Omonada woreda (top left), 
Bako-Tibe woreda (bottom left), men groups in Kersa woreda (top right) and Omonada 
woreda (bottom right) 
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use, access to credit, herd structure and size, crop and livestock marketing, income sources and 
expenditure, membership of different groups and organizations, land tenure, food consumption 
habits, exposure to different shocks during the ten years prior to the survey time, risk 
communication, the risk perceptions of households, and coping strategies. I also included in the 
questionnaire a real pay-off risk preference game, in order to capture more dimensions of the risk-
taking behavior of households. As a result, the data provides a unique opportunity for the analysis 
requiring different household characteristics, crop, and livestock system components.  
  
2.3.Methods of data analysis  
Different data analysis methods were employed in this study. For the qualitative data, I applied the 
thematic analysis, “the method that involves discovering, interpreting and reporting patterns and 
clusters of meaning with in the data” (Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls, & Ormston, 2003). This method 
enabled me to identify different themes within textual data that I collected using different 
approaches. These themes were re-grouped and organized into broader themes, in order to answer 
the key research questions (Ritchie et al., 2003; Thomas & Harden, 2008; Joffe, 2012). The 
transcribed data were coded into different themes (codes) and broader themes (families) using 
ATLAS.ti software, in order to simplify the process of analysis. 
I analyzed the quantitative data using descriptive statistical tools, principal component 
analysis, and multivariate and ordered probit regression models. I used descriptive statistical tools 
throughout the study where I made use of the data from the household survey, and used principal 
component analysis in the construction of the wealth index in Chapter 5. The regression models 
were used to identify the influence of family farmers’ perceptions of different risks on their choice 
of livelihood strategies. Detailed descriptions of these models are presented in respective chapters, 
where the results are discussed. I used SPSS version 24, STATA 15 and Microsoft Excel to analyze 
the quantitative data.  
 
2.4. Ethical considerations in the research process 
According to Berg (2001), “the social scientist should ensure that the rights, privacy and welfare 
of the people and communities that form the focus of their studies are respected,” because social 
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science research delves deep into the social lives of subjects and unethical practices can harm their 
safety and welfare. Taking this into account, I tried to consider the principles of ‘respect for 
autonomy’, the principle of justice, and the principle of beneficence (Thompson & Chambers, 
2012). The principle of respect for autonomy demands respect for the individual’s right to provide 
informed consent to participate in research. With respect to this principle, I took due care in 
explaining who I was and the purpose of my research to all the subjects in my study, and I made 
clear their implicit right to refuse to participate in the research. I also indicated clearly the output 
of the research, in order to avoid unrealistic and unnecessary expectations. For those individuals 
who were willing to participate, they signed their names to express their informed consent. The 
issue of seeking the informed consent of respondents was an important section in the introductory 
page to the questionnaire I prepared for the household survey. I also trained the enumerators on 
how to approach the farmers, and it was only in rare cases that I came across farmers who refused 
to provide information and were therefore excluded from the sample. 
Sound recording was one of the issues that needed to be done with the informed consent 
of the subjects. In this regard, I recorded most of the indepth interviews and group discussions 
after informing the subjects that I would be recording them during the entire discussion. Once I 
had explained why I needed to record the sound, and outlined the confidentiality of the 
information, I did not come across any resistance from the subjects. 
I undertook extensive discussions with and made repeated visits to the rural communities 
and relevant experts and government officials, in order to get satisfactory evidence to answer my 
research questions. Some of the discussions I had with informants were very sensitive, and it was 
difficult to get into direct discussions, especially in the beginning, so I had to win the trust of these 
subjects through expressing the purpose of my research and its implications on their livelihoods 
and welfare. I also had to make clear the level of ethical obligation I had to protect the 
confidentiality of the information collected from different actors. This being the case, I respected 
the promises I made to the subjects of my research as much as possible in data management, data 
analysis, and while writing up the empirical findings. I hope the presentation of the cases 
throughout the empirical chapters invites policy dialogue and positive development interventions 
rather than negative implications for the subjects of my study, since they are entirely anonymous. 
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3. Concepts and Theories 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical and conceptual framework that will serve as a foundation and 
guiding principle of the whole study. The initial sections of the chapter deal with basic concepts 
of food security and risk that will be used as building blocks for the theoretical framework. The 
final sections focus on the theoretical framework on which the analysis in this thesis is based. 
 
3.1. Food security 
The most recent and operational definition of food security is provided by the Committee on World 
Food Security (CFS, 2014, p.7), which states “Food security exists when all people, at all times, 
have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” According to this definition, 
the most important components of food security are food availability, access to food, and the 
proper utilization of food.  
With respect to food availability, Webb and Von Braun (1994) note that it is a function of 
two key issues: Available resources and production levels. They define resources as natural, 
physical, and human and note that improvements in food availability can be achieved in part 
through improvements to these resource bases. Furthermore, improvements in educational 
opportunities and health services for people, responsible husbandry of the soil, water, and plants, 
and sustainable use of productive assets will also contribute to the capacity to improve the 
availability of food. The second key issue is that of production, and so improvements to both the 
farm and non-farm production of food and non-food products not only to improve food availability, 
but also to increase access to it.  
Food access implies adequate resources to obtain level of appropriate food required to 
maintain consumption of adequate amount and nutritional level (Negin et al., 2009). In the context 
of food security, access is a question of whether individuals and households (nations) are able to 
acquire sufficient food (Maxwell & Frankenberger, 1992). Utilization indicates proper feeding 
patterns and appropriate health and hygiene practices, and food utilization is about “proper 
biological use of food, a diet providing sufficient energy and essential nutrients, potable water and 
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adequate sanitation, as well as knowledge of food preparation. Food utilization is also related to 
basic principles of nutrition, proper child care and illness management” (Negin et al., 2009 after 
USAID 1992). Health is an important element in food utilization, too, because adequate income 
and food intake can be converted into adequate nutrition, albeit if and only if an individual is in 
proper health (Webb and Von Braun, 1994). 
Food security is also about the perceptions of concerned individuals or households 
regarding their current situation and uncertainties about the future (Wolfe and Frongillo, 2001). 
While the dietary intake of individuals indicates some aspects of food insecurity, such as calorific 
insufficiency and nutrition inadequacy, they do not show the cognitive and affective components 
of uncertainty (expressed as anxiety) about unacceptability of the food, or the unsustainability of 
its supply and access. For example, the current intake may be adequate, but food insecurity is still 
experienced due to concerns over future intake. Alternatively, intake may be inadequate but only 
temporarily, in order to protect supplies and prevent future insecurity (ibid).  
 
3.2.Risk 
Different scientific and professional disciplines have tried to define the term ‘risk’ in their own 
different ways (e.g. Hardaker, 2000; Kates and Kasperson, 1983; and Knight, 1921). However, all 
approaches have one common assumption, namely the distinction between reality and possibility 
(Zinn, 2008). Zinn argues that the concept of risk is tied to the possibility that the future event 
could be altered—or at least perceived to be altered—but the outcome is still uncertain, since the 
future may or may not be controlled by human activities. Some authors (e.g. Siegel and Alwang, 
1999) use the terms “risk” and “uncertainty” interchangeably, while others try to make a clear 
distinction between the two (e.g. knight, 1921). According to Knight, risk implies numerical, 
objective probabilities, whereas uncertainty implies uncertain outcomes with unknown 
probabilities. However, these distinctions are not operative as such, since the probabilities are very 
rarely known. 
In this study, risk is understood as exposure to uncertain events that may have unfavorable 
consequences on human health, life, and wellbeing, as well as the built and natural environment 
(Hardaker, 2000). Risk can also affect financial assets, economic investment, cultural heritage, and 
social institutions through its effect on the physical assets of the victims. It is important to make 
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clear the distinction between risk and hazards. According to Renn (2008), hazards are the internal 
characteristics of the risk agent (source of risk) that cause potential negative consequences, while 
risk is the potential effect that might happen to humans, their assets, and the environment. On a 
practical level, the potential effect (consequence) may happen or it may not, depending on the level 
of exposure of the victims to the hazard, the vulnerability of the target victims, and their level of 
resilience. In this case, the term ‘exposure’ describes the contact of the hazard-carrying agent with 
the subject/victim, while ‘vulnerability to risk’ describes the quality of being hurt or attacked by 
the hazard (Aven & Renn, 2010). Resilience implies the capacity of the target or subject to protect 
himself or the system against the consequences of exposure to the hazard or source of risk (ibid).  
Risk perception refers to the intuitive/subjective judgement of the probability of a specified 
type of accident happening and how concerned we may be with the consequences (Slovic, 1987; 
Sjöberg, Moen, & Rundmo, 2004). This means perceiving risk includes evaluating the probability 
of  the risk happening and making an intuitive judgement on the consequences of the risk 
factor/accident (Sjöberg et al., 2004). According to Renn (2009), risk perception is “the result of 
the processing, assimilation and evaluation of the past experience of the subject or information 
and different narratives about risk by individuals or groups in the society.” At the rural household 
or community level, risk perception is the basis for assessing the severity and consequences of risk 
and the management strategies taken in response to any potential risk.  
 
3.3. The concept of risk from different perspectives 
There are debates on the concept of risk, its causes, and approaches to analysis. This section 
focuses on the debates between positivists and constructivists on how risk should be 
conceptualized as well as the difference between the concepts of risk society and riskscapes in 
terms of their approaches to analyzing this matter. 
  
3.3.1.Social constructivism/relativism versus realism perspectives of risk 
There is a debate about whether risk should be conceptualized as an entity that has objective 
existence on the one hand and a social construct whose interpretation depends on the socio-cultural 
background of the interpreter on the other (Bradbury, 1989; Zinn, 2008). From a realist’s 
23 
 
perspective, risk is thought of as a real event or danger that can be verified objectively, without 
being confused by subjective and social factors. This is applicable in actuarial, toxicology, 
engineering, probabilistic analysis, and economics of risk (Renn, 2008). Realists believe that 
individuals observe their environment, collect signals, and provide structure to their perceptions 
of different real events, while social constructivists/relativists consider risk as a mental model 
rather than a real phenomenon (Renn, 2008; Zinn, 2008). The link between risk as a mental model 
and reality is forged through the experience of actual harm (Renn, 2008a). According to Renn, a 
social constructivist’s view of risk as a mental model implies differences in how people perceive 
different events. For instance, something that is considered a risk to one person may be considered 
an opportunity to another person. As a result, the ways people respond to different events vary 
according to their perceptions of these events. These two positions represent extremes in a 
spectrum of risk perspectives (Renn, 1996).  
 
3.3.2.Risk society versus riskscapes 
The risk society concept was coined by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck in 1986, in that “the 
modern society has become a risk society in the sense that it is increasingly occupied with 
debating, preventing and managing risks that itself has produced.” Furthermore, according to 
Beck, in advanced modernity, the social production of wealth is accompanied by the social 
production of risk(Beck, 1992), and “modernity is faced with its own destructive potential of social 
and technological development without having adopted adequate answers” (Beck, 2008).  
The other important concept worth mentioning at this point is that of the ‘world risk society’, in 
that “global anticipation of global dangers and catastrophes rocks the foundations of modern 
societies” (Beck, 1992, 2002, 2006, 2008; Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003). The world risk society 
concept was coined to capture global risks such as the side effects of nuclear technology, mad cow 
disease, avian influenza, and terrorism. These risks are the consequences of decisions made in 
modern societies and their global impact, regardless of national states and boundaries. According 
to Beck (2008), global risks have three important characteristics: Delocalization, un-calculability, 
and non-compensability. Global risks are delocalized in the sense that they are present everywhere 
(omnipresent). Un-calculability of global risk implies their consequences are un-calculable and 
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unknown, while the non-compensability of global risk implies the irreversible nature of its 
consequences, which may not be compensated in monetary terms.  
According to Renn (2008), the three characteristics of global risk imply three important 
dimensions: The knowledge and non-knowledge created within society because of global risk, 
spatial variations in terms of their impact on the ultimate victims of these risks, and the inequality 
of the costs and benefits of the risk. Delocalization exposes the temporal, spatial, and social 
delocalization of global risks.The temporal delocalization shows the long-term effects of global 
risks. This dimension of global risks shows a lack of knowledge about the anticipated form of the 
danger, as well as its extent, timing, and duration. It also demonstrates the fact that non-knowledge 
could be greater than knowledge in relation to the impact of global risk to take precautionary 
measures at all levels and reduce potential dangers (Beck, 2002, 2006; Hornidge & Scholtes, 
2011). Spatial delocalization of global risk displays its transcending nature beyond national 
bounderies and on to different nations and regions (Beck, 2006). However, in explaining the 
concept of spatial delocalization, Beck does not go beyond the spread of risks across nations or 
illustrate spatial differences in terms of the level of impact within a given sub-locality in a given 
country. This was rather captured by the concept of riskscapes coined by Detlef Müller-Mahn and 
Jonathan Everts (2013).  
Riskscapes highlight the overlapping risks in a given space, along with different levels of 
influence on different actors in that space. Riskscapes are also about the perception of the different 
dimensions of risk in a given space by different actors, which varies with spaces. The theory of 
riskscapes asserts that while many risks appear global by their very definition, they are still 
embedded in particular landscapes and produce locally perceptible effects. The authors suggest 
using a common framework to analyze risks that happen simultaneously in one location, in order 
to understand better how collectively they shape life and space. Müller-Mahn and Everts (2013) 
argue that different actors with different perspectives can view riskscapes differently from others, 
and there can be a multitude of riskscapes. They explain the fact that “riskscapes viewed by 
different actors from their own perspectives could partially overlap and these riskscapes are 
intrinsically interrelated/connected. These riskscapes could also be conflicting and may create 
controversial socio-spatial images of risk.” Based on this notion and earlier works of Bickerstaff 
and Simons (2009) and November (2004), Müller-Mahn and Evers (2013) criticize Beck’s risk 
society, in that it has less focus on the multiplicity of risks related to the same topic and/or the 
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same place. They also criticize the approaches in which people from different disciplinary 
backgrounds and interests pick a certain aspect of risk out of the multiplicity of risks happening in 
one location and analyze them from their own perspective.  
 
3.4. Evolutionary risk governance framework 
In this study, I developed the concept of evolutionary risk governance framework (ERGF) based 
on the evolutionary governance theory (EGT) (Van Assche et al., 2013). Governance in general is 
usually defined as a form of coordination in taking collectively binding decisions within a certain 
community, involving formal and informal institutions and diverse groups of government and non-
government actors (Beunen et al., 2015; Nye & Donahue, 2000; Van Assche et al., 2013). 
Evolutionary governance theory (EGT) is a theoretical framework for explaining governance from 
evolutionary perspectives (Van Assche et al., 2013). EGT considers governance and its elements 
as constantly changing and emphasizes the co-evolution between discourses, actors, and 
institutions. According to Van Assche et al. (2013), EGT offers a perspective on the ways in which 
institutions, markets, and societies evolve. ERGF is the application of the basic ideas and principles 
of EGT to the perception, assessment, and management of risks at household and community 
levels. Furthermore, it takes note of the fact that family farming households are exposed to several 
ecological and socioeconomic shocks (Suess-Reyes & Fuetsch, 2016). ERGF also underscores the 
fact that risk perception is the result of exposure to shocks/past risks (Gloede et al., 2015), as well 
as socio-cultural, historical, and political factors. These factors could be the results of the actions 
of global or local actors, institutions, or discourses (Figure 3.1). The perceptions and social 
concerns created in such a way influence the ways people assess or judge different sources of risk. 
Depending on the level of access to resources, the knowledge and power relation, and the 
prevailing institutional settings, response strategies against the different sources of risk may also 
follow the perception and assessment of respective sources thereof. When risk management is a 
matter of community governance, of collectively binding decision-making extending beyond a 
small circle, we speak of risk governance. If we consider governance as a set of co-evolving 
configurations of actors, institutions, and forms of knowledge, we speak of evolutionary risk 
governance. If we see governance as co-evolving governance configurations, risk governance has 
to be understood as evolving, too, i.e. one has to understand current perceptions- assessments- 
26 
 
management forms as deriving from pre-existing sets of actors, institutions, and forms of 
knowledge. Knowledge includes here both local and expert knowledge, knowledge structured as 
narrative, and knowledge subtly embedded in narratives. At the center of the evolutionary 
governance framework is risk communication, whereby a farmer needs information at each stage 
of evolving risk governance. 
In communities marked with a high risk of events close to core values and pertinent to 
survival, risk itself is likely to become a topic of controversy and a discursive staple of governance. 
Both the understandings of risk and proposed responses thereto are structured by current actors in 
governance and in the institutional tools they own, in that both are discursive products, the result 
of a narrative, and are interpreted, used, and coordinated by means of other narratives. Since actors, 
institutions, and narratives (as forms of knowledge) co-evolve, this introduces dependencies in risk 
governance. This means that one cannot simply jump from one understanding to another one, from 
one tool or solution to a new one, just as one cannot copy ‘best practice’ from other places, without 
considering contextual issues. 
In order to understand the past, which may have an influence on current and future 
scenarios, ERGF involves the analysis of dependencies (path dependences, interdependences, and 
goal dependences), power/knowledge, and actor/institution configurations.  
Path dependencies refer to the legacies of the past that influence the current (North, 2005; 
Van Assche & Hornidge, 2015). This means the current actors, institutions, knowledge, power 
relations, and access to resources are influenced to some extent by their respective past. 
Interdependence on the governance path refers to interdependence between actors, different 
institutions, and actors and institutions in a governance process (Van Assche et al., 2013). Goal 
dependence, on the other hand, is dependence in the future. It can be considered as a shared vision 
among different actors and different institutions with the aim of achieving a certain common goal, 
which could be ensuring food security, attaining a certain level of per capita income, and so on 
(North, 2005; Van Assche & Hornidge, 2015).  
In this study, institutions are considered a system of established and embedded social rules 
that structure social interactions (Hodgson, 2006). Institutions in this case can be formal, informal, 
or dead (Van Assche et al., 2013). “Formal institutions are the rules that are considered as the ones 
that are supposed to govern interaction in a given situation” (Van Assche & Hornidge, 2015). 
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According to North (1991), informal institutions are “social codes of conduct and socially 
acceptable behaviors that are transmitted through generations involving cooperation, collaborative 
learning and self-organization.” Informal institutions are the results of an evolutionary process in 
which society develops its own codes of conduct, in order to overcome different challenges that 
may not be addressed fully by formal institutions. Tridico (2004) describes informal institutions 
as “carriers of history that have passed the test of historical time.” According to Van Assche et al. 
(2013), formality is the result of power relations in a society in which the most powerful actors 
define the social rules of the game which should be enforced in the overall system. Formal 
institutions are rather “imported” from outside, while informal institutions are self-organized and 
intrinsic to local communities (Stellmacher, 2007). Since formality is the result of power relations, 
a once formal institution may turn out to be informal, and vice versa (Stellmacher, 2007; Van 
Assche & Hornidge, 2015).  
The reality on the ground in Ethiopia shows that rural governance interplays between 
formal and informal institutions (Stellmacher, 2007; Stellmacher & Mollinga, 2009; Stellmacher 
& Nolten, 2010; Stellmacher, 2013). In rural contexts, informal institutions may play a much 
greater role in setting norms and social values, i.e. codes of conduct that guide social interactions 
and peace and stability, than in urban contexts. However, this does not mean that informal 
institutions are substitutes for formal institutions (ibid). In legal pluralism, they can complement 
each other. However, because of power relations in society, formal institutions have a high 
tendency to suppress their informal counterparts or actors implementing the formal institutions 
abusing the informal institutions. This in turn signifies the presence of several different actor-
institution and power-knowledge configurations that influence local livelihoods and social 
interactions in rural areas. Since these configurations are the results of macro- and micro-level 
social and administrative structures, it is mandatory to understand social organizations and the way 
they have evolved over time.  
The need to understand the evolution of social organizations’ structures is not to give a 
simple name, path dependency. Instead, we need to understand how human groups have operated 
in the past and which ‘positive’ aspects have been carried over. It is also vital to understand what 
weaknesses have been felt in the past organization and its functioning, and how it has been 
reshaped in the current organization or which of these negative aspects taken from the past is still 
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influential. Accordingly, in order to paint a clear picture of evolving rural governances, this study 
(in Chapter 5) provides a brief analysis of administrative structures since pre-imperial Ethiopia 
(the Gada administration) in the study areas and up to the current government. This includes 
interactions between different institutions within these systems, the nature of power relations, and 
their implications for the current and future governance.  
The ERGF considers the perceptions and understanding of global and local risks as results 
of evolution (Figure 3.1). In terms of the ERGF, global risks such as climate change are the results 
of the evolutionary process in the society that created them in the first place. The influence of 
global risks on family farmers also depends on the evolutionary processes within the victim’s 
community that enhance the vulnerability of the community and individual households to such 
risks. Furthermore, the ERGF considers the fact that the perceptions of individual households and 
communities are the result of evolution of the knowledge system, in a community being shaped by 
the power/knowledge configuration in that society.  
Additionally, the ERGF understands the local contexts in which communities operate, 
including social structures, institutions and actors, discourses, political and cultural settings of the 
society, household resources (human, natural, social, financial, and physical resources), 
technologies, and capabilities of family farmers from an evolutionary perspective. Due to the 
exposure of farmers to different shocks in the past, and the different risk management strategies in 
response to these different shocks, the ERGF underscores that risk governance strategies co-evolve 
with the different institutional and political settings the society undergoes. This means that the 
perceptions of individual farmers about different risks are the result of lessons acquired over time, 
due to their exposure to similar shocks in the past and the way these shocks were managed. 
Perceptions set in such a way continue to influence farmers’ assessments, which in turn influence 
their management strategies of similar risks in the future (Figure 3.1).  
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Source: Own sketch based on Renn (2009) 
Figure 3.1: Evolutionary risk governance framework 
The risk management strategies of farmers include their ‘choice of livelihood’ strategies in 
response to perceived risks. Taking this into account, I argue that the perceptions of family farming 
households in Ethiopia for different risks influence their choice of different livelihood strategies. 
This being the case, the ERGF injects pathways of influence of risk perception of households on 
their choice of livelihood strategies in the sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) (Scoones, 
1998).  
According to the SLF,9 the choice of livelihood strategy is influenced mainly by a 
household’s access to livelihood assets (Norton & Foster, 2001a; Scoones, 1998). The SLF also 
stresses the importance of the vulnerability context in which people’s livelihoods and the 
availability of assets are affected by critical trends, shocks, and seasonality over which they have 
                                                          
9 The schematic outline of the SLF and its modification using ERGF are presented in Appendix 2. 
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limited control. The SLF underscores the role of transforming structures and processes (actors, 
institutions, and culture) in shaping livelihoods by determining access to different forms of capital, 
terms of exchange between capitals , and returns on any given livelihood strategy. However, the 
SLF does not indicate the role of these shocks, trends, seasonality, actors, institutions, and access 
to resources on the perceptions of risks that people may face and how they intend to manage these 
risks, including their choice of different livelihood strategies. From the ERGF perspective, I argue 
that trends indicated in the SLF (population trends, resource trends, national/international 
economic trends, governance, and technological), shocks, and seasonality form the basis of the 
risk perception of households. The risk perception of households in turn plays a key role in 
household’s choice of different livelihood strategies, which form their risk management strategies, 
in order to achieve their livelihood outcomes, reducing food insecurity in this case.  
As indicated in Figure 3.1, risk communication is at the center of the evolutionary 
governance process. This shows both the day-to-day communication of the perceived risk of food 
insecurity within the community and references to past events in terms of the historical 
experiences, how they were assessed, and coping strategies. The community tends to scan national, 
regional, and global issues to its best ability and associate them with their livelihoods and food 
security.  
Figure 3.2 presents the conceptual framework showing how different factors influence the 
risk perceptions of households and the later in turn affect household’s choice of livelihood 
strategies. The picture that I want to portray in this conceptual framework is the causality between 
boxes 4 (risk perception) and 5 (the choice of livelihood strategies) and their linkage to other 
elements of the sustainable livelihoods framework. As stipulated in the DFID’s sustainable 
livelihoods framework, a household’s choice of livelihood strategy is affected by its access to the 
five livelihood capital (arrow a). The vulnerability context (box 2) affects households access to 
this livelihood capital (arrow b), and structures and processes (box 3) affect a household’s access 
to resources, the terms of exchange between the different forms of asset and return on the 
livelihood strategy (arrow c). The heart of our argument lies in risk perception (box 4). Access to 
resources (arrow d), exposure to different shocks (arrow e), and institutions and actors in place to 
mitigate the different shocks (arrow f) shape the perceptions of people over time. One of these 
perceptions could be about sources of food insecurity risk (box 4), which in turn influences the 
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choice of different livelihood strategies (arrow g), in order to achieve livelihood outcomes (arrow 
h). The level of achievement of livelihood outcomes at larger scale in turn endogenously influences 
the types of institutions and actors in place (arrow m) and the level of access these households 
have to capital (arrow o) (Babulo et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from DFID’s sustainable livelihood framework (Norton & Foster, 2001b) 
Figure 3.2: Modified sustainable livelihoods framework from an evolutionary risk governance 
perspective 
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4. Rural development policies and strategies in Ethiopia  
 
This chapter presents a review of rural development policies and strategies in Ethiopia since the 
imperial regime (1880s to 1974). The information in this chapter is used as a springboard for issues 
related to risk governance in subsequent chapters. Despite the fact that rural development includes 
all development activities, including agriculture, rural health and education services, water supply, 
and other rural infrastructures, this study focuses on issues related to agricultural development, 
such as land tenure and land use, agricultural input supply, credit and extension services, 
agricultural marketing, and food security policies and strategies.  
 
4.1. Land policies and strategies during the different regimes 
4.1.1. The imperial regime (1890s to 1974) 
The complex land tenure system during the imperial governments of Ethiopia can be broadly 
categorized into the communal land tenure system, or rist, the ‘private’ tenure system, or gult, the 
church and state-owned lands (Rahmato, 1984; Rahimato, 2009; Stahl, 1974).  
 
The rist system  
Rist is a tenure system in which individual members of a community gain access to land according 
to their blood ties to the founding fathers of that community (Allen Hoben, 1973; Jemma, 2004; 
Stahl, 1974). The rist system was commonly practiced in the northern part of the country, including 
Gojam, Gondar, Tigray, Wello, and North Shewa. In the rist system, members of the living 
generation had a usage right to parcels of land they inherited from their parents, but they could not 
sell or use the plots to mortgage them, since actual ownership was vested in the founding father 
(Stahl, 1974). In return for using the land, each user was required to pay different forms of tax, 
including tribute and tithe (Daiel Weldegebriel, 2012). The rist system encouraged the extreme 
fragmentation of agricultural lands, since land was redistributed whenever new, legitimate kin 
members made a claim over the land. Consequently, tenancies were not widespread in the northern 
part of the country (Rahmato, 1984).  
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The gult system 
Gult is a private form of land tenure arrangement that flourished after the expansion of the 
Ethiopian empire to the south during the second half of the 19th century, which involved 
confiscating the land holdings of native peasants and leaving them landless tenants and servants 
of the new landowners (Weldegebriel, 2012). Unlike the rist system, gult was not the right to hold 
land but the right to collect tribute from users of that land (tenants). The gult right was usually 
granted to those who provided loyal services to the crown. It was a form of salary/maderia or 
recognition for loyal services, with recipients empowered to collect taxes or tribute from people 
on gult property and to exercise administrative and judicial authority in the area (Rahmato 1984; 
Rahmato 2009). The gult estates were worked by peasants who paid tribute to use the land. The 
owners of the gult right had the right to transfer this right to their heirs but were not given the right 
to sell or mortgage it. However, through land grant arrangements, the imperial government granted 
free gult (which could be sold or mortgaged) in 1942 to different members of society such as the 
military, i.e. those who provided special services to the crown, public servants, and landless loyal 
citizens (Stahl, 1974).  
Though gult and land obtained through the imperial land grant arrangement were known 
as private lands, the ultimate power over the land remained with the crown. The owner of the land 
exercised ownership rights as long as she/he remained loyal to the crown, even when the land was 
obtained through the land grant arrangement. Rahmato explains the ultimate power of the state 
over this land as follows:  
“Land under private tenures was private not in the strictly capitalist but in the specifically 
Ethiopian term. What the state has granted and virtually all land under private tenures was 
originally state property. The state could take away land so far as the authority of the state was 
concerned, the, the latter had the right to claim land held under private ownership, and to 
dispossess any person or landholding institution”(Rahmato, 1984, p.19). 
Tenants were peasants that cultivated gult land on a rental basis. Rent paid by these tenants 
to landowners varied from one-third to two-thirds of the total production on the land according to 
the contribution of the landowner in terms of farm implements, inputs, and oxen. In addition to 
land rent, tenants were expected to pay tithe as compensation for the land tax that the landowner 
paid to the government and the provision of labor services (Stahl, 1974). Tenants were also 
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expected to visit the landowners during the holidays and provide gifts (sheep, chicken, butter, etc.). 
Tenants were not compensated for improving the value of their leased land by planting trees or 
using other conservation methods. Rather, landowners would increase the land rent because of 
increased fertility (ibid). 
 
Semon/church land 
Semon is the vast area of land that belonged to the Ethiopian Coptic Church during imperial times. 
The church distributed semon land to its clergies and others that supported its services (Rahmato, 
1984, 2009b; Stahl, 1974), and these in turn were allowed to lease it to others. The holders of the 
church land could transfer their use right to their heirs but could not sell or mortgage it. The holder 
of the church land and their heirs continued using the church land as long as they accepted the 
terms of the church and continued serving it. Church land was estimated to make up 10-12 percent 
of the total land area in the country (Rahmato 1984, 2009).  
 
State land 
State held vast tracts of agricultural land throughout the country and especially in the southern 
regions. All land in the southern part of the country was state-owned before it was distributed to 
people in the form of madeira/salary or other forms (Weldegebriel, 2012). Apart from the 
distribution of land for political purposes, to buy support and loyalty and to threaten and discourage 
opposition by dispossessing and evicting them from the land, the state was the major actor in 
leasing to tenants (Rahmato, 1984; Stahl, 1974). This means that land during the imperial regime 
was used as a means to run the state machinery in two important ways. The first method involved 
giving out land to buy the loyalty of influential people or as recognition of the loyal service given 
to the crown. The state also leased out land to tenants and collected taxes on it. This means that 
land was the major source of state power and wealth. 
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Land reforms during the imperial regime and efforts at modernization 
Along with the land grant arrangement, the imperial government introduced successive tax 
legislations in 1942 and 1944, the objectives of which were to convert in-kind taxes into cash and 
raise government revenue. The legislation was successful in raising some amount of tax; however, 
the amount did not grow as much as government expenditure, mainly because the legislation was 
effective only in the southern parts of the country. The church and government holdings were free 
from tax. However, the legislation increased the burden of the tenants, because landowners 
transferred the tax obligation to them (Stahl, 1974). The 1967 tax reform also failed, because the 
government was not able to pressurize the landlords due to the fear of losing their loyalty 
(Rahmato, 1984a; Rahmato, 2009; Stahl, 1974; Daiel Weldegebriel, 2012). In general, being the 
major owner of agricultural land on its own, and through its loyal figures, the government could 
not implement any land reforms because of the conflict of interest in implementing them 
(Weldegebriel, 2012).  
As a result of the failure to implement tax reforms to collect local revenue, the government 
had to resort to external sources to finance its development projects in the form of loans and foreign 
direct investment. The government was successful in securing external financial and technical 
supports that were implemented through the three successive five year plans (Cohen, 1987; Stahl, 
1974).  The details of the plans and their controversies in agricultural development will be 
discussed in the next subsection. 
 
The first and second five-year development plans 
The first five-year plan (1957-1962) focused on investments in transportation, communication, 
electric power, manufacturing, housing, and education (Aredo, 1990; Rahmato, 2009a; Shiferaw, 
2014). The strategy of this plan for agriculture focused on surveying the irrigation potential of the 
country’s major rivers, developing a sugar factory, improving farm labor productivity on 
commercial farms, and stimulating the export-oriented livestock industry (Cohen, 1987). The 
second five-year development plan (1963-1968) gave priority to investment in manufacturing, 
mining, and electricity. The proposed investment in the agricultural sector during the second five-
year plan was intended largely to promote commercial farming, but the plan document called for 
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progressive tenancy and landownership reforms acknowledging at least the major constraints 
hampering the development of smallholder production (Cohen, 1987).  
The development of peasant agriculture was neglected in the first and second five year 
plans, mainly because of the prevailing theories of dual economy models which consider 
agriculture as a means for growth in other sectors (Aredo, 1990a; Cohen, 1987; Stommes & Sisaye, 
1979; Tecle, 1975). The dual models suggest the development of large-scale commercial farms to 
feed the urban population, provide raw materials for industry, and release capital to other sectors 
through the production of export commodities. As a result, the peasant agriculture was totally 
overlooked. A small proportion of investment allocated to the agricultural sector during this period 
was allocated to development of large-scale commercial farms producing export commodities and 
raw materials for domestic industries. Hence, the first two development plans focused on 
investment in infrastructure, manufacturing and technology, and plantation agriculture (Aredo, 
1990; Cohen, 1987; H. Kassa, 2008). The important point here is that the content of the plans was 
dictated by the prevailing global development discourses and the interests of donors, which 
highlights the role of actors and institutions in development governance. In this case, global actors, 
mainly donors and discourses, influenced the plans and guided the country’s development in their 
own direction.   
 
The third five-year development plan (1968-1973) 
The third five-year development plan (1968-1973) saw a marked difference to the first two five-
year plans, in that it recognized the importance of the agricultural sector and introduced a relatively 
clearer agricultural development strategy. However, this plan also continued to consider large 
commercial farms as key to agricultural progress (Shiferaw, 2014; Stommes & Sisaye, 1979) until 
donors and development partners fought hard to write into the plan that priority be given to 
smallholder agriculture (Cohen, 1987; Stommes & Sisaye, 1979). Thus, the shift of policy with 
regard to the development of smallholder agriculture was the result of i) changes in global 
development theories regarding the role of smallholder agriculture, ii) experience gained from 
implementing the first two five-year plans, and iii) changes in donor policies which resulted in 
pressure from development partners such as United States agencies, the World Bank and FAO 
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(Aredo, 1990; Cohen, 1987; Kassa, 2003). Thus, the third five-year development plan gave priority 
to agricultural development and tried to promote both smallholder and large commercial farming.  
 
4.1.2. The Dergue regime (1974 to 1991) 
Following a mass uprising, due to the repressive land tenure system, the 1973 famine, and other 
causes, the military junta, ‘Dergue’, overthrew the imperial regime in 1974. Coming to power in 
the wake of mass starvation, the Dergue government attempted to address the issue of hunger 
through increased production. To achieve this aim, it introduced three important reforms aimed at 
state-led growth in agriculture: land reform, collectivization, and a narrow sectoral and 
geographical concentration of investment (Webb & Von Braun, 1994). In an attempt to respond to 
the basic grievances of the peasants, redistribute income, and stimulate agricultural growth, 
proclamation number 31 of 1975 abolished the private ownership of land, thereby granting 
smallholder farmers access to a maximum of 10 hectares of land under the auspices of peasant 
associations (PAs). The reform restricted the land market in all forms, including mortgages, and 
no-one was allowed to transfer land use rights to others except when the holder of the land use 
right (father or mother) died, in which case the children inherited it. This reform also restricted the 
labor market, in that no-one was allowed to hire agricultural labor except when the owner of the 
land use right was sick or could not accomplish any farming activities due to old age, or if widows 
could not accomplish the farming activity. The land proclamation also included provisions for the 
establishment of the PAs, which were low-level government bodies administering up to 800 
hectares of land with a membership of 250 to 270 households. Some of the mandates of the PAs 
were to distribute land, establish marketing and service cooperatives, undertake villagization 
programs, and administer and conserve public properties within their area. Though land reform 
resolved tenant-landlord relations and ensured land use rights to millions of landless poor, it was 
not successful in increasing food production and eradicating famine from Ethiopia, mainly because 
of policies surrounding grain marketing, collectivization, and other related strategies (Stellmacher 
2007; Rahmato, 2009). 
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4.1.3.  The Current regime (1991 to present) 
Land tenure policies of the current regime are more or less similar to those devised by the Dergue 
regime (Rahmato, 2004). The peculiar feature of current land policy, however, is that it is 
enshrined in the constitution of the country, with Article 40 stating that “Ethiopian farmers have 
the right to obtain land without payment and the protection against eviction from their possession.” 
Land still belongs to the state, and peasants have only the usufruct right over land in their 
possession but cannot sell it or exchange it for a mortgage. The current land policy allows for the 
transfer of the land use right to heirs and the use of hired labor for farming activities. In addition, 
it maintains the periodic redistribution of land, in order to address landlessness among the younger 
generation. However, regional legislations limit redistribution of land to irrigable lands, and some 
regions like Oromia have specified that a person cannot have more than 0.5 hectares of irrigable 
land. Holders of a rural land use right maintain it if and only if they conserve it and continue using 
this land. If a land use right holder is absent from the kebele for more than two consecutive years, 
the local administration considers that she/he has willingly left the land and transfer the use right 
of it to other landless residents ( Rahmato, 2004).  
The major divergence of the current land policy from that of the Dergue regime is its shift 
towards large commercial farming. The current government supports the development of 
smallholder farmers through its intensive agricultural extension program. However, following the 
issuance of more elaborate rural policies and strategies in 2002 (EFDR, 2003), the government 
showed interest in expanding large commercial farming concerns. The assumption made was based 
on the availability of non-utilized agricultural lands in lowland areas of the country. However, 
when it came to implementation, the huge demands for agricultural land in the highland areas 
competed for plots occupied by smallholder farmers (Rahmato, 2004, 2008, 2009). As stipulated 
in the land legislation, the government had the right to evict holders of land user rights when a 
certain land was found to be more important for public services or large investments. The 
government issued and enacted proclamation numbers 455/2005 and 456/2005 to determine the 
amount of compensation to be paid to farmers, to be evicted from their holdings. However, there 
was a complaint that the amount of compensation was far too small and that this would endanger 
their livelihoods. This is believed to be one of the causes of the mass protests in the Oromia region 
in 2015/2016.  
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4.2. Agricultural extension policies during the different regimes 
4.2.1. The imperial regime 
The formal agricultural extension in Ethiopia was started in the early 1950s with the establishment 
of the Imperial Ethiopian College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts (IECAMA, the current 
Haramaya University) with the assistance of the United States of America under the Point Four 
Program (Kassa, 2003). When the college was founded, it was given the mandate to develop and 
deliver a national program in agricultural extension. With the restructuring of the system and the 
establishment of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1963, the mandate for agricultural extension was 
transferred from the college to the Ministry of Agriculture (Kassa 2008). This made organizing 
the extension service as one of the departments in the ministry at the national level, and the ministry 
assigned extension agents and supervisors at the provincial level (Kassa 2003; Kassa 2008).  
As mentioned above, the third five-year development plan (1968-1973) promoted the 
development of smallholder agriculture. However, given the limited financial and trained human 
resources to cover the whole country at a time, the government decided to use comprehensive 
package approaches. This involved promoting intensive agricultural development in strategically 
selected, promising areas where results could be achieved easily so that these results and 
technologies could be disseminated to other farmers through demonstrations and social networks 
(Aredo 1990; Cohen 1987; Kassa 2003). 
 
The comprehensive package programs 
The first comprehensive package program implemented in Ethiopia was the Chillalo Agricultural 
Development Unit (CADU), which was later expanded into the Arsi Rural Development Unit 
(ARDU) and finally included the Bale region and became the Bale-Arsi Rural Development Unit 
(BARDU). CADU started in 1967 with funding from the Swedish International Development 
Agency (SIDA). The major objectives of CADU and similar comprehensive package projects were 
to raise the real incomes of smallholders, elicit their participation and that of local government 
officials in rural development efforts, generate additional employment opportunities, and narrow 
prevailing income disparities in rural areas (Tecle, 1975). CADU was an integrated rural 
development program aimed at the integration of crop and livestock production, agronomic 
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research, the dissemination of research results, the provision of modern farm inputs, marketing 
and credit facilities, the development of rural infrastructure (such as roads), input supply (improved 
seeds and fertilizer), home economics, and the promotion of cooperative societies (Cohen, 1987). 
CADU was an overarching socioeconomic development designed to draw lessons for scaling out 
to other parts of the country. The program trained farmers through field days on demonstration 
plots, managed by extension agents, and through model farms (Cohen 1987; Kassa 2003; Kassa 
2008). Based on the experiences of CADU, other autonomous comprehensive package projects, 
with varying objectives and approaches, were established during the third five-year plan period, 
though only CADU was fully operational until it phased out in 1986 (Kassa, 2008; Kelemework 
& Kassa, 2006).  
 
The minimum package program 
Based on the experiences of CADU, the imperial government of Ethiopia realized that 
comprehensive package programs were too costly in terms of finance and trained human resources 
for expansion at the national level (Kassa 2008). As a result, the first nationwide agricultural 
extension program, the Minimum Package Program I (MPP-I), was launched in 1971. MPP-I was 
prepared for the period 1971-1979 with the financial assistance of SIDA and was designed to 
provide smallholder farmers with services considered to be the minimum essential elements for 
agricultural development, including credit, marketing, and the dissemination of innovations such 
as improved seed, fertilizer, and the provision of extension advice (Tecle 1975; Kassa 2003; Kassa 
2008). It was planned that MPP-I should cover the whole country by the end of the 1970s. Ten 
project areas, each addressing 10,000 households within a 10km radius of all-weather roads, were 
to be covered each year (Aredo, 1990). An implementation structure for MMP-I, namely the 
Extension and Project Implementation Department (EPID), was established in the Ministry of 
Agriculture. EPID had the mandate to administer both comprehensive projects and MPP-I and 
gradually phase out the comprehensive programs (Kassa 2003). Similar to the comprehensive 
packages, MPP-I used demonstration plots and model farmers to train farmers.  
MPP-I established 55 minimum package areas, with 346 development centers in 280 
woredas out of the total 580 woredas in the country (Mengisteab 1990). However, it failed to bring 
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about intended improvements in the agricultural sector because of the failure of the government to 
reform the restraining land tenure system, tenant-landlord relationships, and other administrative 
bottlenecks in government bureaucracy (Mengisteab 1990; Kassa 2003). As a result, MPP-I gave 
minimum attention to the livestock sector, did not benefit smallholders, and was not able to reach 
the vast majority of farmers (Kelemework & Kassa, 2006).  
Though the government initiated the comprehensive package and minimum package 
projects during the third five-year plan to reach smallholder farmers, the land tenure system in 
place diverted the intended course of the projects, and the major clients of the extension became 
landlords and smallholder farmers only around the project areas (Kassa 2003; Kassa 2008). 
Tenants were required to provide the official land lease agreement and the consent of the 
landowner in order to gain access to the package projects’ credit program. However, since the 
landlords were reluctant to take responsibility, they were not willing to provide their consent, and 
so this excluded smallholder peasants from accessing technology and credit facilities. As a result, 
the package projects benefited the landed big farmers and the landlords instead of the smallholder 
farmers that were the major targets of the package projects (Kassa 2008; Tecle 1975). 
 
4.2.2. The Dergue regime 
In 1978, the Dergue enacted cooperative legislation and demanded farmers be organized in service 
and producers’ cooperatives. This shifted the focus of government interventions, including 
extension activities that used model individual smallholder farmers as focal points for service and 
producer cooperatives when introducing innovations (Kassa, 2008). The Minimum Package 
Program-I continued during the post-revolution period for four years, but its implementation and 
further expansion were constrained due to political instability, which resulted in government 
change and the reluctance of donors to release funds according to the schedule (Aredo, 1990). This 
reluctance also affected the launching of the Minimum Package Project-II (MPP-II 1981-1984), 
which was delayed by the World Bank for two years and finally came into action in 1981 (Kassa 
2008). 
Affected by the socialist ideology of the new government, MPP-II was ambitious in terms 
of its objectives and geographical coverage (Besha and Park 2014; Kassa 2008). It was expected 
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to co-ordinate various government activities, such as establishing farmers’ organizations, 
improving crop and livestock productivity, and developing rural infrastructure in 440 woredas 
across the nation. With the advent of MPP-II, EPID was dissolved and the responsibility for 
coordinating extension services was given to commodity-based departments in the newly re-
organized Ministry of Agriculture, such as crop production and protection, livestock production, 
forestry development and cooperative promotion departments. This resulted in the fragmentation 
of efforts, weak integration, multiple chains of command and the proliferation of administrative 
staff, bureaucratization, and confusion regarding the management, coordination, and supervision 
of extension activities (Kassa 2008). MPP-II was not successful, mainly because of a shortage of 
extension personnel to cover all parts of the country, budget constraints, and the overloading of 
extension agents with extra activities such as collecting tax and loan repayments and promoting 
farmers’ cooperatives (Besha & Park, 2014; Kassa, 2003; Kassa, 2008).  
In 1986, MPP-II phased out and replaced by a new program, the Peasant Agricultural 
Development Program (PADEP). PADEP classified the country into eight development zones but 
was successful in securing foreign funding for high potential (surplus producing) areas of 
northwestern Ethiopia, eastern and southeastern Ethiopia, and central Ethiopia, and was 
implemented in 148 woredas in these areas (Kassa, 2003; Kassa, 2008). PADEP used the modified 
Training and Visit (T&V) extension approach that was piloted in six woredas in 1983, based on 
India’s experiences and adopted by MOA as an extension management system in major surplus-
producing areas of the country. In this system, an extension agent was assigned to serve 1,300 
households through contact farmers in surplus-producing areas, and 2,500 households in non-
surplus-producing areas (Kassa, 2003; Kassa, 2008). 
The major objectives of PADEP were increasing food production (at least to the level of 
self-sufficiency), increasing the production of cash crops for export and raw materials for domestic 
industries, increasing employment opportunities in rural areas, promoting rural cooperatives, and 
environmental protection for sustainable development. Since poor linkages between research and 
extension systems was considered one of the major constraints for the success of the extension 
work, PADEP established research-extension liaison committees at national and zonal levels in 
1986 (Kelemework & Kassa, 2006). However, because of the ideological orientation of the 
Marxist government, PADEP gave priority to producers’ cooperatives in the dissemination of 
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inputs and extension services, and smallholder farmers were left out (Besha & Park, 2014; Kassa, 
2003). 
 
4.2.3. The current regime 
The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) adopted the Agricultural Development Led 
Industrialization (ADLI) as its development strategy in 1994. ADLI is the umbrella strategy, with 
the main goal of attaining fast and broad-based economic growth, using agriculture as the major 
engine of growth by generating necessary resources for industrial development. ADLI was later 
rationalized in the form of the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program 
(SDPRP), 2002/03-2004/05; a Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
(PASSDEP), 2005/06-2009/10); the Growth and Transformation Plan-I (GTP-I), 2010-2015; and 
Growth and Transformation Plan-II (GTP-II), 2016-2020.  
With regard to the extension program of the country, PADEP continued to serve for four 
years until ADLI was adopted, and it was replaced by a new extension program in 1995. The 
initiative that created the foundations for the new extension program started in 1993, when 
Sasakawa Africa Association and Global 2000 (SG-2000) of the Carter Center initiated a pilot 
extension service program on 160 farmers’ maize and wheat extension management training plots 
(EMTPs) in Oromia and in SNNPR regional states (Kassa, 2008). The pilot EMTPs projects of 
SG-2000 demonstrated the possibility to double or triple maize and wheat yields through intensive 
input use and the proper management of crops. In 1994, the SG-2000 pilot project expanded to the 
Tigray and Amhara regional states, and technologies for maize, wheat, tef, and sorghum were 
demonstrated to 1,600 farmers (Kassa, 2003). The success of the SG-2000 pilot project convinced 
the TGE to adopt its Participatory Demonstration and Training Extension System (PADETES) as 
a national extension intervention program (NEIP), which was launched in 1995 (Kassa, 2003; 
Kassa, 2008; Kelemework & Kassa, 2006). Unlike all of the earlier extension programs 
implemented in Ethiopia, the government financed PADETES.  
The major objectives of PADETES included increasing agricultural production to ensure 
food self-sufficiency, increasing the production of industrial and export crops, improving the 
productivity and incomes of the rural population, conserving and developing natural resources, 
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and empowering farmers to participate actively in the development process (Kassa, 2003). 
PADETES was based on the package approach promoting the research-extension and input-credit 
linkages (Kassa, 2003; Kassa, 2008; Kelemework & Kassa, 2006; Quiñones et al., 1997). Initially, 
it promoted cereal production packages in high-rainfall areas of the country, but the packages were 
diversified to address farmers in all agro-ecological zones over many years, with the intention of 
providing smallholder farmers with the menu of technology packages (ibid). 
The number of participating farmers increased from 35,000 at the beginning of PADETES 
to 5.1 million at the end of the initiative in 2009/10 (MoANR, 2017). Understanding the fact that 
a shortage of extension agents would limit the success of PADETES, their training was conducted 
through technical and vocational education training centers (TVETs). As a result, the number of 
extension agents increased from 2,500 in 1995 to 55,000 in 2013 (Besha & Park, 2014). The ratio 
of extension agents to farmers also declined from 1:1200 in the MPP-II era to 1:120 (Kelemework 
& Kassa, 2006). In general, PADETES reached many farmers equitably and increased the number 
of participant households in extension packages, the use of fertilizer and improved seeds, and the 
production and productivity of grains in some areas (Davis et al., 2010). However, it is criticized 
for its supply-driven approach, with the majority of the packages focusing on crop production, and 
its narrow focus on cereals while limiting its attention to cash crops and livestock. Despite its wider 
coverage, the incomplete use of packages with 75 percent dis-adoption and limited participation 
of women farmers, is also mentioned as a limitation (ibid). 
In 2010, a new extension program, known as the Participatory Extension System (PES), 
was introduced following the commencement of the first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP-
I). PES was a modification of PADETES in which the community was organized in one-in-five 
and development groups. These social organizations were pursued in the agricultural extension 
with the motive of ensuring the adoption of the full package of technologies through closer follow 
up, using a command post of experts in each kebele and strong social networks. Accordingly, the 
number of participants in the extension program increased from 5.1 million farmers at the 
beginning of PES in 2009/10 to 13.8 million in 2014/15(MoANR, 2017).  
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4.3. Agricultural marketing policies and strategies during different regimes 
4.3.1.The imperial regime 
During the imperial regime, markets were characterized by a high share of marketed cereals in 
total production, limited government intervention, and high transportation costs (Rashid & 
Negassa, 2012). The high share of marketed cereals during this regime was due to the land tenure 
system, which kept most of the land in the hands of large landlords, the church, and government 
authorities. Smallholders leased land from owners and paid rent in kind or cash. As a result, the 
marketed ‘surplus’ was higher than what had been observed during the other two regimes 
(Holmberg, 1977; Rashid & Negassa, 2012). 
The imperial government established the Ethiopian Grain Board (EGB) in 1950. The EGB 
functioned as a regulatory body with a primary emphasis on export licensing, quality control, 
supervision of the marketing intelligence, and the regulation of domestic and export purchases and 
sales. The EGB did not hold stocks, since it was not involved in buying and selling activities. In 
1960, the Ethiopian Grain Corporation (EGC) was established with the mandate to stabilize grain 
prices and engage in imports and exports. It was established to facilitate the grain export trade 
particularly, since Ethiopia was a net grain exporter up to the beginning of the 1960s (Aredo, 1990; 
Holmberg, 1977; Tecle, 197). The main focus of the government on the export market was 
indicated in a proclamation for the establishment of the corporation, which stated “EGC 
encourages the production of agricultural products throughout the country by providing an assured 
market where such products may find ready sale at prevailing world prices” (PGE, 1976). The 
objectives of the EGC, as stipulated in the legislation, also highlighted the intent of the government 
to be involved in the stabilization of grain markets. However, the EGC could not deliver fully its 
expected services, since it suffered from a shortage of working capital, a lack of adequate market 
information, and profitability problems (Rashid & Negassa, 2012). 
 
4.3.2.The Dergue regime 
In line with the prevailing socialist ideology, markets during the Dergue regime were controlled 
by the state. To this end, the government effected different measures to control all production and 
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marketing activities in the country. According to Franzel et al. (1989), drives to take control of the 
agricultural markets were both ideological and pragmatic. Ideologically, the state believed that 
traders exploited producers and urban consumers, so intervention was needed to get rid of this 
practice. The pragmatic aspect was the declining grain supply, which in turn resulted in higher 
prices for urban consumers and triggered the eventual establishment of the Agricultural Marketing 
Corporation (AMC) in 1976.  
The principal objective of the AMC was to execute the government’s policy in the fields 
of grain marketing, the procurement and distribution of inputs, and the maintenance of national 
grain reserves (The Provisional Militrary Government of Ethiopia (PGE), 1976). The corporation 
was responsible for handling almost all aspects of agricultural input and output markets. The 
import and export of agricultural products, buying and selling inputs, processing and marketing 
finished products for profit or otherwise also came under the umbrella of the corporation. In 
addition, it was given the power to construct, equip, and maintain buildings, silos, storage facilities, 
and other structures and machinery (PGE, 1976). In the mid-1980s, 30-40 percent of the nation’s 
marketable surplus of all grains was purchased by the AMC (Franzel et al., 1989). This grain was 
supplied to state organizations and urban dwellers at prices below the prevailing price in parallel 
markets (ibid).  
Franzel et al. (1989) indicated that AMC prices reduced farmers’ incomes and their 
incentives to use improved inputs, and eventually decreased grain production. The pricing system 
also promoted the production and marketing of low-quality products, since there was no incentive 
to supply clean, high-quality grain to the AMC. The parallel market was also distorted, because 
the activity of private traders was restricted. The restriction of interregional trade limited 
producers’ access to higher market prices, consumers’ access to markets with lower grain prices, 
and the national economy at large (ibid). These policies also fueled the food insecurity and hunger 
problems of 1984 by restricting people’s access to markets and the free movement of grain to areas 
experiencing food deficits. According to Degefe and Tafesse (1990), the development of 
marketing and pricing policies during the military government would be divided into the following 
three phases. 
Phase I (1974-1979): During this period, the government tried to stabilize grain prices through a 
series of legislative price controls (fixing grain prices). However, the prices fixed by the 
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government were not attractive to producers and resulted in grain supply to the market falling 
below an increase in demand (Degefe & Tafesse, 1990). During this time, the AMC was competing 
with private traders in an open marketing system.  
Phase II (1979-1987): In 1979, the government stopped relying solely on its price control system 
and developed a mechanism through which urban consumers would be supplied with grain at 
stabilized, official prices. The quota system was developed in such a way that all state farms sold 
their products directly to the AMC at government-established prices. Smallholder farmers were 
forced to sell at fixed prices to the AMC until they fulfilled the quota set for their peasant 
association, and thereafter they were free to sell on the free market (Franzel et al., 1989). Private 
traders were not allowed to move more than 100 kg of grain from one region to the other before 
the AMC quota in their region was fulfilled. Traders were also required to sell a proportion of their 
purchases to the AMC at the fixed AMC price (which was less than half of the prevailing market 
price) as a pre-condition to getting a permit to transport grain from region to region (Degefe & 
Tafesse, 1990; Franzel et al., 1989). Purchase prices for the AMC were determined centrally for 
all regions of the country, and they were uniform throughout the nation (Degefe and Tafesse 1990). 
Farmers who failed to supply their quota were not allowed to use the service cooperatives’ shops 
(the main suppliers of non-agricultural commodities and farm inputs) and ultimately were deprived 
of their land use right. As a consequence of these sanctions, farmers who fail to fulfill their AMC 
quota from their produce bought grain from local markets and then submitted it to the AMC 
(Degefe & Tafesse, 1990; Franzel et al., 1989; Teferi & others, 1992). 
In 1983, revision was made to the quota assignments. In the revised system, private traders 
were compelled to sell 50 percent of their total purchases to the AMC at fixed prices (Degefe & 
Tafesse, 1990). Traders were instructed to sell the stated proportion of their produce within 24 
hours of their purchase, and they were not allowed to hold grain in stock beyond a specific period 
of time. In some places, traders were totally banned from the grain market (ibid). After some time, 
the quota for farmers was changed from a flat quota assignment to one that took production into 
account. In this system, an annual purchase plan was worked out at the center and given to the 
AMC as its annual purchase quota. Since the revision of market operations overlapped with the 
great famine of 1984, it is believed that these market regulations exacerbated the situation greatly 
(Franzel et al., 1989). The impact of market regulations is not only in terms of access to better 
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supply markets but also their contribution to decline in the livelihood of farmers and eventual 
entitlement failure (Sen, 1981).  
Phase III (1987-1991): In 1987, because of increasing external pressure from donors, internal 
political pressure, worsening economic conditions, and ideological and economic policy changes 
in USSR and Eastern European socialist states that were its strong allies, the socialist government 
started to introduce changes in its grain marketing policies (Degefe & Tafesse, 1990). The AMC 
was restructured in 1987 by removing its mandates for the direct export of grains, the import of 
agricultural products, and the purchase and sale of inputs through Legal Notice 103/1987. Based 
on the suggestions of a task force, the government increased the price of all grains. In 1988, traders 
in all regions were given trade permits to move beyond the regional border as long as they 
submitted 50 percent of their purchases to the AMC. In 1990, the government made major reforms 
to the grain marketing system, including the removal of grain movement restrictions, the abolition 
of quota deliveries, and the elimination of the AMC’s power monopoly.  
 
4.3.3. The current regime 
After a change of government in 1991, the new Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) government launched various reforms in the agricultural marketing system. One 
of the reforms was reorganizing and restructuring government parastatals, including the 
Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC). In 1992, the AMC was re-established as an 
autonomous public enterprise that operated on the open market in competition with the private 
sector with a new name: The Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE). The mandates of the 
EGTE upon its reorganization included stabilizing prices, with the objectives of encouraging 
production and protecting consumers from price shocks, and earning foreign exchange through 
exporting grain to the world market. In addition, it was also expected to maintain strategic food 
reserves for disaster response and emergency food security operations. As per its mandate, the 
EGTE intervened in the maize market when prices collapsed below production costs in 1995/96 
and 1996/97 (Bekele, 2002). The EGTE tried to stabilize the market by setting floor prices in 1996 
and exporting 48,000 tons of maize grain in 1997. What is important to note here is that producers 
in high-potential areas suffered from a large decline in grain prices, which fell below production 
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costs, while over two million people in drought-prone areas needed emergency food aid (ibid). 
This means the government was involved in exporting grain from high-potential areas through the 
EGTE and then importing grain in the form of food aid for drought-affected areas. This 
demonstrated the fact that only the availability of food at national level does not guarantee food 
security unless there is a functioning distribution system and the buying capacity of households in 
the drought prone (lean market areas) attracts sellers.  
The mandates of the EGTE were revised through subsequent proclamations and regulations 
in 1999 and 2000, which set out to allow it to withdraw gradually from price stabilization and 
focus on promoting exports and facilitating the development of emergency food security reserves 
(Rashid & Negassa, 2012). However, the move to withdraw the EGTE from its price stabilization 
role was not successful, because the country faced problems in 2002 when cereal prices collapsed 
following two consecutive bumper harvest years because of favorable weather and the adoption of 
improved technologies. Maize prices dropped by 80 percent in 2002, thereby making maize 
farming unprofitable (Rashid, Getnet, & Lemma, 2010; Rashid & Negassa, 2012). Though the 
EGTE withdrew from the task of market stabilization, it was ordered to procure maize in order to 
rescue farmers and boost their confidence. Though it was a rather late intervention, the EGTE 
procured some grain and then exported most of it. In the following season, the late onset of rainfall, 
coupled with a decreased use of modern inputs (being discouraged by price depressions), resulted 
in a 52 percent decrease in production (Rashid et al., 2010; Rashid & Negassa, 2012). This created 
food shortages that would put over 15 million people into starvation if the government and the 
international community did not respond by importing grain (ibid).  
The EGTE faced the opposite challenge when grain prices drastically increased, from 2005 
to 2008. In 2008, the government responded to the situation by taking several policy measures, 
including imposing an export ban on cereals, suspending domestic purchases of grain by the World 
Food Program (WFP), which took the strategic grain reserve to 17 percent of the targeted level 
and in turn put urban consumers at high risk of hunger and food insecurity, directly importing 
cereals through the EGTE, and reintroducing urban food rationing (Rashid et al., 2010). The EGTE 
started to import wheat grain in 2008 and has continued its rationing program at subsidized rates 
since then (Wakeyo & Lanos, 2015). The continued rationing of subsidized wheat grain to urban 
consumers might again be at the cost of wheat and maize producers. As explained by Demeke 
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(2012): “The government has succeeded in its policy of ensuring relatively lower prices for 
consumers who are mostly poor and often live below the poverty line. However, this achievement 
has come at the cost of denying adequate incentive to producers.” In the long run, farmers 
disincentivized to use improved inputs, because of depressed grain prices, could lead to higher 
prices (Kuma, 2002) and entitlement failure (Sen, 1981).  
The export bans on maize have been on and off following fluctuations in domestic prices 
and government concerns over potential inflation. Maize exports were banned in 2008, lifted in 
2010, re-imposed in 2011, and have remained in place since then (Wakeyo & Lanos, 2015). An 
overvalued exchange rate, the export ban on maize grain , and the distribution of imported cereals 
at subsidized rates at times of high food prices have kept domestic prices relatively low (Demeke, 
2012). Moreover, results of monitoring and analyzing food and agricultural policies, by the FAO 
in 2012, revealed the disincentive of Ethiopian maize producers, in that they were taxed at an 
average implicit taxation rate of 32-42 percent during the period of 2005 to 2010 (Wakeyo & 
Lanos, 2015). This study indicated that countries that tax the agricultural sector stall both their 
structural change and economic reform. Reshid et al. (2010) also argued that policy interventions 
after the crisis in 2000 were ad hoc and shook the market actor’s confidence and diminished the 
effectiveness of policy interventions. The authors in this case suggested having consistent market 
policies in place instead of looking for ad hoc measures. 
 
4.3.4. Input delivery system since the imperial regime 
An agricultural input supply system has evolved together with the different agricultural and rural 
development policies of successive governments. The features of an input supply and credit service 
during these periods are summarized in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Policy regimes and development programs in agricultural input delivery system and markets, 1950s to present 
Period Intervention/event Objective Focus up on implementation Remarks 
1957-1967 First and Second 
five year 
development plans 
Develop infrastructure and 
large-scale commercial farms  
Establishment and expansion 
of large scale commercial 
farms 
Subsistence farming was 
neglected 
1968-1973 Third five year 
Development Plan 
(Comprehensive 
Integrated Package 
Projects) 
Develop infrastructure, promote 
large commercial and 
smallholder farming. 
Dissemination of improved 
inputs (fertilizer, improved 
sees, improved farm tools), 
credit and extension; formation 
of cooperative societies 
Both smallholder and large-scale 
commercial farming were targeted. 
Prohibitive conditions for use of credit 
and inputs for smallholder tenant 
farmers such as down payment of 25% 
input prices, need for 2 guarantors for 
tenants (or one need to be landowner), 
group collateral at community level 
 Implementation revolved around three 
comprehensive extension programs 
that focused on high potential areas 
 Ultimate users of the credit and inputs 
were landed farmers and landlords 
because of the conditions associated 
with credit use  
1971-1979 Minimum Package 
Program I (MPP-I) 
Expand geographic coverage of 
the comprehensive extension 
programs: provide fertilizer, 
credit and extension to 
“minimum package areas.” 
 More areas addressed; 
 Applied same conditions as 
comprehensive packages; 
 Credit by the development bank was 
available for tenants cultivating a 
maximum of 20 hectares; settled 
previous loans and pay 25% down 
payment;  
 Beneficiaries of the minimum 
package program were also the landed 
peasants that can pay for the down 
payment for input credit or those who 
had good relation with landowners. 
The latter important to get their 
consent as a guarantor. 
NB. These conditions were applied until 
the land reform of 1975 
1978 Agricultural 
Marketing 
corporation (AMC) 
Improve management of 
agricultural input importation, 
storage, and transport by 
handing over control of these 
tasks to the AMC 
 
 All input importation and distribution 
became the task of AMC and the 
service cooperatives. Priority was given 
to state farms and producer 
cooperatives in input distribution. 
 High level of subsidy on fertilizer 
 Priority to state farmers and producers 
cooperatives 
 The price control on outputs 
discouraged use of inputs because 
output prices fail to pay for use of 
modern inputs. 
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Period Intervention/event Objective Focus up on implementation Remarks 
1980-1985 Minimum Package 
Program II (MPP-II) 
Expand input supply and 
extension service coverage 
three-fold 
 AMC was the key player in input and 
output marketing. MOA was 
distributing inputs through service 
cooperatives. MOA was estimating 
demands and overestimates were 
causing overstocking of fertilizer. 
Priority given to producer cooperatives 
and state farms 
There was less incentive for 
smallholder farmers since there was 
centrally controlled fixed grain price 
and grain quota supply was based on 
total production per farmer  
1984 Agricultural Input 
Supply Corporation 
(AISCO) 
Improve the importation of 
fertilizer and marketing of other 
agricultural inputs 
 AISCO was the sole importer of 
fertilizer 
 
 As a successor to the AMC, AISCO 
was limited by lengthy bureaucratic 
process needed to secure foreign 
exchange, high freight costs, and lack 
of proper port facilities, high inland 
transport costs, inaccurate demand 
estimates and organizational 
inefficiency. 
1986-1995 Peasant Agricultural 
Development 
Program (PADEP) 
Provide inputs, credit, and 
extension services to 
smallholders organized into 
Service Cooperatives (SC) 
using a Training and Visit 
(T&V) extension approach 
 Implemented only in limited high 
potential areas of the country, 
 PADEP gave high priority to 
producer’s cooperatives and state farms 
neglecting smallholder farmers. 
 Poor coordination because the 
agricultural extension activities were 
distributed to different commodity 
based departments 
 
1991-1995 Partial liberalization 
of fertilizer market 
Open the importation, 
wholesaling, and retailing of 
fertilizer to private companies 
 Private companies such as Ethiopian 
Amalgamated and others entered the 
fertilizer import and distribution market 
 Fertilizer prices remained pan-
territorial and subsidized 
1993-1995 Pilot Extension 
Management 
Training Plots 
System (EMTPS).  
To demonstrate the possibility 
of doubling or tripling yields of 
maize and wheat under 
intensive input use and proper 
management. 
 In 1993, pilot extension service 
programs were initiated on 160 farmers 
maize and wheat extension 
management plots in Oromia and 
SNNP regional states.  
 Demonstrated on a pilot basis that 
yields could be doubled with 
application of modern inputs;  
 The major precondition for access to 
input credit was a down payment of 
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Period Intervention/event Objective Focus up on implementation Remarks 
 In 1994, the trial was expanded to other 
regions on 1600 farmers’ fields. 
Farmers were given input credit. It was 
a success and the idea was taken up by 
the government. 
25 percent of the total value of the 
inputs. Regional government provided 
guarantee to suppliers for inputs to be 
supplied in their regions. 
1995- 2010 Participatory 
Demonstration and 
Training Extension 
System (PADETES) 
taken as National 
Agricultural 
Extension 
Intervention 
Program,  
Promote improved seed-
fertilizer packages (primarily 
for maize and wheat) through a 
“training and visit” approach 
piloted by SG- 2000. Scale up 
the PADETES approach to the 
national level as a means of 
boosting cereal yields and 
output 
 The intensive use of inputs and 
demonstration scaled up at national 
level. This has shown tremendous 
increase in yield and served as a basis 
for agricultural growth. 
 Efforts to scale up the PADETES 
approach were less successful than the 
piloting demonstrated by SG-2000 
 Access to input credit by smallholder 
farmers has changed over time. 
Provision of input credit is taken over 
by micro-finance institutions where 
by farmers are asked to provide group 
collateral. This is becoming 
prohibitive for resource poor farmers 
1997-98 Fertilizer price 
liberalization 
Eliminate subsidies and 
deregulate the price of fertilizer 
at the wholesale and retail 
levels 
 Elimination of fertilizer subsidies 
exposed farmers to high fertilizer prices 
which was not offset by increased grain 
prices for some crops 
 Liberal prices have not resulted in 
competitive market due to the 
government´s continued control over 
marketing and credit. 
2010-
present 
Participatory 
Extension System 
(PES) adopted as the 
major extension 
program of the 
country 
The extension program based 
on the farmers development 
groups, one in five and social 
networks 
 Promotion of adoption of full package 
of technologies using the development 
groups and social networks. Lead 
farmers, those who are willing and can 
afford full package of technologies are 
expected to play exemplary role in 
motivating and supporting poor 
farmers.  
 Farmers categorized as type C farmers 
are resource poor farmers that could 
not make use of improved agricultural 
inputs. These farmers are those who 
cannot afford to pay for inputs in cash 
and most are not eligible to use 
microfinance credit.  
Source: (Spielman,et al., 2009) and the author. 
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4.4. Food security policies and strategies during different regimes 
4.4.1. The imperial regime  
Up to the end of the 1950s , Ethiopia was a surplus producer and net exporter of grain (Demeke et 
al., 2004; Tecle, 1975). It was in 1959 that the nation received food aid for the first time in its 
history (Demeke et al., 2004). This was the time when Ethiopia saw the complete failure of rainfall 
and an outbreak of locusts that created critical shortages of food in the country. In Tigray alone, 
over one million people were affected by this problem, and over 100,000 of them died as a result 
(Bewket, 2009; Webb & Von Braun, 1994). The 1957-1959 famine was followed by a series of 
famines in different parts of the country in the 1960s and the famine of 1973-1974, which affected 
most northern parts of the country and left over a quarter of a million dead. Recurrent droughts 
damaged the livelihoods of people so that they lost the capacity to buy anything despite the 
availability of food. For instance, a study conducted by Sen (1981) in Ethiopia indicated that grain 
was cheaper in Wollo markets during the 1973 famine, and some amount of grain was transported 
to Addis Ababa and Asmara from these markets. However, the local community did not have the 
capacity to buy from these markets, thereby showing the fact that the major cause of the famine 
was an entitlement failure of people (Sen, 1981).  
The imperial government hid the news of the 1973/74 famine until a BBC documentary 
exposed it to the world and attracted the focus of the international relief effort in mid-October 1973 
(Van Uffelen, 2013). After the issue was exposed to the world, Emperor Hailesilassie issued order 
number 93/1966 in 1974 to establish the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). The 
mandate of the RRC was to mobilize relief resources from domestic and international sources and 
provide emergency relief services to areas affected by drought and other disasters (Adugna, 2014). 
Up until the establishment of the RRC, there was no organized state response to the food insecurity 
crisis in the country. The 1973-74 famine was the most salient and immediate cause of the downfall 
of Haileselassie’s government in 1974 (Aredo, 1990; Rahimato, 2009; Webb & Von Braun, 1994). 
Opponents of the government used the attempts of the state to hid news of the famine that claimed 
the lives of hundreds of thousands to effect regime change and finally dispose of the emperor.  
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4.4.2. The Dergue regime  
Following the land reform of 1975, the Dergue military government issued more proclamations 
promoting the collectivization of farmers into service and producer cooperatives. State farms were 
also established in high-potential areas of the country. Smallholder farmers were encouraged to 
organize into producers’ cooperatives, mainly to benefit from the preferential treatment given to 
these cooperatives in terms of access to inputs, technology, and extension services. With the aim 
of achieving food self-sufficiency, a great deal of investment was made in state farms and 
producers’ cooperatives established in high-potential areas. As indicated earlier, minimum 
package programs and the PADEP were also promoted in these areas. However, all of this 
investment could not bring about the intended increase in food production, with per capita food 
supplies declining from 128 kg per head during 1961-1974, to 120 kg in 1975-1991 (Aredo, 1990; 
Demeke et al., 2004; Tecle, 1975).  
In 1976, the Settlement Authority was established with four major objectives: i) To redress 
population imbalances and reduce population pressure in the highlands; ii) to increase productivity 
and make use of supposedly under-utilized fertile lands; iii) to provide land to those without it; 
and iv) to resettle pastoralists and remove unwanted urban unemployed (Pankhurst, 1990). 
However, this authority merged with the already existing Relief and Rehabilitation Commission 
(RRC) and the Awash Valley Authority to re-establish a new RRC in 1979. The new RRC resettled 
about 46,000 households (about 150,000 people) in different parts of the country (Rahmato, 2009). 
However, this resettlement program was unsuccessful in terms of both the number of households 
planned to be resettled and the objective of increasing productivity and thereby reducing hunger 
(Pankhurst, 1990; Rahmato, 2009). On the eve of the 1984 famine, these resettled households were 
requiring food aid.  
In 1984, the cumulative impact of droughts that started at the end of 1970s in different parts 
of the country caused the great famine, which affected over eight million people throughout the 
country (Webb & Von Braun, 1994). The marketing policy of the Dergue, which banned the 
movement of grains from one region to another, grain supply quotas imposed on smallholder 
farmers at nationally fixed low prices, and limited grain trade operations worsened famine 
conditions even further (Aredo, 1990; Demeke et al., 2004; Rahimato, 2009; Rashid & Negassa, 
2012; Webb & Von Braun, 1994).  
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Following the path of its predecessor, the Dergue military government also responded to 
the 1984 famine very late through the RRC’s ‘early warning’ system and called for international 
assistance in May and announcement of the famine situation in October of same year (Jean, 2008). 
Despite the massive inflow of international relief through the Live Aid series of concerts, over 
800,000 people died through starvation and famine-related disease (Pankhurst & Rahmato, 2013; 
Webb & Von Braun, 1994).  
One of the government interventions in the 1984 famine was to move households that were 
living in drought-prone areas to high-potential agricultural areas. The government considered 
resettlement as a mechanism to address the root causes of famine, on the one hand, and an 
opportunity to implement its collectivization policy, on the other (Pankhurst, 1990). The 
resettlement operation was planned in haste to relocate 1.5 million households over a period of 
two years and started in October 1984. By March 1986, the program had moved 200,000 
households (600,000 people), mainly from the northern highlands, to settlement sites in Wellega, 
Elubabor, and Gojam (Pankhurst & Rahmato, 2013; Webb & Von Braun, 1994). Since the RRC 
did not have the capacity to coordinate such a massive program, the resettlement program was 
planned and coordinated with a committee composed of ministers, the RRC and relevant 
organizations, and high government officials.  
The role of the RRC in providing relief and rehabilitation services during the 1984 famine 
was limited to the early warning that alerted UN agencies and donor communities (Abebe, 2009), 
because it did not have a preparedness plan by the time the famine occurred. Up until 1989, there 
was a lack of coordinated and integrated prevention, preparedness, and response efforts between 
central and local government institutions, on the one hand, and the RRC and ministries, on the 
other. In 1990, the government launched its National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness 
Strategy, which was designed to address three important issues: Integrated disaster prevention, 
preparedness, and responses. However, the Marxist government was toppled in 1991, before 
implementing these strategies. 
The 1984 famine contributed to the mobilization of forces that eventually led to the 
overthrow of the regime in 1991 (Devereux, 2007), which means that the famine claimed the 
political powers of two successive governments. 
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4.4.3. The current regime 
After the downfall of the military regime in 1991, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia enacted 
a National Policy for Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM). This policy set out 
objectives that emphasized disaster prevention and preparedness measures, the actions needed to 
link relief measures with long-term development, and livelihood-enhancing actions (TGE, 1993). 
Accordingly, the government decided to promote food-for-work initiatives under the employment 
generation scheme instead of all other free food distribution activities, with the aim of rebuilding 
productive assets and improving livelihoods by harnessing relief food aid flows to the country 
(Kehler, 2004). A national program for disaster prevention/mitigation and preparedness, which 
established an institutional and a resource base for the execution of the policy, was also issued in 
November 1993. The establishment of the national program and enactment of the emergency code 
consequently contributed to streamlining the implementation of the schemes and structures down 
to the kebele level (Abebe, 2009). 
In August 1995, the RRC was re-established as the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness 
Commission (DPPC) under proclamation No. 10/1995. The main objectives of the new DPPC 
were to prevent disasters by tackling their root causes, to build the capacity necessary to reduce 
the impacts of disaster in advance, and to ensure the timely arrival of necessary assistance to the 
victims of such disasters. In general, the institutional reforms of August 1995 underlined a shift of 
emphasis, from addressing the consequences of food crises, to preventing such crises from 
happening in the first place (Van Uffelen, 2013).  
In 1999/2000, Ethiopia faced another drought crisis, but this time, it coincided with the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean border war. The major victims of famine were pastoral communities in the 
Somali Regional State, and because of the conflict, little attention was given to the food security 
problem, to which the responses of the international community and the government were 
exceptionally slow. According to Salama et al. (2001), approximately 77 percent of the deaths due 
to hunger and associated cases in the Gode area occurred before the arrival of major food aid in 
April/May 2000. The total number of deaths from drought-induced food crisis by this time was 
estimated at 72,000 to 123,000 lives (Salama et al., 2001).  
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Another drought and food crisis happened in 2003 because of the late onset of rainfall and 
low grain production. It left more than 13 million people in need of food aid, with chronic 
malnutrition peaking at approximately 52 percent (MOARD 2009). However, this food crisis was 
not declared a famine by the government or the international community. This showed that 
vulnerability to famine was perceived as a disgrace, something bad to be ashamed of by both 
Ethiopian politicians and the international community—and something to be addressed at all costs 
(Van Uffelen, 2013). As a result, the then prime minister declared food security as the top priority 
of the Ethiopian government and launched a large-scale consultation process called the New 
Coalition for Food Security (NCFS) (MOARD 2009). The NCFS worked on ways to reduce the 
nation’s dependence on foreign emergency food aid and to phase it out totally. Following this 
consultation process, the government revised its existing food security program to include 
resettlement, a productive safety net, and other food security interventions. In 2004, the DPPC was 
renamed the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA), to implement the revised food 
security program.  
With regard to the major components of the revised food security program, there was 
unanimous support for the integrated use of the productive safety net (PSNP) and other 
complementary food security initiatives by the government of Ethiopia and its development 
partners, while the resettlement component was supported only by the government. As a result, 
the PSNP was funded fully by the international community, mainly the World Bank, while the 
resettlement program was financed entirely by the Ethiopian government. 
In 2011, a drought in the Horn of Africa affected the pastoral lowlands of Somali and Afar. 
About 4.6 million people were in need of food aid, and the government managed the situation 
before it reached an acute level of famine. 
Following a business process re-engineering for the DPPA, the new National Policy and 
Strategy on Disaster Risk Management (NPSDRM) was approved by the Council of Ministers in 
2013. The major objective of the new policy was to reduce disaster risk and potential damage 
caused by a disaster by establishing a comprehensive and coordinated disaster management 
system. The policy focused on reducing disaster risk and vulnerability by integrating the issue into 
development plans and programs, in order to save lives in times of disaster, protect livelihoods, 
and ensure all disaster-affected people would be provided with recovery and rehabilitation 
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assistance. The policy also aimed at reducing dependency on relief aid and mainstreaming disaster 
risk management into development plans and programs across all sectoral institutions as a 
mechanism of implementation at all levels.  
Following the approval of the new policy, the DPPA was re-organized as the Disaster Risk 
Management and Food Security sector (DRMFS) in 2013. The peculiar difference in this policy 
from the one revised in 2003 was that it integrated saving lives and livelihoods and also focused 
on reducing and avoiding risks before they caused disasters. The new plan took on a multi-hazard 
and multi-sectoral approach. As indicated in the objective of the policy, it was planned to be 
mainstreamed into sectoral ministries, departments, and other relevant bodies so that all actors, 
starting from the local community, would be responsible for disaster risk reduction and 
management. Unlike earlier policies, this policy envisaged addressing not only the population in 
the drought-prone areas, but also vulnerable people in other parts of the country, including in urban 
and high-potential areas.  
Despite these policy revisions and institutional reforms, in 2015 and 2016, the El Niño-
induced drought created a food crisis that affected over 10.2 million people in the north, northeast 
and eastern parts of the country. The crisis extended to the remaining pastoral areas of the country, 
thereby intensifying the food, feed, and water shortages (NDRMS, 2015). 
The New Coalition for Food Security predicted that Ethiopia would graduate from 
dependence on food aid to self-sufficiency by 2015. However, only 15 percent of the PSNP’s 
beneficiaries were reported to have seen success in this regard by the stated time.  
In general, the food security problem in Ethiopia has continued on an even broader scale, 
affecting more people and demanding more resources from time to time. Over six billion dollars 
have been invested on emergency relief operations since the 1973 famine, but the problem is 
expanding and is still an issue of concern (Pankhurst & Rahmato, 2013). Some authors have 
indicated that the famine landscape is changing towards the southern part of the country, since the 
government is taking maximum care to minimize the risk of famine in the north, fearing its political 
implications, since it was one of the main drivers that claimed the political power of the last two 
regimes (Lautze & Maxwell, 2007).  
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4.5. Discussions and conclusions 
Ethiopia has suffered from decades of food insecurity that has threatened the lives of millions of 
citizens. The international community and successive Ethiopian governments have made 
tremendous efforts to avert these problems, spending over six billion USD since the 1973 famine 
(Pankhurst & Rahmato, 2013). However, the root causes of the problem have yet to be addressed, 
leaving many people affected by the ongoing food insecurity risk. The major causes of food 
insecurity in Ethiopia are natural calamities and institutional constraints related to government 
policies and strategies. Natural calamities include recurrent drought, floods, and related climatic 
variables that result in crop failure and the massive loss of livestock. Institutional constraints 
include problems in government policies relating to land tenure and its use, constraints in 
agricultural developments, including extension and marketing policies, and food security policies 
and strategies.   
Despite a form of private landownership that was created through the imperial land grant 
arrangement by the imperial regime, land generally has never been a real private property in 
Ethiopia (Rahimato, 1984). The private ownership of land by individuals and institutions during 
the imperial regime lasted in effect only as long as the individual stayed loyal with the crown. This 
means that land was a source of power and has continued to serve the same purpose during the 
Dergue military regime and up to the current government. Smallholder farmers have use rights 
over a certain plot of land allotted to them, as long as they abide by the terms and conditions set 
by government legislation. 
Ethiopia was a net exporter of cereal grains during the early 1950s (Adams, 1970).  This 
was because growth in food production was slightly above population growth without government 
intervention (Rahimato, 2009). Assuming that crop production would continue growing in the 
same way, the first and second five-year development plans of the country neglected agriculture 
in general and smallholder farming in particular. The adverse effects of the first two five-year plans 
were observed in the 1960s. Cereal production lagged behind the growth of both the urban and the 
rural population, and the country for the first time in its modern history became a net importer of 
cereals, with imports amounting to 45,000 tons in 1959/60 (Aredo, 1990). This implies that 
Ethiopia turned into a net importer of cereals, mainly because of the policies which neglected 
smallholder farmers, who were the major producers of these crops. 
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There were several contradictions in the development policies and strategies of Ethiopia in 
the imperial era. The first among these was the promotion of smallholder farming and large 
commercial farms in the southern highland areas of the country during the third five-year 
development plan (end of the 1970s) (Stommes and Sisaye 1979; Stahl 1974; Rahmato 1998, 
2011). Implementation of this plan created policy contradictions, in that large commercial farms 
expanded by evicting tenant farmers and damaging their livelihoods. This created discontent 
among the poor peasant communities. This discontent, coupled with the hidden story of famine 
and other factors, marked the end to  the imperial reign (Stahl 1974; Rahmato 1998; Rahmato 
2011). The current government is promoting the development of smallholder farming but has 
gradually introduced policies and strategies promoting large commercial farms. The result of these 
policies is also starting to displace smallholder farmers in the central and southern parts of the 
country, to make way for the larger operations (Rahmato, 1994, 2011a; Stahl, 1974c; Stommes & 
Sisaye, 1979). As enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(EFDR), all lands belong to the state, and smallholder farmers have a usufruct right over it. 
According to the land legislations of the country, when a certain tract is needed for public services 
or large investment projects, holders of the land use right will be compensated a certain figure 
determined by law, and then evicted from their holdings. The problem with these laws lies in the 
size of compensation that is given to the victims. This compensation is too small relative to the 
rate at which the government leases out the land and the damage inflicted on the livelihoods of the 
victims (Rahmato, 1994, 2011; Stahl, 1974; Stommes & Sisaye, 1979). This issue was one of the 
major reasons for the mass protests in the Oromia region in 2015/2016. The second policy 
contradiction worth mentioning here is the distribution of imported wheat at subsidized rates 
(Wakeyo & Lanos, 2015) to protect consumers and removal of input subsidies following the 
structural adjustment program that was implemented since the 1990s. This means that farmers 
have to compete with subsidized imported wheat grain while using subsidy-free fertilizer. On the 
other hand, while removing subsidies on input prices has escalated the cost of production, the price 
of maize grain has been systematically suppressed through export bans on the crop (Rashid et al., 
2010) and other mechanisms of the EGTE. Such policy contradictions in the distribution of 
subsidized grain, and suppressing grain prices for the major produce of farmers, have exposed 
family farmers to unfair competition, which may negatively affect their productivity in the short 
term and endanger the food security situation of the nation in the long term (Demeke, 2012; Kuma, 
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2002; Sen, 1981). Taking this notion into account, the reverse government action of subsidizing 
inputs might have better long-term impacts that may benefit both producers and consumers, since 
it would encourage production and the better use of inputs. 
The common target of the policies and strategies of the past two governments and the 
current EPRDF policies and strategies is to achieve food self-sufficiency. The current government 
has made tremendous efforts to achieve this goal through its intensive extension program. 
Accordingly, surplus grain production was seen in 1995/96 and 2002 to the extent that the markets 
were over-supplied and prices fell abruptly, resulting in grain prices failing to cover production 
costs (Rashid et al., 2010; Rashid & Negassa, 2012). In both years, the government was forced to 
intervene through the EGTE, to stabilize the market. While markets in the high-potential areas of 
the country were over-flooded, millions of people in drought-prone areas of the same country were 
in desperate need of food aid. Moreover, while the government intervened by exporting grain in 
both years, it was forced to look for food aid immediately, due to the reverse condition because of 
low production that happened as a result of low input use and bad weather conditions in the 
following season (Demeke, 2012; Kuma, 2002; Sen, 1981). This implies that food self-sufficiency 
might not be practical unless there is a functioning marketing system. 
Ethiopia has struggled with the challenges of ensuring the food security of its people for 
the last five decades. However, the efforts of successive governments have been countered by 
climate-related variables, with recurrent droughts being the major factor. Drought has been 
affecting at least some part of the country every year leaving millions of people in need of 
emergency food aid. Despite efforts to contain the problem through the coordinated efforts of the 
international community and the government, the numbers of victims increase from time to time. 
As indicated in the earlier paragraphs, the growing problem is not only because of drought and 
other climate-related problems, but also to the different policies and strategies implemented by 
successive governments. The results of these policies have been observed to have worsened the 
famine situation in 1973 and 1984, and these famines in turn have contributed to the abolition of 
two last governments. The current government is trying to address the food insecurity problem in 
as much as possible. However, it is becoming difficult to contain the problem. I argue that the 
government needs to reconsider the negative effects of path dependencies and inter dependencies 
in its plans, policies, and strategies that perpetuate food insecurity. This is because some of the 
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policy measures have damaged the livelihoods and food security of people and they have the 
potential to create similar impacts on state power in the future.  
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5. Evolution of Rural Governance: Case Studies from Southwestern Ethiopia 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Rural governance is a critical cross-cutting issue for family farming households in Ethiopia. 
Addressing rural governance in this study stems from the fact that it affects not only the livelihoods 
and food security of rural communities, but also the nation as a whole and the national economy 
at large. According to Van Assche and Hornidge (2015), rural areas can be defined relative to 
urban areas, as areas that are not urban, or in terms of population density, and access to 
infrastructures for transportation services, information, market, and other social services. The 
Ethiopian National Labor Force Survey (CSA, 2005) also defined rural areas as all localities that 
are not urban and whose inhabitants are primarily engaged in agricultural activities. However, this 
does not mean that rural areas are all about agriculture, since any rural development strategy has 
to start from a multiple land use perspective (Van Assche & Hornidge, 2015). Hence, rural 
governance involves multifaceted issues characterized by the interaction of different actors, 
including family farmers, the government and non-government actors, institutions, and resources, 
especially land and labor.  
 Family farming households, the major residents of rural areas in Ethiopia, are 
exposed to several sources of  food insecurity risk. Some of the major sources of food insecurity 
risks are recurrent drought and other adverse climate variables, crop and livestock diseases, 
fluctuations of input and output markets, and socio-political and institutional risks (Webb & Von 
Braun, 1994; Von Braun & Olofinbiyi, 2007; Bewket, 2009; Taffesse et al., 2012; Hill & Porter, 
2017). Rural governance involves addressing these webs of interconnected and complex sources 
of risk. Since the perception of risks  are rooted partly in how past generations and regimes 
addressed and managed related shocks, we need to have evolutionary lenses that enable us to 
understand how the past can influence the present and what can be learned from the past. This may 
serve as an input to manage the current challenges existing in rural Ethiopia, where food security 
is still at the forefront of family farmers’ concerns.  
In this chapter, I focus on governance paths in rural Ethiopia, in order to shed light on 
important implications of evolving governance on the livelihoods and food security of current and 
future generations. The chapter starts with the governance structure during the Gada 
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administration (pre-imperial era) and proceeds with evolution in social organizations, dynamics in 
formal and informal institutions, knowledge/power configurations, dependencies and their 
implications, as well as other related issues in subsequent regimes. The ERGF is applied in the 
analysis of the evolutionary paths during the different regimes.  
 
5.2. Evolution of governance since the pre-imperial period 
5.2.1. The Gada administration 
Ethiopia as a state can be traced back to the Axumite civilization in the northern part of the country 
around the 10th century BC (Ayele, 2011). From the time of Axumite civilization up to the 1850s, 
the country was composed of local kings (Rahimato, 1994). The southern part of current Ethiopia 
(the current states of Oromia and Southern Nations and Nationalities and People’s Regions) were 
included in the Ethiopian empire from the 1880s to the 1890s (ibid). Before its inclusion into the 
Ethiopian empire through the expansionist movement of the 1880s, Oromo land was governed by 
the Gada system (Baissa, 1994; Hassen, 1994; Legesse, 2000; Ayele, 2011). Gada is an 
egalitarian, democratic, social, and political system that has been effectively practiced in the 
Oromo land before 1890s (Baissa, 1994; Hassen, 1994). 
The building blocks of the Gada system were the Gada (luba) rulers, the moety 
organization (qallu, electors and ritual leaders), the general national assembly (gumi), and age 
organization (the hariyya). According to Legesse (2000), “The Gada system is a system of Gada 
classes (luba) or segments of generations that succeed each other every eight years in assuming 
political, military, judicial, legislative and ritual responsibilities.” A generation in the Gada system 
is 40 years, divided into five periods, with each lasting eight years (Hassen, 1994; Legesse, 1973, 
2000). The nation is divided into five parties, each with specific roles and functions to perform in 
five stages, each lasting eight years in the system. Each male Oromo enters into these five stages 
of roles and responsibilities upon birth. Each of the Gada class (luba/parties) above the third stage 
(i.e. the fourth and fifth Gada classes) has its own leaders, known as hayyu adulas, and its own 
assembly, known as yaá. The hayyus (leaders of lubas) become leaders of a nation organized into 
national and local councils to administer the country. The luba council serves as a legislative body, 
with executive responsibility assigned to a few officials elected for specific responsibilities 
(Baissa, 1994). The apex of the luba council is the Abba Gada, who is the political head and 
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spokesman of the government (Hassen, 1994). The Gada council also has an Abba Dula (father of 
the war), a military leader, and an Abba Sera (father of the law), an expert in traditional law. The 
council of elders, known as the shanee or salgee council, is formed from retired Gada officials, in 
order to support the active Gada structure in legislative issues at higher levels and to take care of 
the day-to-day community governance, thus ensuring the peace and stability of their local areas 
(Hassen, 1994; Jalata, 2012). 
The word shanee also signifies the social organization of the Oromo people next to the 
household (Figure 5.1). According to an ethnographic study by Megersa (1993), shanee (also 
known as shanacha in some places) consists of five households grouped under the leadership of 
an Abba Shanee. Megersa (1993) indicated that the “Abba Shanee is responsible for managing the 
overall affairs of its members ensuring its peace and security, discussing natural resource use with 
the heads of the households, allocating labor for the different tasks, settling disputes between the 
individuals and families and representing their interests at the level of Olla.” Olla in turn is a group 
of at least five shanees headed by the Abba Olla (leader of Olla). Abba Olla has similar roles to 
the Abba Shanee in guiding the day-to-day activities of its members based on customs and laws, 
maintaining close links among shanees, and taking care of issues that are beyond the reach of Abba 
Shanees. Several ollas join together in one neighborhood to form reéra. The different reéra join 
together and form dheéda, which in turn link up and form the Gada assembly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own sketch 
Figure 5.1: Social organization during the Gada administration 
Gada 
Dhe’eda 
Re’era 
Olla= 5 shanee 
Shanee=5 
households 
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The Gada government is a confederacy of different, autonomous local governments known 
as afrechas (dhe’edas). The introduction of afrecha into the Gada system was to cope with 
population growth and the spread of this population in different directions (Hassen, 1994). Each 
afrecha is a miniature version of the overarching Gada system, with all the components of the 
system at local levels. The governance structure and function of all afrechas are similar to each 
other, since they are bound together by the Oromo spiritual leader, the Abba Muudaa (Hassen, 
2005). Abbaa Muuda inspires all the afrecha leaders to follow specific Gada principles and 
guidance during the mandatory pilgrimage visits that each leader pays to him in regular ceremonies 
and events (ibid). 
The assemblies at different levels are the major pillars of the Gada system, which has a 
unifying national-level assembly (gumi), afrecha-level assemblies, clan, and very local (arda)-
level assemblies. The general assembly of the nation (gumi) is made up of the Gada assemblies of 
all afrecha assemblies and councils of the active and retired councils (Hassen, 1994; Legesse, 
2000). The gumi meet once every eight years to review any unresolved conflicts and the 
performance of the outgoing Gada, as well as review new laws and issue proclamations for the 
next eight years (ibid). The afrecha-level Gada assemblies meet more frequently and have the 
power to make decisions on specific afrecha specific issues. The council of elders, known as 
shanee or salgee, at the local level is concerned with the day-to-day jurisdiction of the community 
(Marco, 2005; Jalata, 2012).  
 
5.2.2. The imperial regime 
Ethiopia came under central government administration during the reign of Emperor Minilik 
(1889-1913) (Zewde, 1991). Minilik centralized the nation under a unitary state regime and 
divided it into different provinces and Awurajas (subdivisions of provinces). The emperor used 
both diplomatic persuasion and military coercion to expand his empire southward to the current 
Oromia and southern regions of the country (Ayele, 2011). In the areas where the authorities of 
local governments and kingdoms peacefully submitted to the expansionist force, Minilik allowed 
them to retain their kingdoms, provided that they pay the necessary tributes to the central 
government as well as keep the peace and stability of their areas (Ayenew, 2007). Some of these 
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leaders, who were followers of Muslim or other non-Christian religions, were forced to convert to 
Christianity and learn Amharic (Ayele, 2011). In areas where local kingdoms confronted Minilik’s 
forces, the local authorities were disrupted and put under the direct rule of the central government. 
In such cases, the emperor gave governorship of these regions to his generals, who led the war of 
conquest against these kingdoms (Daniel Weldegebriel, 2012). The generals again subdivided their 
granted areas into different localities and appointed their subordinates as governors of the area. 
Due to language, cultural, and resource limitations and barriers to administering the new areas, the 
centrally appointed regional and local governors needed help from the indigenous leaders (Ayele, 
2011). The indigenous leaders who were given the title of balabat (named Abba Qoro by the local 
community) were placed under the woreda administrator. The Abba Qoros acted as a bridge 
between their community and the governors, with the main task of maintaining peace and security, 
assisting the regional and local governors in collecting taxes, tributes, and mobilizing the local 
people when assistance was needed by central government (ibid). The advantage of the Abba 
Qoros was that they maintained their land, unlike the rest of the community, whose land was totally 
confiscated by the expansionist force and given to the administrators, soldiers, church, and 
nobility.  
Emperor Hailesillassie (1930-1974) strengthened his project to centralize and build a unitary 
Ethiopia by introducing the first written constitution in 1931, in which he extended his absolute 
power over central provincial and local governments. This constitution replaced the traditional 
provincial governors with appointees loyal to the emperor. By the decree promulgated in 1942, 
which defined the role of Ministry of Interior, three levels of government, namely province (teklay 
gizat) divided into awuraja gizat, and woreda gizat, were formed throughout the country. Woreda 
gizats also had deputies, known as mikitil woreda gizat (mislene) (Figure 5.2). The structure below 
the mikitil woreda gizat was the qoro (a subdivision of the mikitil woreda gizat) and ganda. 
According to information obtained from in-depth interviews (Int. code no. 102, 2015; 75, 2016), 
these structures were also in place in the study areas, and the positions above the qoro were filled 
with the outsiders, while Abba Qoro (the father/administrator of qoro) and Abba Ganda (the 
father/administrator of ganda) were assigned from the local area. I learnt that there were about six 
to 12 gandas under each qoro, and there were two to three Abba Shanees under each Abba Ganda. 
The task of the Abba Shanee was to transfer orders from the upper administrative structures to 
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 about 200-300 households under their command area. Abba shanees can have two to three Aba 
Labsis (messengers).  
Source: Own sketch 
Figure 5.2: Administrative structure during the imperial regime 
 
Formal and informal institutions during the imperial regime 
The imperial governments of Ethiopia created a system of central government in which the local 
community fell under the direct and indirect control of the monarchical throne. After the 1931 
constitution, which was issued after the coronation of Emperor Hailesillasie in 1930, all powers 
over central and local government, the legislature, the judiciary, and the military were vested in 
the emperor (Ayele, 2011; Zewde, 1991). 
After the control of the southern part of Ethiopia by Emperor Minilik, the shanee, which 
was a formal institution of community governance during the Gada regime, was changed into an 
informal institution. With this change of formality, there were times when it was invisible but 
nevertheless served its purpose of community governance. The rural community maintained the 
Ministry of Interior (yager gizat minister) 
Provinces administration (Tekilay gizat) 
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continuity of this institution in different forms, the first of which involved using its organization 
through different names and in different places. For example, it was known as Tuula in the Yoyu 
area, Ilubabor zone, Oromia region (Tulu, 2010; Toli & Boland, 2006), reji in the Jimma area and 
Iddir in Bako (Lewis, 1974). Reji was a voluntary organization whose major purpose was to 
support members in organizing burials, help bereaved families, and attend funerals, in addition to 
aiding those whose house had burned down, oxen had died, and who had met other misfortunes. 
Rejis met every month to settle conflicts arising because of matters related to its services, 
and to collect fees for the association. In addition to its regular services, it was involved in 
resolving conflicts within the community (ibid), albeit it should not compromise the power of the 
throne. Since the imperial regime vested all powers to deal with any jurisdiction of the throne and 
its agencies, other institutions were not allowed to engage in the jurisdiction of conflicts without 
permission. According to the informants (Int. code no. 102, 2015 & code no. 102, 2016), the 
council of elders in the reji by this time was not allowed to impose social sanctions to enforce its 
jurisdiction. However, this does not mean that the shanee was powerless during the imperial 
regime. Rather, the mode of enforcement changed and became implicit, though it still plays 
indispensable roles in the society.  
Apart from the shanee under the umbrella of iddir, there is a council of elders, known in 
the Oromo language as Jarsa biyya. Jarsa biyya has different levels depending on the level of 
issue on which it arbitrates. Simple conflicts between neighbors, intra-household conflicts, and 
conflicts due to the daily lives of the community are taken to the council of elders located in the 
immediate vicinity of the two parties. Such elders bring the two parties together by resolving the 
conflict at hand, based on the facts and all available evidence. Such elders are selected based on 
their experience, credibility in the community, and social acceptance in the society, regardless of 
their wealth and genealogy (Jotte Tulu, 2010). When things are beyond the jurisdiction of these 
elders, the case would be taken to the shanee under the umbrella of reji.   
The higher level of Jarsa biyya is territorial, found at the kebele level and beyond (Tulu, 
2010; Toli & Boland, 2006). Membership of Jarsa biyya is based on three important criteria, the 
first of which is  being the Abba Gada or member of the serving Gada council. The second is 
genealogy in places where there is no Gada council. In such cases, the eldest son of the family, 
considered the elder of that specific rural community, would be head of the Jarsa biyya. The third 
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is having a good reputation and good knowledge of local customs and traditions. According to 
informants (Int. code no. 56, 2015; 118, 2016), this level of Jarsa biyya has nine members and 
deals with big social agendas such as the reconciliation of issues related to murder. For instance, 
the case of murder is taken to the court and the perpetrator given the verdict according to law when 
there are evidences. Though the perpetrator would be penalized for his/her crimes, the family of 
the deceased and the perpetrator might attack each other in revenge for the lost life. However, the 
council of elders plays a key role in maintaining peace and stability in such cases by softening the 
issue and initiating the guma10 ceremony so that both sides would not plot revenge. In extreme 
cases, the council of elders can arbitrate between the murderer and the family of the deceased, 
even when the former is not under the custody of law. Jarsa biyya has  a social power assisted by 
religion and the traditional belief in settling fierce disputes and normalizing situations. Rural 
people in the study areas believe that accepting the words of elders and getting their blessing is 
very important for one’s future life. Such things made the role of the shanee and its different forms 
of application indispensable. This role also ensured its continuation through generations.  
According to informants (Int. code no. 75, 2015; 100 & 101, 2016), the formal government 
administration was also using shanee in critical times. For instance, woreda governors needed the 
council of elders to uncover crimes such as robbery and other acts committed in the community 
when ample evidence was not readily available to take the case to the court. The involvement of 
the council of elders (which rural communities still call a shanee council) in this case was through 
the mechanism known as awuchachigne. Once the council of elders generated evidence, the case 
went to court. During this time, the shanee council had no power to make any decision or enact 
the community’s customary laws on perpetrators. If the shanee council failed to uncover the 
criminals, the community had the obligation to contribute resources and pay for properties lost, if 
the case under investigation was a robbery/theft. As agencies of the throne, the woreda governors 
had the power to forgive the perpetrator, even after the verdict of the court. 
 
 
                                                          
10 Guma is a ceremony in which the council of elders arbitrates between a person who has assassinated somebody 
and his kin with the family and kin of the deceased, to stop further bloodshed through revenge. 
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5.2.3. The Dergue regime 
After the downfall of the imperial regime, the Dergue government assumed power in 1974. 
Immediately after gaining power, the Dergue consolidated the existing 14 provincial 
administrations and replaced all serving governor-generals. The provinces (teklay gizats) were re-
structured and organized as regions (kifle hagers), which were then divided into a total of 102 sub-
regions (awurajas) and 556 woredas (Ayenew, 2007). The 1975 land proclamation also 
established peasant associations (PAs) to implement the redistribution of land and take care of 
local-level governance in rural areas. One PA had the mandate to administer an area of about 800 
hectares or more, and elected members led these bodies. The PA leadership was composed of an 
executive committee (which people called them Abba Shanees, with the intention of preserving 
names from the early days in the Gada system), an inspection committee, and a judicial tribunal. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Source: Own Sketch 
Figure 5.3: Administrative structure during the Dergue regime 
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Formal and informal institutions during the Dergue regime 
PAs had relatively more power to make decisions at the local level compared to the government 
structure during the imperial regime. The PAs had power to deal with land re-distribution, 
administer and conserve public property such as water and forestry, establish judicial tribunals and 
solve land disputes, establish cooperatives and physical infrastructure (such as schools and clinics), 
and undertake villagization programs. The judicial tribunal of each PA had mandates to hear and 
decide any dispute involving pecuniary claims of up to ETB 500 or any disputes over property of 
a value up to ETB 500. The tribunal also had the mandate to deal with disputes related to land 
within the PA, the division of common property, and fees for the collective use of lands and 
instruments. It had the power to hear and decide on disputes between the PA and its members on 
the payment of loans advanced through the PA. Moreover, the PA judicial tribual was given the 
power to hear and decide on most criminal jurisdictions. In principle, devolvement of power to the 
local level enabled family farmers to be led by their ‘own’ representatives. However, in practice, 
this was not implemented as initially intended (Bekele, 1982). Instead, PAs became the political 
arm of the military government, in order to control the rural population and to enforce all sorts of 
impositions, ranging from the recruitment of military personnel and forced villagization, to the 
supply of grain quotas to the Grain Marketing Corporation (ibid).  
Despite the intention to make use of their informal institution, implemented through the 
Shanee and practiced under the cover of reji and Jarsa biyya, the rural community was under huge 
pressure from the military government. Not only the council of elders (that were already 
suppressed during the imperial regime), but also the reji/iddir proper were not encouraged at this 
time. This was mainly because of the perception that reactionary forces controlled rejis and the 
conflicts of the so-called ‘reactionary forces’ with the newly established PA leadership (Pankhurst 
& Hailemariam, 2000). However, the rural community continued to use its informal institutions 
because of their indispensable roles. As was the case during the imperial regime, the formal 
institution made use of the council of elders (which the community still called Shanee) as a tool to 
solicit evidence for complicated crimes for which it was difficult to get evidence in order to handle 
the case by the judicial tribunal of the PA. The different levels of Jarsa biyya also continued their 
roles despite the intention of the Dergue government to handle everything through a formal system 
(Int. code no. 75, 2015; 100, 101, 2016). The elders indicated that people were afraid of using 
informal institutions since the killing of over 64 ministers and high-ranking officials that served 
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the imperial government, and its actions during the red terror, which demonstrated the 
mercilessness of the Dergue government.  
 
5.2.4. The current regime 
The EPRDF deposed the Dergue military regime in 1991. Upon regime change, ethnic-based 
regions subdivided further into zones, and woredas replaced the province administration of the 
Dergue. The formal grassroots administrative structure during the current regime was the kebele. 
After the 2010 election, the ERDF introduced more administrative subdivisions to the kebeles in 
the form of formal social networks. In this arrangement, a group of five neighboring households 
form a one-in-five group with four members and one group leader (Figure 5.4). Again, a group of 
five one-in-five groups form one gare (a development group). The leadership of the development 
group (gare) is composed of an Abba Gare, the five Abba Shannees that are members of this gare, 
and the leader of the zone in which the development group is located. Members of the gare assign 
an Abba Gare (the leader of the gare). This person need to be member of the ruling party so that 
he could inspire the five Abba Shanees (leaders of one-in-five groups). The Gare is expected to 
solve problems that could not be solved by the one-in-five group. A number of gares form a gott 
(zone), and one kebele is composed of three zones/gotts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own Sketch 
Figure 5.4: Administrative structure during the current regime  
 
According to directives for the formation of the one-in-five group, and discussions with 
informants (Intr. cod no. 56, 2015), the leaders of all three stages of the community organization 
are preferably affiliates (members or strong supporters) of the ruling party. According to 
information obtained from government documents and discussions with informants, this new 
subdivision is the result of lessons learnt during the election campaign in 2010, with the intention 
“to repeat the election victory in agricultural development.” The major assumption is that party 
members with “demonstrated efficiency in convincing farmers to vote for their party” can play a 
similar role in development activities. In this case, the major tasks of the leaders are to convince 
their fellow group members to develop crop plans, prepare their plots, procure inputs, follow 
intensive training programs, and implement the knowledge obtained to boost their production. 
However, in cases where members of the party have a marked weakness in planning and executing 
their farming practices, better performing farmers are selected to lead the farmers’ one-in-five 
groups. According to guidelines for the establishment of one-in-five groups, the leaders of these 
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groups organize meetings with their members every three days and discuss any progress or 
problems encountered, in order to motivate them toward achieving their intended goals.  
Informants and the literature indicate that the one-in-five and gare systems of community 
organizations are adopted from the Gada system (Megerssa, 1993) (Int. code no. 75, 2015 & 102, 
2016). As shown above, there were similar social organizations during the Gada administration. I 
understand that the re-introduction of this form of social organization emanated from a good 
understanding of the power of such a social organization in the Gada system, with some 
modifications set up to adapt it to the existing reality. According to the informants, one-in-five and 
gare are not new concepts but have been used in different contexts during different regimes. 
Accordingly, the 200-300 people organized under the Abba Shanee during the imperial regime, 
and those people organized under the seven executive committee members of the PAs (the rural 
community calls them Abba Shanees) during the Dergue regime, followed a similar structure. My 
informants indicated that Abba Shanees during the imperial and the Dergue regimes led hundreds 
of farmers. This means they were not able to understand the situation of individual households in 
response to the delivered messages. Due to the communication gap with Abba Shanees, each 
household did not have the chance to present why they had not implemented their orders. 
According to discussions with elders, Abba Shanees during the Dergue regime were stronger and 
more efficient than the current one-in-five groups in terms of mobilizing the community around a 
certain theme, because it was not easy to gain access to the then Abba Shanees and provide 
justifications not to perform what was required. As a result, the choice was either to execute their 
orders or accept punishment for not accomplishing what they had been instructed to do. In the case 
of the current one-in-five leaders, they are one of the five neighbors that can also be members of 
one family. As a result, members of one-in-five groups can easily convince their leaders to get 
permission not to execute the orders. According to my informants, the leader and members of a 
one-in-five are close to each other and help create excuses not to execute orders from higher 
government structures. This means the enforceability of order from higher government hierarchies 
is lower with the current one-in-fives compared to previous government structures.  
 
77 
 
Major actors in rural areas, and their characteristics  
The current local government administration in rural Ethiopia is the kebele. This level of 
administration is responsible for implementing most of the government rules and regulations 
targeting rural and agricultural development. The kebele administration is actively involved in all 
sorts of agricultural development activities, namely the development of social services such as 
education, health, and the maintenance of peace and stability in the area. Implementation of these 
different policies and development plans in rural areas involves different actors. Family farmers 
are the major actors in rural Ethiopia in general and the study areas in particular. Other important 
actors include extension agents, schoolteachers, experts in government offices working with the 
rural community, and officers of woreda administrations. Some nongovernmental organizations 
including World Vision and United Nations-affiliated organizations such as the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), also operate in the study areas. These actors have interconnected 
and mostly interdependent activities, though they all have their own objectives and guiding 
principles. However, depending on the ways in which different actors implement these different 
policies and plans, the power/knowledge configuration in the study areas varies and needs due 
consideration and understanding.  
Land is the major source of livelihood for rural households in Ethiopia in general and 
family farmers in the study areas in particular. The ultimate owner of the land is the government, 
even during the imperial regime when there was a certain form of private ownership by elite groups 
and social classes affiliated with the monarch. The 1975 land proclamation of the Dergue totally 
nationalized land, and it is still in the hands of the government, while family farmers have a 
usufruct right to farm it. The average land holding in Ethiopia is 1.77 hectares per household (CSA 
and World Bank, 2013), and it is 1.7 hectares per household in the Kersa and Omonada woredas 
and 1.1 hectares in the Bako-Tibe woreda. However,  holding sizes vary significantly among 
farmers. Results of the household survey show that over 20 percent of the households cultivate 
less than 0.5 hectares. In relation to farm size, over 81 percent of the sample farmers said that they 
do not have access to enough land to produce food and non-food products for their household. The 
most common strategies to gain access to more land involve sharecropping or renting-in. The 
results of this study show that 38 percent of the sample farmers sharecropped-in and 17 percent 
rented-in croplands in the 2014/2015 cropping season. On the other hand, about 55 percent of the 
sample households reported that they earned income from leasing out their farmland. According 
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to the results of the in-depth interviews, farmers sharecrop out/lease out their farmlands when they 
need cash urgently and when they do not have other near-cash assets such as livestock or access 
to credit. Sharecropping is an arrangement in which the owner of a land use right finds someone 
that will cover crop inputs (mainly chemical fertilizers and improved seeds) so that they can share 
the harvest. The share of the harvest depends on their agreement. The general scenario is the owner 
of land use right cultivates the land and covers all labor costs, while the sharecropper covers the 
input costs and they finally divide the harvest equally. The share of the final harvest from the 
sharecropped land that goes to the holder of the land use right becomes less than half when the 
sharecropper handles production activities, too.  
 
Knowledge and power configurations in rural areas 
A council composed of a chairperson elected from the community; a manager hired by the 
government and members of the kebele cabinet, including coordinators of extension agents; a 
director of the school in that kebele; representatives of the three kebele gotts; and the person 
represented from the woreda administration to coordinate the overall activities of the kebele govern 
rural kebeles. This means extension agents and other actors in rural areas are part of the kebele 
administration. From my observations, the involvement of professionals such as extension agents 
in decisions that may involve the personal welfare of individual households, in addition to their 
technical engagement with these households, tends to create a kind of power relation between the 
farmers and the respective professionals. According to my informants (Int. code no. 56, 2015; 92, 
2016), being members of the council of a kebele administration, these local experts are involved 
in all sorts of decision-making, including those affecting access to the land of family farmers. This 
creates a scenario in which experts may favor some farmers and vice versa, depending on their 
closeness to and compliance with ideas they are promoting.  
With the introduction of the one-in-five group organization in 2010, the government 
introduced the periodic ranking of farmers. Based on their level of participation in extension, input 
use, market orientation, political participation, their capacity and willingness to share their 
knowledge and experience with other farmers, and other socioeconomic activities, the extension 
system categorizes family farmers into three groups: Type A farmers (model farmers), Type B, 
and Type C farmers (MOA, 2010). Type A farmers are those who use the full package of crop and 
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livestock technologies, are able to buy fertilizer and improved seeds for cash, and produce a 
marketable surplus. Such farmers have good extension contacts, and they plan and implement their 
activities in consultation with extension agents. They also have a good level of political 
participation and are willing to inspire other farmers. Type A farmers are surplus producers and 
food secure. Type B farmers are intermediate farmers using improved agricultural technology 
packages; however, they do not always use the full package of recommended technologies. Type 
B farmers are not willing and/or able to inspire other farmers. Most of type B farmers are food 
secure. Type C farmers are generally poor and cannot afford to buy fertilizer or improved seeds 
for cash. As a result, they usually sharecrop out their land to those who are able to cover the costs 
of inputs. Type C farmers also lack livestock and other assets, so they are not able to get micro-
finance credit, since they cannot get group collateral. 
The important implications of categorizing farmers into different ranks can be seen from 
two important perspectives. The first is the creation of a sense of competition among this cohort 
and targeting different categories with different packages of technologies. The second is in terms 
of knowledge and power configuration in the farming community. The results of the household 
survey reveal the fact that those farmers classed as Type A have better access to credit and 
extension services, and they participate more in the political scene than Types B and C. Moreover, 
Type C farmers are resource-poor and food insecure, do not have access to credit, have less access 
to extension advices, and participate less in politics than their Type A counterparts. This sort of 
knowledge and power configuration creates or expands a social stratum in which wealthier farmers 
become more influential in the community, due to their greater wealth status, better access to 
knowledge, and their acceptance into the government’s political decision-making circle. For 
instance, a lack of access to finance, which compels Type C farmers to engage in sharecropping 
arrangements, creates an opportunity for wealthier farmers to harvest more crops and therefore 
make more wealth. The issue one needs to note here is the trade-offs going on in the rural 
community. While those farmers that have better access to financial resources look for more plots 
of agricultural land, those who do not have access to finance to procure farm inputs are compelled 
to give up their scarce plots of land through different informal tenure arrangements. This creates a 
poverty trap for poor family farmers, since they lose at least 50 percent of their harvest in 
sharecropping arrangements year after year. On the other hand, those who acquire land through a 
sharecropping and/or rental arrangement usually become better off and enter into more of such 
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arrangements every year. The emerging better-off farmers that enter into different business 
activities generate their investment capital in such ways. This implies that the existing 
power/knowledge configuration in rural Ethiopia promotes the creation of few affluent farmers at 
the expense of several farmers who fall deeper into the poverty cycle. While this facilitates a take-
off point from which wealthier farmers can break out of agriculture and move into a diverse 
business environment, it also creates more ultra-poor, food insecure farmers. This issue therefore 
requires focused policy and development action, to address the lack of access to finance and other 
causes that perpetuate poverty and food insecurity among the rural poor. 
 
The informal institutions of family farmers 
Jarsa biyya and shanee, a structure rooted in reji, run the informal institutions of family farmers 
in the study areas. Reji is a voluntarily established informal self-help community organization. 
According to focus group discussions (FGD code no. 13, 2015; 23, 2016) and in-depth interviews 
(Int. code no. 61, 66 & 69, 2015; 114, 117 & 118, 2016), reji has two major components: arfe and 
shanee. Arfe is responsible for helping members organize burials, arrange funeral ceremonies, 
support bereaved families, aid those whose oxen have died, and help those whose houses have 
burned down. Arfe also supports members in borrowing money and in some cases grain. It is also 
responsible for the management of members and resolving conflicts arising among members in the 
process of delivering the stated services. The shanee/shanachaa council is responsible for 
resolving conflicts arising in the community, finding out facts and soliciting evidence for 
wrongdoing for which it is normally difficult to acquire evidence to take the case to a formal court. 
Informants in all the locations indicated that shanee is the legacy of their ancestors, albeit the 
imperial and the Dergue military regimes suppressed its use. However, the current government 
does allow rural communities to make use of its customary laws. Shanee is responsible for several 
social issues, including natural resource management, women’s rights, marriage, social behaviors 
affecting the peace and stability of the community, issues related to property rights, and 
community rituals. If there is an incident involving the robbery of assets, including livestock, grain, 
and other assets with limited evidence for a court procedure, communities make use of the shanee 
to identify the perpetrators and penalize them accordingly. This involves religious and traditional 
beliefs as well as social networks. 
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Structure of the reji/iddir  
A Reji has different divisions responsible for its smooth functioning: Abba Reji, deputy Abba Reji, 
secretary, Abba Salgaa, the treasury, accounting and audit, the arfe council, the shanee council 
and Abba Jiga. Abba Reeji is the leader of the reji and is responsible for day-to-day activities. 
There is also a deputy Abba Reji that helps the Abba Reji and substitutes for him when he is not 
available in the area. The Abba Salgaa is responsible for announcing all events to members based 
on the orders of the Abba Reji. Such events could be the burial of a member or his/her family, the 
death of an ox, a general meeting of members, or a work campaign to help members for some 
reason. The arfe council, as indicated earlier, is responsible for handling the routine activities of 
the reji, including conflicts that arise from day-to-day activities, while the shanee is the informal 
legislator and jurisdiction of the community. The Abba Jiga is the overall control organ that takes 
care of members’ appeals against the way the Abba Reji or the arfe and shanee council handle 
their case. The Abba jiga has the right to take the case to an independent council of elders, Jarsa 
biyya, and examine the appeal of members before deciding the next steps. If the member is not 
satisfied even with the response of Abba Jiga, the appealer has the right to appeal to a neighboring 
reji.  
How shanee operates 
The Abba Reji initiates the jurisdiction with the shanee council. Once the Abba Reeji receives an 
appeal about a certain case, he calls the general assembly of members through Abba salga and 
explains what has happened in their community and the need to set up the shanee that will handle 
the issue. He asks the general assembly if they have any doubts about the already elected regular 
members of the shanee handling the case. If the members suspect that any of the shanee members 
might have a stake in the problem at hand, they suggest the selection of a new member of the 
shanee council, after which two elders from the assembly swear-in the shanee members to handle 
the case with a high level of honesty in any circumstances. The swearing-in is according to their 
religious denomination and traditional beliefs. After they have been sworn-in, in front of the 
general assembly, the shanee members immediately start their duties. They talk to all members of 
the community, including elders, youths, women, and all other men. Interrogations start with 
swearing not to hid whatever fact the person may know in relation to the case under investigation. 
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Once the shanee gets a clue about the issue, they continue building a body of evidence and finally 
talk to the suspects. Since the shanee gathers all the necessary evidence, the suspect cannot deny 
committing the stated crime. If he/she does try to do this, he/she will face social sanctions. The 
important power of the shanee system lies in religion, traditional beliefs, and social sanctions. 
Rural people in general and people in the study areas in particular are afraid of social sanctions 
and the swearing or curses. People in the study areas call the social sanction as tumaata. Since the 
livelihood of the rural community is interdependent, the application of a social sanction is like 
terminating one’s life. The person under the social sanction will not get community’s support for 
the burial of her/his family or oneself, will not get any help if a fire accident happens on her/his 
house and no one is allowed to talk to her/him (completely ignored by everyone). In addition, no 
one will rent/sharecrop the sanctioned person’s land even if she or he decides to leave the area. In 
some places, the livestock of said sanctioned person is not allowed to walk on community roads 
to reach their grazing pastures. People are also afraid of swearing, since they believe that it will 
affect their entire life.  
 
Wirtu is a network of different shanees in a certain area. There is one wirtu per nine kebeles 
in Bako-Tibe woreda. One person or a member represents the shanees in a given kebele at wirtu. 
All the shanees in the wirtu meet once a month and exchange information on their activities. Apart 
from the shanees in the different kebels, leaders of the respective kebeles in which the shanees are 
located, the Abba rejis, and religious leaders are part of the wirtu meeting. The purpose of wirtu is 
not only to exchange information, but also to hear about the results of work that shanees in different 
kebeles have conducted during the month. All the members of rejis in respective kebeles will also 
gather to hear these reports and possibly present their complaints, if they have any. Those people 
who are guilty of robbery, breaking the restrictions imposed on the butta (forced marriage), and 
other unwanted behaviors will admit their wrong deeds at this forum and ask for the forgiveness 
of the general assembly. Wirtu is also a forum through which to impose social sanctions on guilty 
individuals who are not willing to abide by the jurisdiction of the shanees. This is to ensure the 
unanimous implementation of social sanctions throughout neighboring kebeles.  
In general, wirtu is a forum to raise social concerns arising in the society. The assembly of 
all the shanees from different rejis and kebeles discusses the issue and potential solutions to 
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overcome the problem. Such solutions can result in norms or informal institutions that the 
community needs to obey, i.e. wirtu serves as a forum of legislation for informal institutions. 
 
Evolution of informal institutions 
According to the elders in the study areas (Int. code no. 75, 2015; 100 & 101, 2016), the shanee is 
not new and was used in the Gada administration (Hassen, 1994; Jalata, 2012). However, the 
shanee changed from a formal jurisdiction system during the Gada administration to an informal 
institution during the imperial, the Dergue, and the current regimes, and it is still an informal 
institution. In addition to its informality, I have tried to show the marginalization of shanees during 
the imperial and Dergue regimes. However, the shanee enjoy relative freedom during the 
current/EPRDF regime.  
According to the informants, cases handled by the shanee have evolved from time to time 
during the last 25 years. The original bylaw of the shanee system obtained from one of the case 
study areas, Checka Dimtu kebele, Bako-Tibe woreda, reveals that issues handled by the shanee 
council have evolved over time, depending on the emerging issues in society. In the initial text, 
developed in 1999 as a shared document among different shanees found in nine neighboring 
kebeles (wirtu) of the case the study area, their major focus was on issues related to the theft of 
assets. The document also includes details on rape and forcing someone into marriage (known in 
the Oromo language as buttaa); unnecessary expenditure on weddings, including extraordinary 
feasts and dowries paid by the groom; and peace and stability in the area. According to this 
document, the major focus of shanees at that time was exposing robbers and making them pay for 
the property they had robbed. Besides these fines, guilty individuals would need to admit publicly 
their wrong deeds and ask the community to forgive them. The document also restricts the 
movement of people in the village during the night, unless for compelling reasons. It also limits 
the time farmers can stay in towns. It is specifically stated that “those moving during the night are 
robbers.” According to this document, all male community members above the age of 18 years 
had the obligation to take part in a night patrol, following the guidance by community leaders.  
The initial bylaw of 1999 protests buttaa and elders engaged in arbitrating between those 
who committed buttaa and the parents of the girls. The document also spelled out restrictions on 
extravagant wedding expenditures. The document also set the maximum amount of dowry that a 
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groom should pay and the maximum number of people that would accompany the groom to take 
the bride. It also specified the fines and final social sanctions against those who did not abide by 
the jurisdiction of the shanee.  
The 1999 bylaw was revised in 2003. The revised document maintained the issues 
articulated in the initial document and included those related to false accusations and witnesses, 
the abuse of weapons, and the establishment of new rejis. Regarding false testimonies, the 
document showed that some people would make false accusations in court and use unrealistic 
witnesses to attack each other, which of course violated justice in society. The document also 
indicated the implications of such unjust practices to society and the need to fight them by exposing 
those who perpetrated these acts.  
With regard to the abuse of weapons, the document indicated that carrying weapons such 
as spears, knives, or heavy sticks at mass gatherings such as markets, funerals, and wedding 
festivals predisposes people to murdering each other and create instability. The revised document 
banned carrying such tools to places of mass gathering and set fines for people who did so. The 
document also banned firing guns during weddings and funerals, due to the violation of peace and 
stability in the area.  
The other important issue that came out on the revised bylaw was the intention of 
establishing new rejis. Some people tend to establish new rejis as a survival strategy when they 
are found guilty of a certain case, and the shanee within their reji initiates social sanctions on them. 
Taking this into account, the revised document placed a restriction of producing clearance from 
existing rejis in order to establish a new one.  
The bylaw, revised in 2003, was again revised in 2014. In this version, more kebeles were 
included and the network expanded to the woreda level. New issues in the revised document were: 
banning female genital mutilation, restrictions on the abuse of natural resources, objections against 
people who use evil powers of sorcerers to disturb the livelihoods of others (and systematically 
confiscate their property), and unacceptable behavior of rural youth, such as gambling. With the 
increased influence of non-governmental organizations, activists, and women’s affairs offices at 
different levels, the attention given to harmful cultural practices such as female genital mutilation 
has increased over time. The influence has gone beyond the formal government system into 
informal institutions, which are more effective at the grassroots level. In this regard, the document 
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set penalties for those people who practice genital mutilation as a source of income and the parents 
who let their children be mutilated. According to this document, those who exposed the people 
doing the genital mutilation would receive the fine money collected from perpetrators. This means 
that apart from their social obligation, for which they would be admonished at the shanee if they 
did not report such cases, people would have the financial incentive to expose the mutilators.  
The bylaw revised in 2014 strengthened those issues that were included in the first two 
earlier versions and included some that contributed further to cases of robbery and theft. Among 
these practices was the excessive engagement of rural youth in gambling. Since gambling involves 
money, those who indulge regularly may use theft as source of income to finance their activity. 
Moreover, such people engaged in regular gambling activities will not help their family or 
contribute to any production activity but rather become a burden to society. The document thus 
highlighted the need for the parents of such youngsters to advise their children as much as possible 
and expose them to the community before they reached the stage of engaging in such harmful 
practices. 
 
Determinants of the effectiveness of informal institutions  
The importance of informal institutions varies according to the nature of problems in society and 
the level of effectiveness of formal institutions to address these problems. I observed that location 
and proximity to urban centers also influence the effectiveness of these institutions. For instance, 
the looting of livestock is a more serious problem for farmers in Bako-Tibe than for those in Kersa 
and Omonada. There was also an incidence of livestock theft while I was conducting the fieldwork 
in Amarti Gibe kebele, Bako-Tibe woreda. One of the farmers with whom I conducted an in-depth 
interview in Cheka Dimtu kebele disclosed to me that his oxen had been stolen (Intr. code no. 61, 
2015). This farmer mentioned the difficulty he had in taking the case to the court because of a lack 
of tangible evidence about the robbers. However, the shanee found his animals by tracing the 
robbers in neighboring woredas. Due to the severity of livestock theft in Bako-Tibe, and the 
difficulty in handling cases through the formal justice system, farmers in Bako-Tibe tend to rely 
on shanees. The problem of livestock theft was not a serious problem in Kersa and Omonada 
woredas. As a result, the role of shanees in Kersa and Omonada rather concentrates mainly on the 
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maintenance of peace and stability and protection against rape and other unwanted social 
behaviors.  
While the shanees in Bako-Tibe were networked at the wirtu and woreda levels, have 
written bylaws and were very strong, those in Kersa and Omonada were not comparable. For 
instance, youths in the four woredas surrounding the Gilgel Gibe-I hydro-electricity dam reservoir 
were engaged in fishing. Several fishery groups were organized, but there was no networked 
institutional arrangement between them, and the shanees in this area were very weak. Every group 
was competing with others for more fishing rights, leading to a ‘tragedy of the commons’ situation 
(Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). Finally, conflict broke out between the rival groups. 
According to an in-depth discussion with a kebele leader (Int. code no. 102, 2016), the fishing 
groups looted and damaged each other’s fishing tools and physically attacked each other. Fishing 
activities were interrupted by the time of the fieldwork for this study. A network of shanees in 
these kebeles (like in Bako-Tibe woreda) would have been able to prevent such conflicts.  
Proximity to urban centers also has an impact on the level of effectiveness of informal 
institutions. This is mainly because of the tendency that farmers residing around towns, where they 
are closer to the police, and other formal services tend to use and rely more on these structures. 
Moreover, those who have relatives or strong linkages with people in leadership positions in 
government offices tend to disrupt the activities of shanees. This happens especially when family 
members or the person himself is found guilty of a certain case. According to discussions held 
with an elderly man (Int. code no. 75, 2015), there were cases when shanee members had been 
harassed and put into prison because of initiating social sanctions on a person with close linkages 
to officials in the woreda office.  
 
5.3. Dependencies  
5.3.1. The interdependence between formal and informal institutions  
As indicated earlier, the indispensable role of shanees has made it difficult for past and current 
governments to contain their activities. However, this does not mean that there was no 
interdependence between formal and informal institutions during these times as both sought, the 
support of one another. The formal institution sought the support of shanees to handle cases that 
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were difficult to settle through formal court procedures, because formal judicial tribunals need 
readily available evidence, which is not always readily available. In such cases, society relies more 
on its informal institutions. Moreover, shanees takes care of emerging issues that may affect the 
day-to-day lives of the local community but which may not be considered by formal institutions. 
Understanding the effectiveness of shanees, formal government structures also tend to rely on 
informal institutions to handle cases such as the maintenance of peace and stability in rural areas. 
When we see the degree of acceptance of formal and informal institutions in rural areas, farmers 
tend to consider informal institutions as their own and implement its resolutions in their day-to-
day lives (Int. code. no. 60 & 61, 2015).  
Beside their jurisdiction role in the community, informal institutions tend to set norms and 
values in the rural community. For instance setting the maximum limit of wedding expenses and 
dowries; the rights of women; bans on female genital mutilation; protests against the practices of 
sorcerers; bans on the abuse of weapons; and limiting the time the farming community stays in 
urban centers, were depending on the level of concerns created among the rural community. In this 
regard, I argue that informal institutions are forerunners in addressing the concerns and grave needs 
of rural communities. This might be taken up by actors in power and modified as formal 
institutions (Van Assche & Hornidge, 2015). Taking this notion into account, there is a tendency 
for informal institutions to interplay with formal ones. For instance, cases handled by the shanees 
can be channeled through the kebele, which in turn directs them to Abba Rejis to deal with the 
matter. In some cases, the findings of the shanee council are also presented to the kebele 
administration before the shanee takes punitive action against perpetrators. On the other hand, the 
shanees may also need the support and protection of the kebele. 
 
5.3.2. Path dependence in contradictory land policies 
Land has never been a private property in Ethiopia (Rahmato, 1984b; Rahimato, 2009c), although 
there was some form of this in southern Ethiopia during the imperial regime. The imperial 
government granted free gults (Rahimato, 1984; Stahl, 1974b) to its loyal citizens to use it as a 
private property, as long as they stayed loyal to the crown. Free gults used to be exchanged and 
used for mortgages; however, the emperor had the right to dispossess free gults whenever the 
owner of the gult right was found to have violated her or his loyalty to the crown (ibid). 
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The third five-year (1968-1973) development plan of the imperial regime acknowledged 
the importance of smallholder farming and considered it as its major policy focus (Cohen, 1987; 
Stommes & Sisaye, 1979). The plan also promoted large commercial farming concerns (Shiferaw, 
2014; Stommes & Sisaye, 1979). When the imperial government started implementing the plan, 
both commercial and smallholder farming activities competed for the same area of land, 
particularly in the south-central highlands of the country. Since the majority of smallholder farmers 
were tenants and the land belonged to landlords, the expansion of large commercial farms came at 
the cost of smallholder tenant farmers. This policy contradiction created mass protests in different 
parts of the country and contributed to the already  inflammatory opposition against the imperial 
government, which finally came to an end in 1974 (Cohen, 1987; Stahl, 1974).  
After the 1974 revolution, private land ownership was officially abolished in the land 
proclamation of 1976, which limited the maximum area per farmer to 10 hectares and banned land 
and rural labor markets (Aredo, 1990; Rahimato, 2009; Shiferaw, 2014). The current/EPRDF 
government has basically continued with the Dergue’s land proclamation (Aredo, 1990; Rahimato, 
2009; Shiferaw, 2014). However, it has made some modifications that give more freedom to land 
users to lease their land for a maximum of three years, bequeath use rights to legitimate heirs, and 
also make the rural labor market free.  
Initially, the EPRDF government focused on smallholder agriculture and invested heavily 
in the agricultural extension system. However, through further policy articulations in 2002, more 
focus was given to the expansion of large commercial farms (Rahimato, 2011). This policy shift 
triggered massive investments in commercial farming, particularly in the central highlands of the 
country. The expansion of flower farms is the best example. However, the growth of large 
commercial farms, urban settlements, and industrialization in densely populated areas required 
evicting large numbers of family farmers. As stipulated in the land legislation, the government has 
the right to evict farmers when the land is deemed important for large investments or public 
services, after paying the necessary compensation. Proclamation numbers 455/2005 and 456/2005 
determined the amount of compensation to be paid to farmers evicted from their holdings. 
However, there are reports about complaints regarding the amount of compensation paid 
(Rahmato, 2008). There are two important path dependencies to be mentioned here. The first is 
the continued state ownership of land throughout the imperial, Dergue, and EPRDF regimes. The 
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second involves repeated policy contradictions that have become permanent points of social and 
political concern in the country, i.e. the current government’s repeated promotion of smallholder 
and large commercial farming in densely populated areas of the country that challenged state 
power during the imperial regime. I argue that the development of pull factors or projects that 
absorb smallholder farmers needs to happen before enacting and implementing policies requiring 
the eviction of rural households from their land. The creation of sufficient pull factors could 
encourage rural urban mobility and the evacuation of spaces for large-scale investments.  
 
5.3.3. Path dependencies in accessing input credits  
The first comprehensive package programs implemented in Ethiopia targeted smallholder farmers 
by enticing with packages of improved crop inputs and credit services, among others (Cohen, 
1987; Stahl, 1974; Tecle, 1971). However, due to the prevailing land tenure system, in which the 
majority of smallholder farmers were tenants, it was difficult to enter into contractual agreements 
with tenants without the consent of landlords. The major challenge was the absence of contractual 
agreements between landlords and their tenants, meaning that the former could evict the latter 
anytime they desired to do so. Considering this point, the package projects devised a system in 
which smallholder farmers fulfilling certain pre-conditions could obtain input credit. The major 
preconditions were a down payment of 25 percent of the total input value, two guarantors (one of 
whom had to be the landlord, if the borrower was a tenant), a signed lease agreement between the 
landlord and the tenant, and group collateral, to enforce group punishment if a member defaulted 
(Mengisteab, 1990; Tecle, 1971). However, these conditions were prohibitive, given the reluctance 
of landlords to take responsibility for risky agricultural production and the low financial capacity 
of tenants to afford the down payments. Evaluation of the performance of the credit program of 
Arsi Rural Development Unit (ARDU) showed that the ultimate beneficiaries of the program were 
landlords and landed smallholder farmers, who were able to provide community and individual 
guarantors, in order to be eligible for the scheme (Cohen, 1987; Rahimato, 1991; Tecle, 1971). 
From the lenders’ perspective, group collateral was very much effective in ensuring high rate of 
repayment. For instance, the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) enjoyed up to 93 
percent repayment success, using a combination of individual and group guarantors. However, 
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these conditions for input credit were found to exclude tenants, and so CADU had to change its 
credit policy in order to target better the tenant smallholder farmers (Tecle, 1975). 
During the Dergue military regime, and in the 1990s during the reign of the current 
government, farmers received input credits through different arrangements. Currently, micro-
finance institutions are responsible for providing this financial service. Microfinance institutions 
have adopted some pre-conditions, such as group collateral, that have been used by comprehensive 
package projects such as CADU. Currently, micro-finance institutions use group collateral to 
ensure maximum rates of repayment. However, resource-poor farmers face difficulties in getting 
group collateral, and therefore they usually fail to gain access to credit. This means such farmers 
are failing to get access to improved inputs. Engagement in sharecropping arrangements in which 
they have to give up at least half of their produce is mainly the result of this problem. As indicated 
in the characteristics of actors (in sub section 5.2.4.1), Type C farmers are the major victims of 
this problem.  
 
5.3.4. Path dependencies in grain market stabilization policies and strategies 
A review of the policies and strategies adopted by the three Ethiopian governments since 1950 
shows path dependencies in attempts to stabilize grain markets. In 1960, the imperial government 
established the Ethiopian Grain Corporation (EGC) to stabilize grain prices and engage in imports 
and exports of this crop (Aredo 1990). However, the EGC did not fully deliver its intended mandate 
of market stabilization, mainly because of a shortage of working capital, a lack of adequate market 
information, and profitability problems (Rashid & Negassa, 2011). In line with its socialist 
ideology, whereby it considered producers and consumers exploited by traders and intermediaries, 
and rising food grain prices following the 1974 revolution, the military government established 
the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) in 1976 (Franzel et al., 1989). The major purpose 
of AMC was stabilization of grain market prices, procurement and distribution of inputs, and the 
maintenance of the national grain reserve (Degefe & Tafesse, 1990). Until 1979, the government 
tried to fix grain prices so that the AMC could procure grain at fixed prices from open markets. 
However, these fixed prices were not attractive enough, and so grain supply to the market fell 
below an increasing level of demand. The government responded by levying a grain supply quota 
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on farmers and placing restrictions on the activities of grain traders, in that they were not allowed 
to move more than 100 kg of grain between regions before the AMC quota had been filled (Degefe 
& Tafesse, 1990; Franzel et al., 1989). Farmers who failed to meet the grain quota supply would 
be initially banned from using service cooperative shops that sell basic industrial products and 
farm inputs, before finally being evicted from their land. As a result, farmers who could not meet 
the grain quota out of their own production were buying from the open market at higher prices and 
supply the AMC at very low prices (Franzel et al., 1989). Government market regulations stopped 
the ability of consumers to get grain from surplus producing areas at better prices, as well as 
producers’ prospects of selling their harvest at better prices to traders and consumers from low 
production areas. This blockage of grain trade opportunities exacerbated the 1984 famine, because 
it denied people in drought-affected areas access to grain produced in better production areas. 
According to Sen’s (1981) entitlement theory, such measures devastated the livelihood of 
producers and consumers and created a condition of entitlement failure. Market regulation 
discouraged producers from using improved agricultural inputs and destroyed their incentive to 
produce more (Franzel, Colburn, & Deguet al., 1989). This issue, coupled with recurrent droughts 
that threatened the country, decreased production leading to supply shortages in the markets. This 
in turn raised the grain price in the market so that both urban and rural consumers were unable to 
buy bundles of food with their resources in hand (Sen, 1981; Franzel et al., 1989).  
After the downfall of the Dergue military government, the AMC was re-established as an 
autonomous public enterprise operating on the open market and in competition with the private 
sector with a new name: Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (the EGTE) (Rashid & Asefa, 2007). 
The mandates of the EGTE upon its reorganization included stabilizing prices, earning foreign 
exchange through exporting grains, and maintaining a strategic food reserve for disaster response 
and emergency food security operations. As per its mandate, the EGTE intervened in the maize 
grain market in 1995/96 and 1996/97, when grain price fell below production costs, by setting 
floor prices and exporting 48,000 metric tons of maize to neighboring countries. The government 
revised the mandates of the EGTE through subsequent proclamations in 1999 and 2000, to 
gradually withdraw it from price stabilization and instead focus on the competitive export of 
different crops and facilitate the development of emergency food security reserves. However, 
following the good weather conditions and the better adoption of improved inputs, maize supply 
to the market increased and its price declined by 80 percent in 2002. In order to rescue the farmers, 
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the EGTE had to rein back on its earlier mandate of price stabilization to procure as much as 
possible and export some grain. In the next season, there was a 52 percent decrease in national 
maize production, mainly because of the low input use due to low grain prices and the late onset 
of rainfall. This created a situation of food shortage through which about 15 million people would 
starve if the government and the international community did not respond by importing grain 
(Rashid et al., 2010; Rashid & Negassa, 2011).  
From 2005 to 2008, food prices increased drastically. In response, the government imposed 
an export ban on cereals, suspended the World Food Program’s (WFP) purchases of grain from 
domestic markets, imported food grain through the EGTE, and re-introduced urban rationing, 
which had been the major task of the AMC during the Dergue military regime (Demeke, 2012; 
Rashid & Asefa, 2007; Rashid et al., 2010). Since then, the EGTE continued importing wheat grain 
and rationing it to urban consumers at a 30 percent subsidized rate. Moreover, with the purpose of 
stabilizing domestic grain prices and providing affordable food to consumers, the government has 
imposed an export ban on maize grain. Maize export has been banned in 2008, lifted in 2010, re-
imposed in 2011(Wakeyo & Lanos, 2015), and has remained in place since then and up to the data 
collection phase of this study. This has kept the domestic price of maize grain very low (Demeke, 
2012). This shows the challenges that smallholder family farming households face by competing 
with highly subsidized food grain on the one hand and increasing input costs on the other hand, 
while the price for their produce has been artificially depressed because of the export ban on their 
harvests.  
In a nutshell, the market stabilization efforts of successive governments have clearly 
marked path dependencies, and their effects on discouraging input use and producers’ and 
consumers’ entitlement failure are my points of concern. This point was raised by Franzel et al. 
(1989) and Reshid et al. (2010), in that policy interventions made by the government to effect 
market stabilization have shaken market actors’ confidence. What was observed during the 1984 
famine and the grain supply shortage in 2003, which was believed to be the result of an 80 percent 
decline in grain prices in 2002, was also the outcome of price stabilization policies. Farmers 
interviewed for this study, in both Bako and Jimma areas, complained about the depressed price 
of maize grain and ever-increasing input prices as major sources of food insecurity risk. Some of 
the farmers also indicated that the government was fixing the market price and expressed their 
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intention to reduce maize production, mainly because its low price hardly covers input costs (Int. 
code no. 60 & 61, 2015).  
 
5.3.5. Interdependences between different policies 
The effects of each of the policies and strategies discussed above rely on the implementation 
modalities of other policies on the ground. For instance, the major target of agricultural extension 
policies is to promote ‘improved’ farming technologies and to increase the productivity and 
livelihoods of farmers. However, the use of chemical fertilizers and improved seeds, for example, 
is still far below what is seen in other Sub-Saharan African countries. This has been the case during 
all successive governments of the country. During the imperial regime, for instance, insecure 
tenure rights impeded smallholders from investing in new technology and improving productivity 
(Stahl, 1974; Tecle, 1971). During the Dergue regime, the high priority given to state farms and 
producer cooperatives, and the discouraging effect of centrally fixed grain prices, deterred 
smallholder farmers from investment (Aredo, 1990; Degefe & Tafesse, 1990; Franzel et al., 1989). 
After 1991, state market interventions, such as food imports, export bans, and subsidies  
perpetuated low prices for maize and other grains, discouraging farmers’ use of improved crop 
inputs (Demeke, 2012; FAO, 2014; Rashid & Asefa, 2007). In general, the different rural and 
agricultural development policies and strategies implemented in Ethiopia in the past, and current 
policies and strategies are interdependent in affecting family farmers’ food security. 
 
5.4. Discussion and conclusions 
This study focused on rural governance from the perspective of evolutionary governance theory. 
The study shade light on evolution of social organizations and government administrative 
structures, actors and institutions, access to resources, knowledge/power configurations, and their 
implications for the livelihoods and food security of family farmers. 
The evolution of administrative structures in the last four regimes (including the Gada 
administration) reveals one important trend (Figure 5.5). During the Gada administration, the 
lowest level of formal government structure was the shanee. Five neighboring households form a 
shanee, and the Abba Shanee (the father of fives), a person selected from the five households, leads 
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the shanee. Five shanees form an Olla. During the imperial regime, the lowest administrative 
structure was the ganda, divided into three shanees, each coordinated by a person again known as 
the Abba Shanee, who was responsible for the coordination of 200-300 households. However, 
unlike counterparts in the Gada administration, imperial-era Abba Shanees were not concerned 
with the day-to-day activities of households; rather, they concentrated on tax collection and the 
maintenance of the peace and stability. In a similar manner, the local community called the seven-
members of the executive committee of PAs during the Dergue regime Abba Shanees, who were 
also responsible for coordinating up to 200 households. The current government introduced new 
forms of formal social networks, known as one-in-five and gare, after the election season in 2010. 
The community again called the leader of a one-in-five the Abba Shanee. Despite differences in 
the roles during different regimes, the local community has continued to use the name shanee 
throughout. This was the mechanism of the local community used to preserve its original social 
organizations. The interesting thing in this regard is the re-emergence of the original shanee 
through the name one-in-five, without mentioning that it is derived from the Gada system. This 
created a negative impression, though, since a one-in-five was considered an imported form of 
control mechanism employed to monitor the socio-political activities of each citizen. This was 
partly because of the political affiliations (mainly affiliated to the ruling party) of leaders of one-
in-five groups and their role in the society. However, elders in the study areas explained that “one-
in-five/shanee is not a new form of social network. It has been there since our ancestors. It is rather 
the re-emergence of the oldest form of social organization.” According to Megersa (1993), a 
shanee was a very powerful social network in the Gada system, which is used to mobilize society 
towards a certain goal. The current government tried to make use of this powerful social network 
for political and development activities.  
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Source: Own sketch 
Figure 5.5: Summary of the administrative structure and revival of shanees 
 
Three important categories of family farmers, namely Type A, Type B, and Type C, are 
officially differentiated through periodic ranking in the study areas. This ranking is based on 
criteria such as the use of a full package of technologies, extension contacts, market orientation, 
political participation, and the capacity and willingness to share their experience with other 
farmers. This could be with the intention to target different types of farmers with different 
technology packages depending on their reception capacity. However, such categories and 
previlages given to model farmers, and the neglect of Type C farmers especially in their access to 
finanace has created unintended outcomes. Analysis of results in this study show a widening 
power-knowledge relation in the study areas due to the difference in access to extention, rural 
financial services and political participation by farmers in the different categories. Those who have 
better access to resources and services are becoming more affluent and more influential at the 
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expense of the resource poor farmers especially because of their lack of access to rural credit that 
compels them to get into share cropping arrangmens.  This shows a need for focused intervention 
to address access to finance by poor farmers, in order to improve their input use, and food security.  
Shifts in state power are central to the changing roles of actors and institutions in rural 
Ethiopia. During the Gada administration (pre-imperial period), the shanee council was the formal 
institution responsible for the day-to-day governance of local communities. However, its role as a 
formal institution ceased with the inclusion of the southern parts of Ethiopia into the central 
administration of the imperial government. This witnessed the role of state powers in defining the 
formality of institutions (Van Assche & Hornidge, 2015). However, despite the fact that the 
imperial government put all powers under the central government, the local community continued 
using the council of elders under the umbrella of its self-help local organization, the reji/iddir. Reji 
has two distinct councils, known as the arfe and the shanee. The shanee council under the umbrella 
of the reji continued the role of legislating and implementing informal institutions of the rural 
community, depending on social dynamics in different areas. In addition to the shanees under the 
umbrella of the reji, rural communities currently use different levels of councils of elders, known 
as Jarsa biyya. I learned that two major levels of jarsa biyya were operational in the study areas. 
The first one is responsible for resolving conflicts between and within households, due to daily 
social interactions and resource (e.g. land) use. The rural community sets up such councils of elders 
as the need arises. The second level of jarsa biyyas is responsible for resolving higher levels of 
conflict, which might have involved human life, or issues that are beyond the jurisdiction of the 
first level of jarsa biyyaas or the shanees operating under the umbrella of the rejis. This level of 
jarsa biyya is a council of five or nine elders, who are usually found at the kebele level. Despite 
their diversity, all councils of elders represent informal institutions that are legislated depending 
on the social dynamics in the community to address issues that are not yet covered by formal 
institutions. They also focus on issues that cannot be taken care of by formal institutions, perhaps 
due to lack of evidence. 
In areas where there is strong shanee activity (e.g. Bako area), there is a network of shanees 
known as wirtus. I came across a wirtu of nine kebels that meets in a small market village known 
as Shoboka. One member represents all Shanees in a given kebele at the wirtu, the latter of which 
is a forum for exchanging information, evaluating the performance of each shanee, and legislating 
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informal institutions. I had the privilege of viewing the bylaws of the Shoboka wirtu, which had 
been revised twice, in 2003 and 2014, since they were developed in 1999. Revisions were made to 
incorporate more institutions that needed to be implemented in the area to address different social 
concerns. Revision of the bylaws is a good indication of how informal institutions co-evolve with 
the social dynamics in society. 
The effectiveness of institutions was not uniform in all of the study areas. I understood that 
informal institutions are implemented more effectively in areas where their formal counterparts 
cannot effectively guide the social behavior of the rural community. This depends on the distance 
away from urban centers, where government structures and actors running these formal institutions 
are abundant. In rural communities located near to urban centers, farmers tend to rely more on the 
formal institutions than the informal. The effectiveness also varies with the nature of the problem 
faced by the community. For instance, those facing more frequent robberies of livestock rely more 
on informal institutions to protect their property. The activity of shanees was very strong in these 
areas, because it was not easy to get evidence on the robbers.  
I observed interdependence between formal and informal institutions in the study areas. As 
indicated in the last paragraph, informal institutions tend to address issues that formal institutions 
cannot handle due to lack of evidence, while informal institutions are stronger in mobilizing the 
rural community around a certain task. Due to these merits of the informal institutions, the formal 
ones tend to rely on them for certain issues. There were cases, for example, where government 
structures tended to make use of the informal institutions operating under the umbrella of reji and 
jarsa biyyas to handle cases related to peace and stability of the rural community. The role of 
informal institutions in maintaining peace and stability, enforcing women’s rights, fighting against 
false accusations and false testimonies, and similar activities complements the conservation of law 
and order by formal institutions. Informal institutions also need protection by actors running the 
formal institutions in cases where they handle issues that involve aggressive individuals that may 
physically attack members of the council of elders. Strengthening the activity of councils of elders 
in the legislation, and implementing informal institutions that address problems, might be a short 
cut to maintaining law and order in rural areas.  
Path dependencies exist in contradictions within land policies, conditions for access to 
credit, and agricultural marketing policies. These policies are not only path-dependent, but also 
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interdependent whereby the effect of one policy exacerbates the negative effect of another. The 
negative effects of these policies have contributed to the food insecurity and famine incidences the 
country has suffered to date, and their effects contributed to the downfall of the past two regimes. 
It is a wise step to look back and take corrective measures in relation to the policies and plans of 
the country. More specifically, land policy that evicts smallholder family farmers without enough 
compensation to cover the damage inflicted to their livelihood and social welfare needs proper 
consideration. This is because such policies expose several family-farming households to food 
insecurity and destitution.  
As indicated in the previous paragraphs, Type C farmers lack access to finance, mainly 
because they are not creditworthy and cannot provide group collateral, which the micro-finance 
institutions require as a basic lending criterion. If these households are left in the ‘business as 
usual’ scenario, millions of them will languish in the poverty trap while just a few progressive 
farmers will continue enjoying wealth and prosperity. This situation also erodes their resilience 
and increases their vulnerability to chronic food insecurity. There is therefore a need to consider a 
social security program that addresses poor family farmers in the so-called ‘surplus-producing’ 
areas of the country, including the study areas, in order to rescue many family farmers that are 
already categorized as Type C. It would also be wise to look into the market stabilization policies 
of the country that promote the distribution of subsidized wheat grain and use of subsidy free 
chemical fertilizer and certified seeds. This means domestic farmers are compelled to compete 
subsidized, imported grain with grain whose production costs are already inflated due to very 
expensive inputs. This may have a strong long-term effect on input use and productivity and may 
eventually cause the entitlement failure to both family farmers and consumers (Stommes & Sisaye, 
1979; Sen, 1981; Kuma, 2002; Rashid & Negassa, 2012).   
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6. Perceptions, Assessment, and Management of Food Insecurity Risk among Family 
Farming Households in Southwestern Ethiopia 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The history of famine and food insecurity in Ethiopia dates back to 253 BC (Webb & Von Braun, 
1994b). Nearly all famines and food insecurity problems have happened following consequent 
years of drought (Bewket, 2009; Webb & Von Braun, 1994). Taking the situation since the 1960s 
as a case in point, efforts to increase domestic grain production did not result in the intended 
outcome, mainly because of problems in policy design and implementation (Aredo, 1990; 
Rahimato, 2009; Von Braun & Olofinbiyi, 2007). During the late imperial regime, food production 
was based largely on a tenant-landlord relationship, which was rather prohibitive for technology 
adoption. The focus of the Dergue government (1975-1991) was also on producers’ cooperatives 
and state farms. Market restrictions, grain supply quotas, and centrally fixed prices were obstacles 
to the inter-regional distribution of food throughout the country, thereby fueling food insecurity in 
general and the 1984 famine in particular (Rahmato, 2009). Since 1991, the EPRDF-led 
government has set up huge smallholder-based agricultural extension program to help foster the 
adoption of improved technologies. To reduce structural food insecurity, the government has been 
working on a productive safety net and other complementary programs in drought-prone and food 
insecure areas of the country. Though improvements have been witnessed in building the resilience 
of households, food insecurity is still a persistent problem, in its many different dimensions. In 
2015, for example, over 10 million households were threatened by food insecurity after severe 
droughts, which were exacerbated by the El Niño weather phenomenon (NDRMC, 2015). Apart 
from weather and climate conditions, path dependencies in agricultural policies and market 
structures have also negatively affected technology use and productivity in agriculture.  
 
This chapter focuses on the major sources of food insecurity of risks, the perceptions of 
family farmers on these risks, their assessment and management strategies.  Understanding how 
farmers perceive, assess, and manage these risks helps in the design of practical solutions to 
address household food insecurity. This study applies an evolutionary risk governance framework 
to analyze and explain the linkages between the perceptions, assessemtn and management of food 
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insecurity risk. Three major categories of risk, namely climate-related risk, crop and livestock 
diseases, and institutional risk related to markets, influence household food security among family 
farming households in the study areas. These risks are interdependent, with one exacerbating the 
effects of the other. The impacts of certain risks pronounce local inequalities among family 
farmers. Family farmers use different strategies to cope with and adapt to the different sources of 
risks. However, some institutional and market-related risks make these strategies difficult to 
implement.  
The design of feasible interventions to improve the food security situation of family 
farmers needs understanding the risk perceptions, assessments, and management strategies of 
farmers, as well as the underlying causes that created these perceptions and practices in the first 
place. It is essential to understand that the farmers’ risk governance practices are the outcomes of 
an evolutionary process that involves interactions between different institutions, actors, and 
knowledge. 
 
6.2. Perceptions, assessments, and management of food insecurity risk 
This section is divided into three subsections. The first analyses the perceptions of family farmers 
about the different sources of food insecurity risk. The second presents assessments of sources of 
food insecurity risk by individual family farmers and groups of people in different communities, 
while the third subsection presents risk management strategies employed by family farmers. 
 
6.2.1. Perceptions of family farmers about the different sources of risks 
Perceptions of food insecurity risk due to climate variables 
The literature (e.g. Bewket, 2009; Webb & Von Braun, 1994) shows that most of the food 
insecurity and famine shocks in Ethiopia are associated with drought and other climate-related 
variables. It is therefore crucial to understand how family farmers perceive changes in climate 
variables and their consequences. The climate variables considered in this category include the late 
onset and early cessation of rainfall, too much rainfall, extended rain at crop harvest time, wind 
and hailstorms, and extended droughts (Figure 6.1). Results of the household survey show that 
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almost all of the sampled family farmers in the study area have experienced shocks from at least 
one of the climate-related sources of food insecurity risk in the last 10 years.  
Among the sample households, about 90 percent had experienced the late onset of rainfall 
at least once in the 10 years prior to the survey. The work of Gloede et al (2015) indicated that 
people’s risk perceptions are influenced by their exposure to similar shocks in the past. In line with 
this notion, analysis of the household survey data revealed that the previously described 90 percent 
of farmers perceived this climate variable as an important source of food insecurity risk. When 
explaining why they perceive late onset of rainfall as important source of food insecurity risk, they 
stated that late onset of rainfall elongates the dry season, creates problems with feeding and 
watering livestock, and also delays crop planting time. An elderly farmer in Cheka Dimtu Kebele 
of Kersa woreda (Intr. code no. 65, 2015) explained that “delayed rainfall means a shorter growing 
season that requires planting early-maturing maize varieties. However, we cannot change the 
maize variety according to weather conditions. This is because we express our seed demand ahead 
of the growing season. Certified seed is not easily available, and it is expensive to make changes 
when the onset of rain comes late.” Family farmers normally buy certified seeds of high-yielding 
maize varieties (e.g. BH 660) before the rainy season. With delayed rains and shorter growing 
seasons, the appropriate crop variety is the early-maturing type (e.g. BH 543 of maize); however, 
seeds for the next season are ordered ahead of time, and it is impossible to change varieties 
according to sudden climactic changes.  
Household survey data reveal that 55 percent of the sample farmers had experienced shocks 
from the early cessation of rainfall at least once in the last 10 years, and the same proportion 
perceived it as a source of food insecurity risk. The impact of this source of risk depends on how 
much the plant grown at the point at which the rain terminates. When the rain stops before the 
grain-filling stage, total crop loss can occur. According to the discussions  with my informants, the 
worst food insecurity scenario happens when a late onset of rainfall is followed by an early 
cessation (FGD code no. 4). However, the likelihood of such a coincidence is low. This happened 
in the study areas only once, in 1983, and resulted in the great famine of 1984. However, similar 
instances were reported in 2015/16 in some parts of Ethiopia (NDRMC 2015).  
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Both low and excess rainfall can cause food insecurity risks to family farmers. About 35 
percent of the interviewed family farmers had experienced a food insecurity shock at least once in 
the previous ten years because of excess rainfall. These farmers perceive excess rain as a source 
of food insecurity risk. However, they (FGD. Code no. 6, 7 and 8, 2015) indicated the degree of 
the problem varied with the amount of rainfall and soil type in the area. Family farmers in areas 
with waterlogging problems (e.g. resettlers in Kersa and Omonada) perceive the risk to be highest 
when the volume of rainfall is very high, which happened in 2008. As per discussions with the 
informants, crops suffer most when it rains continuously without intervals of sunshine (FGD code 
no. 5 and 6, 2015). Excessive rainfall also causes floods and loss of fertile top soil. Studies 
conducted in the Gilgel Gibe-I watershed (Demissie et al., 2013) showed that farmers can lose up 
to 39 tons/ha of top soil per annum due to water erosion.  
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Figure 6.1: Perceptions of farmers on climate-related risks  
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As indicated in Figure 6.1, a higher proportion of farmers in the Bako-Tibe woreda 
perceived extended rain at harvest time as a source of food insecurity risk than farmers in the Kersa 
and Omonada woredas. This could be because farmers in Bako-Tibe woreda were experiencing 
heavy rainfall when the interviews for this study were conducted at maize harvest time. They also 
explained that they had experienced the major extended drought that caused famine and food 
insecurity in 1984.  
About 54 percent and 37 percent of the sample farmers, respectively, had experienced food 
insecurity shocks due to hail and wind storms at least once in the previous 10 years. These farmers 
perceived hail and wind storms as sources of food insecurity risk, because they devastate crops 
and other assets.  
The perceptions of family farmers on food insecurity risk related to climate variables varied 
according to their wealth category (Figure 6.1). This is largely because crop production in the 
study areas is rain-fed with a high dependency on precipitation peculiarities. Poorly endowed 
households have fewer resources to tolerate crop failure and are hence more vulnerable to food 
insecurity problems due to risks related to climate variables. Bad climatic conditions may cause 
yield reductions or total crop failures that might result in food shortages. As a result, a higher 
proportion of poorly endowed households perceived almost all climatic variables as sources of 
food insecurity risk than wealthier farmers.  
 
Perceptions of food insecurity risk due to crop and livestock diseases 
Farmers in the study areas indicated a large number of crop and livestock diseases as sources of 
food insecurity risk. However, the focus here falls on tef head smut, fusarium wilt of pepper, maize 
diseases and pests, post-harvest storage losses, and livestock diseases (Figure 6.2). Head smut of 
tef is the most serious crop disease in the Kersa and Omonada woredas. Analysis of the household 
survey data reveals that 98 percent of the sample farmers had experienced the shock of tef head 
smut at least once in the previous 10 years. These farmers perceived that it was an important source 
of food insecurity risk. However, since the incidence of the disease is lower in the Bako-Tibe 
woreda, only 44 percent of the farmers in this area perceived it as a source of food insecurity risk. 
In the last five years, tef head smut occurred almost every year in Kersa and Omonada woredas, 
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but only once in Bako-Tibe area. Elders in Kersa and Omonada woredas explained that it had 
become more severe after the Gilgel Gibe-I hydropower dam reservoir filled with water in 2003. 
Experts associate this with increased humidity in the area, which is conducive to encouraging the 
disease (Intr. code no. 35, 2015). In addition to location, the perceptions of tef head smut varied 
according to the wealth category of farmers (Figure 6.2), with a higher proportion of poorer 
farmers perceiving it as a source of food insecurity risk. 
 
 
 
 
                    
 
 
Red pepper is an important cash crop in all the study areas. However, the disease known 
as fusarium wilt attacks it. Farmers believe that run-off and flooding cause fusarium wilt, because 
the disease spreads following the entry of floods into their fields. The incidence of the disease 
varies according to location. For instance, about 98 percent and 64 percent of farmers respectively 
in the Bako-Tibe woreda and the Kersa and Omonada woredas had experienced it at least once in 
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Figure 6.2: Perception of farmers on crop and livestock disease related risks 
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the previous 10 years and perceived it as source of food insecurity risk. Looking into the different 
wealth groups, a higher proportion of poorly-endowed farmers perceived fusarium wilt of pepper 
as a source of food insecurity risk than their wealthier counterparts (Figure 6.2), possibly due to 
the fact that pepper is an input-intensive crop that needs large amount of fertilizer compared to 
other crops (Minot & Sawyer, 2013).            
Diseases such as maize lethal necrotic disease (MLND) and the gray leaf spot virus 
(GLSV), and pests such as the maize stalk-borer, attack maize. An MLND outbreak occurred in 
the fields of seed companies in the 2014/2015 season and devastated hybrid maize varieties, which 
eventually caused a shortage of seed for some varieties. As a result, the research and extension 
system tried to create awareness of the symptoms of MLND among farmers, encouraging them to 
report its occurrence to the nearest extension agent. However, the information provided on MLND 
among farmers was not clear enough, and instead they reported other diseases such as GLSV 
instead of MLND. The reality was that MLND was not diagnosed in the woredas during that 
growing season. This shows non-knowledge of (GLFV in this example) and incomplete knowledge 
of the source of risks (MLND in this case) creates over excitement and frustration among the 
farmers. A comparison of the proportion of farmers in the two wealth categories (Figure 6.2) shows 
that more of the poorly endowed farmers perceived maize diseases and pests as sources of risk to 
their food security (Figure 6.2). This is because maize is the major staple food in the area, 
particularly for poorer people. Crop failure or a reduction in yield will directly affect the food 
security of poor farmers that may have no alternative accessing other food grains. 
Post-harvest losses of crops due to weevils, rodents, and other storage pests were 
mentioned by about 60 percent of the family farmers as an important source of food insecurity 
risk. Ultimately, farmers expect risks of post-harvest losses every year, up to and including total 
damage of the harvested crops. 
Livestock is an integral part of the mixed crop-livestock farming systems in Ethiopia and 
livestock diseases are sources of grave risks to family farmers’ food security. About 93 percent of 
the interviewed family farmers perceived livestock diseases as important sources of risk for their 
household food insecurity. The proportion is even higher for poorly endowed farmers than for 
well-endowed farmers (Figure 6.2).  
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Perceptions of prices of agricultural inputs, outputs, and food  
Three interrelated sources of food insecurity risk, namely large decreases in maize prices, and large 
increases in inputs and food prices, are identified in this category of risk. Family farmers in the 
study areas have suffered from tough price fluctuations in the past, and they expressed their 
uncertainty about future prices, too. About 78 percent and 98 percent of the total sample farmers 
perceived large decreases in maize prices and large increases in input prices, respectively, as 
important sources of risk to their food security.  
As shown in Figure 6.3, a higher proportion of poorly endowed households perceived large 
decreases in maize prices and large increases in input prices as sources of food insecurity risk. A 
model farmer in Checka Dimtu kebele, Bako-Tibe woreda (Inter. Code 61, 2015), exemplified the 
situation. After harvesting in November, would normally store maize, in order to wait for better 
prices in July and August, though on this occasion it was not successful: “Maize prices are usually 
declining while the cost of fertilizer and improved seeds are increasing. We are at a point where 
we have to reduce maize production” (Inter. Code 61, 2015).  
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Farmers in the study areas perceived that the government was supporting low grain prices 
to protect urban consumers. In fact, the government influences grain prices in different ways. For 
instance, an export ban on maize, aligned with the distribution of imported grain at subsidized 
rates, keeps domestic grain prices relatively low (Demeke, 2012). The influence of government 
interventions on domestic markets occurs through the activities of the Ethiopian Grain Trade 
Enterprise (the EGTE), which has purchase points in different woreda towns across the country. 
The price determination follows certain procedures. The EGTE conducts its own market 
assessment, announces its purchase prices at the purchase points, and invites all suppliers that can 
supply a certain minimum amount of grain to do so, albeit with certain quality parameters. Traders 
decide on their transaction costs and profit margin and determine prices at which they will buy 
from producers, based on the price determined by the EGTE.  Government intensions in lowering 
grain prices is to satisfy the needs of millions of urban and rural poor consumers. The military 
Dergue government, through its Grain Marketing Corporation, used similar low-maize price 
approaches, which illustrates path dependence in the Ethiopian maize marketing system. However, 
low prices for maize come at the cost of maize-producing family farmers becoming uncompetitive 
and forcing them to dis-adopt technologies, which eventually results in decreased production 
(Rashid & Negassa, 2012). This in turn promotes supply shortages and food insecurity, as was the 
case in 2003 (Rashid et al., 2007). Though farming households are both producers and consumers 
of maize, the decline in grain prices means a decline in the selling power of their produce. Family 
farmers in the study areas usually buy tef, pulses such as beans, edible oil, sugar, and other 
processed products. Unlike the prices for maize, the prices of these food items increase every year. 
As a result, about 51 percent of the interviewed farmers perceived large increases in food prices 
as a source of food insecurity risk. A higher proportion of poorly endowed than well-endowed 
households had this view (Figure 6.3).  
 
6.2.2. Multi-criteria assessment of sources of risk  
Once a family farmer perceives a certain source of food insecurity risk, she/he assesses that risk 
from different perspectives. Farmers have different evaluation criteria, depending on their own 
contexts. The risk evaluation criteria of individual farmers and the community coevolve with the 
nature of the risk. Experiences with different institutional arrangements and the actions of different 
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actors during the past food insecurity shocks have influenced the way individual farmers and 
communities assess differently perceived sources of food insecurity risk. As a result, farmers tend 
to assess certain perceived risks from different perspectives. In this study, I tried to capture 
farmers’ multi-criteria group and individual risk assessments and summarize them in a spider’s 
web graph (Figure 6.4). A multi-criteria assessment was made in 10 small focus group discussions. 
The criteria used in the group assessment were impact on food security, predictability, likelihood 
of occurrence, avoidability, and recoverability. The assessment was made in terms of ranking each 
of the identified sources of risk on a scale between one and five. The definition of the scales for 
each criterion is given in the discussion of each criterion. Each of the criterion is represented by 
specific loops which move across the axis of specific sources of risk in the spider’s web graph in 
Figure 6.4. Individual assessments were conducted through a questionnaire interview as part of the 
household survey, which focused mainly on the impact of different sources of risk on household 
food security and social welfare.   
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109 
 
Impact on food security and social welfare11 
The group assessments on rainfall-related sources of food insecurity risk show that the highest risk 
of food insecurity is perceived due to extended drought, followed by hailstorms, and then the early 
cessation and late onset of rainfall. Extended drought is a source of risk that is perceived to have 
the highest impact on household food security (Figure 6.4). The huge impact of extended droughts 
is usually preceded by the late onset and early cessation of rainfall. Hail and windstorms follow 
one another and destroy crops and other physical assets, thereby contributing to food insecurity in 
different ways. It was understood from the group discussions that impacts of hail and windstorms 
are usually limited to certain localities within a given area. For example, hailstorms usually attack 
the resettlement location in the Kersa woreda, while the surrounding community remains 
unaffected (FGD, code no. 6, 2015). 
Group assessments showed that extended rain at harvest times, and excess rainfall during 
the plant-growth season, were perceived to have a high impact on family farmers’ food security 
(Figure 6.4). On the other hand, the individual risk assessments rated the impacts of extended 
rainfall at harvest time on food security higher than drought. This could have been because of the 
coincidental extended rainfall at maize harvest time while the interviews for this study were in 
progress. Individual assessments revealed differences between poor and well-endowed family 
farms in how they viewed extended rainfall at harvest time. Poor farmers rank extended rain at 
harvest higher than the well-endowed households in all the study sites. 
The group and individual assessments revealed that large increases in the prices of 
agricultural inputs (mainly fertilizer and improved seeds) had stronger negative impacts on 
household food security than other sources of risk. As a result of massively increasing input prices, 
many poorly endowed households in the study areas were unable to afford these inputs, thus 
spurring a downward spiral toward sharecropping agreements or renting out their farmland. 
Both the group and the individual risk assessments revealed that family farmers perceived 
large increases in food prices as important contributors to their household food insecurity. This 
was the case for both poor and well-endowed households. Studies in the Jimma area by Hadley et 
al. (2009), on the impact of the global food crisis on household food security and intra-household 
                                                          
11 Impact on food security and social walfare: 1=Not important (very low), 2= Not so important (low), 3=Average, 
4=Important (high), 5= Very important (very high). 
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inequalities, also support these findings. Since Ethiopia is part of the global grain market and it 
imports a substantial amount of grain (especially wheat) and chemical fertilizer, food and input 
prices may also be linked to the effects of globalization. However, while wheat prices are highly 
subsidized, there is no subsidy on fertilizer, in order to keep inflation low for food prices and to 
protect consumers. However, the depressed price of grain, produced using costly fertilizer, 
discourages smallholder farmers and eventually leads to decreased input use and an associated 
reduction in food production (Demeke, 2012; Rashid & Negassa, 2012). 
 
Predictability12 
Predictability is related to Beck’s temporal delocalization of risk, which is about the degree of 
knowledge and non-knowledge thereof (Beck, 2002, 2006b). In this study, predictability is taken 
as a criterion to explain how far the occurrence of a certain risk can be estimated ahead of time. It 
is knowledge about the anticipated source of risk. A predictable risk is a risk, about which there is 
more knowledge than non-knowledge (Hornidge & Scholtes, 2011). The results of the group 
assessments show that large increases in input prices and post-harvest storage losses are the most 
predictable sources of risk for family farmers’ food security (Figure 6.4). In addition, farmers 
usually expect higher prices for fertilizer and improved seeds during the main crop seasons, and 
large increases in food prices are highly predictable, too.  
Post-harvest storage losses (Figure 6.4) can have a high impact if precautionary measures 
are not taken. As illustrated in Figure 6.4, tef head smut has a moderate level of predictability. 
However, deeper analysis of the group assessments in the three case study woredas reveals that 
predictability of tef head smut is low in the Bako-Tibe woreda, where the incidence of the disease 
is low and is very high in the Omonada and Kersa woredas (FGD code no. 15-17, 2016).  
 
                                                          
12 Predictability: 1= Not predictable, 2= Difficult to predict, 3= Average, 4=predictable, 5= Highly predictable 
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Likelihood of occurrence 
The likelihood13 of occurrence of a certain source of risk relates to the probability of that risk. 
Family farmers can estimate the chances of a certain risk depending on their access to different 
sources of information and the history of the risk. According to the community risk assessment 
summarized in Figure 6.4, post-harvest storage losses followed by large increases in input prices 
have a very high-perceived likelihood of occurrence. This means that storage pests will always 
damage crops if proper treatment is not made beforehand. The very high likelihood of occurrence 
of large increases in input prices shows the sustained concerns among farmers about the soaring 
costs of crop inputs. The likelihood of occurrence of large decreases in maize prices is also high, 
next to input prices. According to the group assessments, there is a high likelihood of occurrence 
of tef head smut in Kersa and Omonada areas. Though it is not revealed on the spider graph, the 
high likelihood of occurrence of tef head smut is limited to the Kersa and Omonada woredas since 
it is associated with the Gilgel Gibe dam, which both the community and experts believe has 
increased relative humidity in these areas.  
 
Avoidability 
Avoidability14 refers to whether a given source of risk could be diverted from affecting or 
influencing a household, a community, or a nation by taking some precautionary measures 
(McDaniels et al., 1995). Furthermore, it forms the basis of mitigation and adaptation measures 
for different sources of food insecurity risk. Community assessment shows that the effects of post-
harvest storage losses, as well as human and livestock diseases, are perceived by family farmers 
to be relatively avoidable, since there are treatments available for the major human and livestock 
diseases and pests. The effects of other sources of food insecurity risk are perceived to be relatively 
unavoidable. 
 
                                                          
13 Likelihood of occurrence: 1=No likelihood, 2= Low likelihood, 3=Average, 4= High likelihood, 5=Very high 
likelihood. 
14 Avoidability: 1=Not avoidable, 2= Difficult to avoid, 3=Average, 4=Avoidable, 5=Highly avoidable 
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Recoverability 
Recoverability15 refers to the difficulties involved in recovering from the effects of a certain source 
of food insecurity risk. As shown in Figure 6.4, post-harvest storage loss of crops is the most 
recoverable food insecurity risk. This is because the grain could be treated before it is totally 
attacked by pests. Maize stalk borer does not cause total damage and its effect is perceived to be 
slightly recoverable compared to other sources of risk. 
It is very difficult for family farms to recover from the effects of most sources of food 
insecurity risk related to climate variables. The history of food insecurity and famine in Ethiopia 
shows that the worst famines, such as those in 1984, were triggered by drought. The food insecurity 
and famine incidences have been exacerbated by institutional and political factors. Recoverability 
from institutional factors is very difficult, and often impossible. As indicated in earlier chapters, 
severe famines in Ethiopia, orchestrated by political and institutional sources of food insecurity 
risk were among the major factors that claimed the power of the two past successive governments. 
The current government is therefore making relentless efforts to prevent critical food crisis pinch 
points that may cause excessive loss of human life and lead to the loss of state power (Lautze & 
Maxwell, 2007). 
 
6.2.3. Risk management 
Based on their experience, accumulated through exposure to food insecurity shocks, responses to 
these shocks by government, and non-government actors and their access to resources, family 
farmers develop different risk management strategies. They do this by taking lessons from all sorts 
of actors and institutional arrangements that have been in place in response to food insecurity 
shocks and the results of these arrangements. I examined the risk management strategies of the 
family farmers based on a series of in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and results of the 
household survey. These coping and adaptation strategies can be divided into three: i) Risk 
mitigation/preventive measures used to divert the consequences of some sources of risk, ii) short-
term coping strategies, and iii) long-term adaptation strategies. 
 
                                                          
15 Recoverability: 1=Not recoverable, 2= Difficult to recover, 3=Average, 4= Recoverable, 5=Highly recoverable 
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Risk mitigation/preventive measures  
One of the risk mitigation mechanisms developed and used by the family farmers in the study areas 
is a strategy against tef head smut. One of the traditional preventive measures against the head 
smut disease was smoking the tef field when foggy weather occurs, in order to kill the disease-
causing organisms. However, this does not work well and the disease has occurred every year for 
the last 12 years, causing almost total yield loss in Kersa and Omonada. Tef is usually planted in 
the middle of the main rainy season. Farmers tried early planting within the main rainy season but 
this could not be successful since dews can happen any time and cause head smut to their tef crop. 
Through several trials at different locations, farmers came up with the idea to plant tef using the 
short rainy season (geniso) in March and April, and then harvest in June. A local variety of red tef, 
known as saye, is used for geniso. Saye matures in 60 days and can be considered an emergency 
crop. This is the result of farmers’ trials and is being widely used in Jimma area. This risk 
mitigation strategy was developed as a result of over a decade of problems with tef head smut. It 
should be note, though, that this is not a simple scaling up of the experience of farmers in other 
areas but is based rather on the local contexts developed as one of the risk management 
mechanisms. 
Being unavoidable source of risk, with high level of impact on family farmers’ food 
security, livestock diseases are the focus of household and government interventions to reduce 
these risks. In this regard, farmers use different vaccines in order to protect their livestock from 
different diseases. The provision of these vaccines is becoming a more common practice with the 
expansion of livestock health posts and the assignment of at least one veterinary technician at each 
health post, built in rural areas to serve two kebeles. Similarly, farmers use preventive measures 
against post-harvest crop pests. They use different local practices and chemicals against storage 
pests such as weevils and rodents. Since there is a very high likelihood of occurrence of storage 
pests, farmers apply these chemicals to prevent the pests from the very beginning. 
Due to a shortage of land, crop production on land with steep slopes is becoming a common 
practice. As a result, farmers lose a significant amount of top soil every year because of run-offs 
following intensive rains. They currently use recommended tillage practices, such as tillage against 
the slope and diverting run-off from their fields as mitigation measures against risk of losing 
topsoil from their plots.  
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Short-term coping strategies  
Short-term coping strategies are the immediate responses of family farmers to different sources of 
risk. In a bid to cope with the impacts of food insecurity risk, family farmers in the study areas use 
a wide range of strategies, ranging from borrowing money or grain and eating less, to selling their 
assets, including the house in which they are living, and migrating to places where they can gain 
employment or food. Borrowing money and/or grain from relatives and friends is one of the more 
common coping strategies. Those households that have relatives and friends in and out of their 
village try to borrow money or grain, in order to help their family through to the next harvest 
season. They also borrow money and inputs such as seed, if they have dependable relatives and 
friends. There are also informal lenders that provide grain, seed, or money, but they offer this 
service at very high interest rate. Since access to formal credit has several challenges, farmers 
borrow from such lenders in order to meet their immediate needs. When resources are a constraint, 
households also resort to buying crop varieties at relatively cheaper prices or use their own saved 
seeds.  
The first measure taken in response to food shortage is saving the available food stock by 
eating less. In the meantime, households try to diversify their livelihood strategies. These 
alternative sources of income-earning strategies include farm and non-farm wage labor, livestock 
income, and transfer incomes such as remittances, food aid, and gifts. Household members try to 
get wage labor either on neighboring farmers’ fields or in the nearby urban centers to generate 
income for food. Selling livestock, livestock products, and services is the other alternative source 
of income, while selling firewood/charcoal in the nearby urban centers is a common coping 
strategy in the study areas. For example, family farmers in Cheka dimtu kebele, Bako-Tibe woreda, 
sell fuelwood and charcoal sourced from Mount Abamargo during stress times. Residents of Cheka 
dimtu kebele describe this mountain as “Abba Hiyeensa” in the Oromiffa language (Father of the 
Poor), since income from selling fuelwood and charcoal collected from this mountain was the main 
resource that enabled the community to survive the 1984 famine (Intr. code no. 69, 2015). Those 
households that have family members/relatives abroad or somewhere in the country try to get 
remittances, in order to  embellish what funds they have available for food. Seeking community 
support and food aid is also a common coping strategy in response to food shortages. For example, 
115 
 
when the resettlers in Bulbul kebele faced a severe food shortage in 2008, civil servants in the 
woreda contributed part of their salary to buy food for the victims until they received food aid 
from the government. Taking Zeka (tithes in the Muslim religion) is also a self-help strategy among 
the Muslim community in Jimma area. Everybody is obliged to provide zeka to their needy 
neighbor, and this helps to support the disabled, elderly, and those who cannot get their daily 
subsistence. 
When the food shortage becomes severe, households sell general household goods and parts of 
their houses. For example, a resettled family farmer in Bulbul kebele (Intr. Code no. 44, 2015) 
explained “I sold seven heads of cattle that I brought from my original place and finally sold part 
of the residence house we are living in, just to feed my family.”  
 
Migration to areas where people can gain access to wage labor or support, to meet their 
daily subsistence, is another coping strategy. For example, a resettled farmer in Kitimbile kebele 
(Intr. Code no. 43, 2015), who was severely affected by the food insecurity and hunger that affected 
resettled farmers in 2008, rented out his land and migrated to a neighboring woreda to work for 
the electricity corporation as a temporary security guard.  
Some households stay with relatives for a short period of time, in order to gain access to 
food until they are able to either produce their own or find other options to buy food or receive 
food aid. For example, the children and wife of the farmer in the last example were moved to his 
wife’s parents home, until he could earn enough money to buy food for them. 
Short-term coping strategies help households survive in prevailing food insecurity 
situations. However, the success of these coping strategies varies depending on their implications 
for the future life of the household after the current problem is over. Some coping strategies such 
as renting out farmland may damage the basis of family farmers’ livelihoods and put the farmer in 
a vicious cycle of poverty. Other coping strategies such as selling charcoal/fuelwood may damage 
the vegetation cover of the area and expose croplands to erosion, again challenging the future 
welfare of the household and the community. Thus, putting new institutions in place, in order to 
protect the livelihoods of individual households and the community, needs to consider the local 
context and what alternative strategies the farmer can make use of, based on what has been used 
widely in the past. 
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Long-term adaptation strategies 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Field & IPCC, 2012), adaptation 
to risk refers to an adjustment to the actual or expected effects of the different sources of risk, in 
order to reduce harm. Long-term adaptation strategies in this study refer to those adopted by family 
farming households in order to reduce harm from anticipated risk. Since community practices 
evolve based on the past experiences of the community, long-term adaptation strategies are usually 
the results of the evolution of the actors and institutions in this setting. 
Discussions with family farmers in the study areas revealed a variety of long-term 
adaptation strategies. Farmers usually select maize varieties with better yield potential (e.g. BH 
660), in order to increase their productivity. High-yielding maize varieties normally need long 
growing seasons and should be planted earlier, in order to minimize the damage cause by the 
probable early cessation of rainfall (terminal moisture stress). However, the late onset of rainfall 
is becoming a common phenomenon delaying planting dates, which in turn shortens the number 
of days before rainfall terminates. This then runs counter to the long season required to grow high-
yielding maize varieties. As a result, farmers tend to shift towards early maturing maize varieties 
that need shorter growth periods, such as BH 543.  
Another long-term adaptation strategy of family farmers in the study areas is to diversify 
the crops they are cultivating. The usual practice is a maize mono-cropping system in which 
farmers rely mainly on maize for household food and income. However, they tend to diversify 
their crop to pepper, haricot bean, soya bean, chat, and coffee as ways of distributing risk over 
different crop enterprises. The tendency for diversification is mainly the result of risks relating to 
crop input and output prices that family farmers have faced for over the last four decades. 
Family farmers in the study areas did not have the tradition to harvest and then store 
livestock feed for dry seasons. This frequently caused livestock losses during past droughts. 
However, due to experience and training provided by the agricultural extension, family farmers 
started harvesting and storing maize stover and tef straw for feed after the 1984 famine. 
Since 2006, the Ethiopian government has initiated nationwide watershed development 
campaigns in the form of sustainable land use programs to reduce soil erosion from agricultural 
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lands. Community-based soil conservation practices such as the construction of soil bunds, tree 
planting, and the protection of trees on communal lands are mandatory practices that farmers have 
been carrying out as part of these campaigns. The farmers receive training, technical support, and 
logistical support to accomplish the soil and water conservation activities. Unlike in the drought-
prone areas of the country, where the community receives food or money in the form of a safety 
net for their involvement in soil conservation activities, farmers in the study areas provide 
free/unpaid labor services for one month a year. However, some special activities such as gully 
rehabilitation are done with small payments for the people engaged in such activities. The 
community intends to benefit from these activities through environmental protection, which may 
protect their croplands from run-off and erosion.  
 
6.3. Discussion and conclusions 
The major sources of food insecurity risk to family farmers in the study areas were discussed 
through three major categories: Risk related to climate variables, risk related to crop and livestock 
diseases, and institution-related sources. The major climate-related sources of food insecurity risk 
were the late onset and/or early termination of rainfall, extended drought, hail and windstorms and 
a combination of these variables. These variables inflict household food insecurity through their 
effects on crop production and the scarcity of livestock feed and water. Many crop and livestock 
diseases are also the results of changes in climate variables (Gadgil et al., 1999), causing different 
levels of crop failure and the deaths of livestock. There were times (for example, in 1998) when 
farmers in Amerti Gibe of the Bako-Tibe woreda lost all their oxen due to drought and disease 
outbreaks and failed to cultivate their crop lands (FGD code no. 14, 2015).  
In addition to the bio-physical factors, family farmers in the study areas have faced 
different institution-related risks that have exacerbated the prevailing food insecurity risk. For 
instance, the pricing policies of the Dergue military government (1974-1991), which included 
nationally fixed grain prices, forced quota-based grain supplies to the Agricultural Marketing 
Corporation (AMC), and restrictions on grain movement from one region of the country to the 
other, contributed to famine and food insecurity problems. As a result, one of the worst 
humanitarian disasters in history happened in 1984 in Ethiopia in general and the study areas in 
particular. Following on from the downfall of the military government in 1991, different policy 
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measures were implemented in the input and output markets of the country with the motive of 
reducing food insecurity risk. However, these policy measures were largely path-dependent and 
implemented at a cost to family farming households. Consequently, family farmers continued to 
face food insecurity risk.  
Family farming households in the study areas use different risk mitigation measures and 
long-term adaptation strategies against different sources of food insecurity risk. Use of these 
strategies depends, among others, on the level of knowledge and experience of the farmers 
regarding the uncertainty and predictability of the anticipated risk, the availability of inputs for 
implementing adaptation measures, and the financial and technical capability of the farmers. For 
example, using early-maturing maize varieties was identified and used as an adaptation strategy 
against the impacts of the late onset and early cessation of rainfall. The important inputs for this 
adaptation strategy are improved early-maturing varieties, though they yield less than longer-
growing varieties. Therefore, farmers use them only when weather conditions do not allow using 
other (high yielding) seed strains. In principle, because of the low predictability of rainfall, farmers 
need timely access to seeds of early-maturing varieties. However, the current seed production and 
distribution system, which is coordinated mainly by the public extension system, requires family 
farmers to place an order for these seeds (type of variety and quantity needed) far ahead of time, 
and they are not allowed to change their order once the demand assessment has been made. This 
highlights two important issues. To be on the safest side, either a farmer has to order high-yielding 
as well as early-maturing varieties at the same time, or the seed system needs to produce these 
very important seeds as contingencies for risk. Due to cost issues, most family farmers cannot 
afford to buy reserve seeds for contingency purposes. A feasible option could therefore involve 
working on the flexibility of the seed system and making it retain contingency/emergency seeds 
in case of climate variability. However, this in turn needs putting in place a sound planning system 
that considers the potential shortfalls that might happen as a result of risk, due to changes in the 
climate variables and other source of risk. 
On the other hand, family farmers perceived institution-related risks such as dramatic 
changes in input, output, and food prices as sources of predictable food insecurity risks with very 
high likelihoods of occurrence. These sources of food insecurity risk are perceived to have a high 
impact on food security, a low level of recoverability, and are unavoidable. The perceptions of 
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family farmers about these sources of risk are also related to adaptation strategies against the 
different sources of food insecurity risk. For example, largely increasing input prices have a strong 
negative effect on the use of early-maturing varieties as an adaptation strategy against the late 
onset and early cessation of rainfall. The low-yielding nature of early-maturing varieties might be 
a future challenge to family farmers looking to use such low-yielding varieties with very high 
fertilizer and seed costs while the grain price is depressed through different interventions to 
stabilize grain markets (Kuma, 2002). This shows the interdependence between the different 
sources of food insecurity risk and how they re-enforce each other. While some of the sources of 
risk (e.g. changes in climate variables) happen to be initial sources of food insecurity risks, 
institution-related sources re-enforce the problem by impeding the adaptation strategies of family 
farmers. This implies the fact that overcoming risks of food insecurity among family farmers needs 
not only focusing on certain sources of risk, but also having a broader understanding of the 
contexts. 
Results of the household survey among family farms in the study areas reveal that there 
are significant differences between the two wealth categories (poor and well-endowed) in terms of 
their risk perceptions, assessments, and management. More proportion of poorly endowed 
households perceived the high impact of most of the risk sources on household food security. 
However, these poorly endowed households fell short of using adaptation strategies against the 
impacts of the different sources of risk. Differences in the perceptions, assessments, and 
management of risks among farmers in the two wealth categories were the results of two factors. 
The first was because of knowledge differences between the two groups. Well-endowed 
households often have a better education and enhanced access to information through their social 
networks, including state sources (e.g. in the kebele administration) and mass media. This enables 
better-off farmers to gain a deeper understanding and assessment of the different sources of risk 
and then allows them to act accordingly. The second reason is the difference in the financial and 
material resources required to apply risk adaptation measures. Well-endowed households have 
higher budgets to buy, for example, improved seed varieties and to store them for contingencies. 
This means that the impacts of certain risks exaggerate local inequalities among family farmers. 
Similar observations were made in the work of Hornidge and Scholtes (2011). Local inequalities 
among family farmers in terms of the level of impact of the different sources of food insecurity 
risk reveal the need for a careful understanding of local contexts. Current wealth differences are 
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the results of different institutional set-ups that have been in place in the area in the past. They 
could also be the result of introducing new actors and the interaction between different actors and 
institutions in the past. Designing sound interventions against the different sources of risk for 
different actors in a given area thus needs careful examination of the evolutionary process that 
produced the current context in the area in terms of wealth differences and the relatively higher 
vulnerability of one wealth group compared to others. 
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7. Land for Food or Power? Risk Governance of Farms and Dams in Southwestern 
Ethiopia 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the risk the Gilgel Gibe-I hydroelectricity dam poses to family farming 
households near to the dam and its reservoir, with the aim of finding a more balanced relationship 
between land use for energy and food production. I will use the concepts of riskscapes and risk 
governance to analyze the tensions between these two aspects of land use in southwest Ethiopia. I 
will also analyze the linkages between risk perception, risk assessment, and risk management for 
local and non-local actors. Distinction will also be made between the riskscapes of landlessness, 
food and energy insecurity, and siltation. The chapter will also deal with the potential of spatial 
planning as a site of risk governance, whereby different actor-related and topical riskscapes can 
encounter, deliberate upon, and result in policy integration.  
 
7.2. Hydropower generation and its challenges in Ethiopia 
In the last two decades, Ethiopia has experienced a massive economic boom coupled with 
agricultural transition and socio-cultural changes (Stellmacher, 2015). In this context, the country 
has increased its hydropower generation capacities massively to satisfy domestic consumption 
demands, boost industrialization, and become a top regional electricity exporter (World Bank, 
2007). Most large hydropower dams in Ethiopia have been built in the southwestern part of the 
country, an area characterized by heavy precipitation in the rainy season, a rugged terrain, fertile 
soils, and traditional family farming. The production of hydroelectric power demands huge 
investment in the construction of dams and the creation of artificial lakes, accompanied by massive 
impacts on land use and land cover. Hydroelectric power projects normally involve the 
displacement of people, mostly family farmers (Bahiru, 2010; Tefera & Sterk, 2008). 
 This study focuses on the Gilgel Gibe-I (GG-I) hydroelectricity dam, located in the Jimma 
Zone, Oromia region, southwestern Ethiopia, which is one of the largest dam projects carried out 
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in the country in recent decades. The first plans for the construction of a hydroelectricity dam on 
the Gilgel Gibe river were conceived in the 1960s during the imperial regime, driven by an initial 
study conducted by the Yugoslav Electro-project company in 1963. Preliminary construction 
activities at the proposed site started in 1988, followed by a cooperation agreement between the 
Government of Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Korea. The project halted in 1994 but 
reignited in 1996 following an agreement between the Ethiopian government and the Italian 
company ENEL (EELPA, 1997; Kassa, 2001). Finally, in 2004, the Gilgel Gibe-I project was 
commissioned at a total cost of 356 Million USD (World Bank, 2006) (Figure 7.2).  
The dam is a 40-meter-high curved, rock-filled wall whose reservoir has a capacity to store 
917 million cubic meters of water (World Bank, 
1997, 1999, 2007a). Furthermore, the reservoir 
occupies about 48 square kilometers. The buffer 
zone, an area found within 500 to 1000 meters 
from the uppermost limit of the water level in the 
reservoir in all directions, occupies about 26 
square kilometers (World Bank, 1997, 1999). 
The project passed 184 MW dependable capacity 
and a total production of 722 GWH/year in 2005 
to the Ethiopian grid system (World Bank, 2007), 
thereby increasing total power supply by 45 
percent and making it the nation’s largest power 
plant. Moreover, it enabled the country to reach 
an additional 380 towns and 164 woredas, 
contributed energy to the country’s fast-growing 
industry and service sectors, and even allowed for energy exports to neighboring countries (Devi 
et al., 2008).  
 According to the World Bank’s project completion report on the Ethiopian GG-I 
hydropower dam project, the project displaced “only” 706 households, all of which were 
compensated by the Ethiopian government (World Bank, 2007). The following sections show the 
Figure 7.1: Map of Gilgel Gibe-I 
reservoir 
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reality is slightly more complicated, and that in the current situation, the effects of the dam on 
family farming still prevail. 
  
7.3. The riskscapes 
The study areas are affected by numerous interconnected and overlapping risk, the resultant 
outcomes of which affect the service life of the hydropower dam and the livelihoods and food 
security of the local community. This section presents the different actors in the study area, the 
important riskscapes for these actors, and their risk management strategies.  
 
7.3.1. Major actors in the GG-I hydropower project area 
In this study, we distinguish three sets of actors with respect to the riskscapes of siltation, 
landlessness, food and energy insecurity with respect to Gilgel Gibe-I (GG-I) hydroelectricity dam. 
The first set of actors comprises experts including the GG-I project management team, researchers, 
technicians working for government and nongovernmental organizations, and local and national 
administration officials. The second set of actors comprises farming households affected by the 
project. The project affected households can again be classified into those who moved to a 
resettlement site after being compensated for their properties on their original site, and those whose 
farming and grazing lands are partially or wholly delineated to the dam project but left in the areas 
surrounding the project without being compensated. For reasons of simplicity, the first set of actors 
will be called ‘experts’ and the second set of actors the ‘local community’.  
The general scenario is that experts consider the local community as sources of risk of 
siltation to the hydropower dam while the local community considers GG-I hydropower project as 
source of risk for landlessness, food and energy insecurity. While the risk of siltation, landlessness, 
food and energy insecurity are overlapping and inter-related, the different actors perceive them 
mainly from their own perspectives. Since severe soil erosion arising from intensively cultivated 
croplands and over-grazed fields causes a high rate of sheet erosion, experts perceive the risk of 
siltation mainly as the result of the community’s actions, thus forming a riskscape of siltation. On 
the other hand, because in many cases the GG-I hydro-electricity dam project has led to the 
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eviction of many of them from their crop and grazing land, without receiving compensation, the 
local community perceives risks of landlessness, food and energy insecurity as the results of the 
project and form riskscapes of landlessness, food and energy insecurity respectively.  
The practices of different actors shape the nature of the different risks and their effect on 
other actors in a given space. For instance, the displacement of households from the GG-I 
hydropower project area, without compensation caused risk of landlessness, food and energy 
insecurity for the local community. In the same way, the survival strategies of the local community 
have caused intensive agricultural and natural resource use practices, which have resulted in the 
rapid siltation of the reservoir. The resultant effect of all of these interconnected practices is the 
risk of food insecurity to the project-affected households. In the meantime, hydropower generation 
for the nation has a significant risk of collapse, which would also have a knock-on effect on 
household food security. It is noteworthy that these riskscapes are associated with the images of 
certain actors, of their preferred institutions and forms of knowledge. 
 
7.3.2. The riskscape of siltation  
The GG-I hydropower dam was designed to serve for at least 70 years. However, Devi et al. (2008) 
estimated that, considering the rate of siltation when they made their investigations, the volume of 
the dam would be reduced by half within 12 years and be completely filled with sediment within 
24 years. Crop farms, grazing fields, and fragile lands located in the surrounding areas of the 
reservoir (its immediate catchment) contribute about 99 percent of the sediments that are estimated 
to be deposited annually. According to Devi et al. (2008), the underlying causes of this sheet 
erosion are traditional agricultural practices, overgrazing, and the poor management or 
nonexistence of a buffer zone to protect the reservoir.  
The GG-I hydroelectricity dam reservoir is surrounded by communities made up of family 
farming households, whose livelihoods are based on a mixed crop-livestock model. The buffer 
zone around the reservoir was intended to be covered with trees of different species and grasses, 
to serve as a filter in order to protect from siltation. According to the project implementation 
reports, about 775,000 trees of various species were planted in erosion-prone areas in the buffer 
zone during the construction phase of the project (EEPCO, 2011). However, these trees covered 
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only small spots across the vast area of the buffer zone, and the land was not protected or managed 
as per initial plans (Devi et al., 2008). According to discussions held with the project management 
team at the Deneba office, aligned with my observations in the field, the buffer zone currently is 
being used for livestock grazing and crop cultivation right up to water’s edge (Figure 7.3). Some 
of the households that were previously resettled are now coming back to cultivate crops in the 
buffer zone (Teklu & Kassa, 2011). In a nutshell, failure to enforce the buffer zone plans has led 
to unsustainable land use and soil erosion around the reservoir.  
 
 
The risk of siltation to the GG-I dam affects the cascade hydropower plant to GG-I, namely 
Gilgel Gibe-II, the latter of which relies on water held in the former. Furthermore, the fate of the 
two power generation plants is tied up with the service life of the GG-I dam, which we know is 
being threatened by the fast siltation process. For many years, this was the riskscape dominant 
with international organizations and certainly for national-level administrative and 
academic/technical actors. In recent years, a good deal of attention has been devoted to the 
riskscapes of local communities (see section 7.3.5. below). 
  
 
Source: Taken from proceedings of the workshop on IWM of Omo-Gibe basin (2010) (left) own 
(right) 
Figure 7.2: Cultivation in the GG-I dam buffer zone, up to the water’s edge 
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7.3.3. The riskscapes of landlessness and food insecurity 
The dam and reservoir construction project entailed the partial or complete displacement of family 
farmers residing in 18 kebeles in four neighboring woredas (Kersa, Omo Nada, Sokoru and Tiro 
Afeta) in the Jimma Zone (EELPA (Ethiopia Electric Light and Power Authority), 1997; Kassa, 
2001). This area was covered with riparian forest, human settlements, agricultural land, and 
grazing pasture (World Bank, 2007a). According to the resettlement implementation plan 
developed by the Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority (EELPA), the project affected 
2,476 households, of which 706 were residing and farming in the reservoir area and the buffer 
zone. The remaining households resided outside the project area but nevertheless used it for 
farming and grazing (EELPA, 1997; Kassa, 2001). The 706 households that were living and 
farming in the project area were offered the opportunity to receive 2.5 hectares of land, a house 
with a roof of corrugated iron sheet, agricultural inputs for one year, and the cultivation of the crop 
land by the project—if they moved to the resettlement site (Kassa, 2001; World Bank, 2007a). 
These households would also be compensated for their trees and perennial crops, before moving. 
Out of these 706 households, 562 accepted the offer and moved to the resettlement sites, while 144 
preferred to move to nearby relatives around the project area, without receiving replacement 
compensation for their land. The rest of the affected households (1,770 households) still exist 
around the buffer zone and have not received any replacement or compensation for the land or 
immobile properties such as trees and perennial crops lost due to the project. These households 
were not resettled and they continued to live in the project area because the main criteria for 
moving were the locations of their residence and farming and grazing land in the reservoir area 
and buffer zone (Intr. code no. 88, 2016). Those households whose plots were in the reservoir area 
and buffer zone but residing outside of the buffer zone were not eligible for relocation (FGD. code 
no. 16, 2016).  
According to information obtained from the local administration, compensation for 
perennial crops grown on private holdings taken up by dam project, houses, and other permanent 
structures built on these lands was paid only to those who were residing on the reservoir site and 
in the buffer zone and were therefore forced to move (Intr. code no. 97, 2016). This means that all 
other farmers who were not in this situation did not receive any compensation, regardless of the 
size of the holding they lost to the project. Moreover, some of them lost almost all their crop and 
pasture lands and are now left with just their residences and attached gardens. For instance, one of 
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the female farmers (Intr. code no. 111, 2016) indicated that all her crop and grazing lands were 
located in the buffer zone but are now formally inaccessible for her. She told me that she did not 
qualify for the resettlement, since her house is located outside the reservoir and the buffer zone. 
Although she has five sons who are already married, there is no intergenerational transfer of land 
to these young farmers. According to the discussions held with members of the Burka Asendabo 
kebele administration (Intr. code no. 97, 2016), out of a total of about 1,000 households in their 
kebele, about 300 lost their land without being compensated.  
According to my interviews with project-affected family farmers, many are still expecting 
to be resettled, since they perceive that the land use regulations are increasingly seriously enforced. 
Moreover, as indicated in earlier chapters, family farmers in the study area rank involuntary 
resettlement and eviction from farmland as the highest risk to food insecurity. In total, about 80 
percent of the households in the area reported too little land to produce enough food for their 
households, while 55 percent perceived themselves as being food insecure.  
While discussing the sources of food insecurity risk during the in-depth individual 
interviews with farmers in Burka Asendabo Kebele, one of them reiterated that the “shrinkage of 
our grazing land area, because of the GG-I dam reservoir, has forced us to limit the number of our 
livestock. Because of this, we cannot gain access to livestock products such as milk. We [men] 
can eat meat or visit restaurants and consume milk at least once every two weeks when we go to 
the town. However, our women and children rarely get even and milk and milk products” (Intr. 
code no. 48, 2016). Other farmers in this village also indicated during the focus group discussion 
that family farming communities had lost their communal grazing land due to the project (FGD. 
code no. 10, 2015).  
Apart from the resettlement and the loss of land, family farmers in the study areas attributed 
the recurrence of the tef head smut disease to the humidity of the artificial lake, as there was a 
marked increase in cases after the dam reservoir was filled with water. They emphasized that tef 
production has been severely affected every year because of the disease, and since it is one of the 
staple food crops in the area, 98 percent considered it a major threat to their food security. These 
findings were supported in the focus group discussions (FGD. codes no. 10&11, 2015). 
Agricultural experts working in the area also witnessed the association of the recurrent occurrence 
of head smut disease with increased humidity due to the artificial lake (Intr. code no. 35, 2015).  
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7.3.4. The riskscape of energy insecurity 
Electricity provision to local households was promised after construction of the dam, and yet over 
the last 13 years, none of the project-affected communities in 18 kebeles has had access to 
electricity. This is highly unfortunate, because it could have played a significant and positive role 
in creating a sense of ownership and given local people a good impression of the project. Moreover, 
it could have also played an important role in reducing deforestation in the areas surrounding the 
buffer zone and hence soil erosion and siltation. 
In order to avoid early eutrophication, all trees and bushes grown on the reservoir site had 
to be cleared before it was filled with water. As a result, in addition to the loss of crop lands and 
grazing pasture, the project affected family farming communities through the loss of access to over 
300 hectares of riparian forest that was their major source of fuel (World Bank, 2007). The forest 
was also the main source of timber for construction and farm implements, as well as a source of 
many family-farming households’ incomes through the sale of wood collected from these forests 
and sold in nearby urban centers; consequently, this also indirectly affected the energy security of 
nearby urban dwellers fuel shortages and increasing prices. Following the loss of access to the 
riparian forest, the affected family-farming communities switched to using small tree stands 
around residential areas and farmland, and as a result, this resource was depleted within a very 
short period. One of the interviewed farmers in Burka Asendabo kebele, Omonada woreda, said: 
“The forest along the Gibe river used to be our major source of wood for construction and fuel. 
However, the project cleared it and we had to use the trees in our area. Now we have finished all 
the trees and we are left with bare land. This has exposed us to run-off and shortage of fuel wood” 
(Intr. code no. 49, 2015).  
 
7.3.5. Management responses to the siltation riskscape  
The actors associated with the siltation riskscape were the ones that had most direct access to state 
resources of enforcement and to the creation of new institutions: new policies, plans, laws to deal 
with ‘the’ problem, for them, siltation. Sometimes, the other riskscapes are acknowledged, yet seen 
as derivative and secondary; one needs to do some other things to deal with the real thing. 
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The dam project management team works in coordination with local authorities to exclude 
farmers from the buffer zone, which they achieve through the local police force and by destroying 
crops to discourage farmers (Intr. code no. 95, 2016). According to the discussions with the woreda 
and zonal offices responsible for land management, they have also tried to resolve the issue by 
barring the farmers physically from entering the buffer zone (Intr. code no. 88, 2016). Kebele 
leaders are in charge of enforcing these policies, but as per the discussions I had with them, it is 
difficult to enforce these policies, as using the buffer zone is a matter of survival for the local 
community (Intr. code no. 97, 2016). So far, despite huge pressure from the government, in 
practice, kebele representatives said that they could not strictly prevent farmers from accessing the 
land in the buffer zone. In this context, one has to consider that many members of the kebele 
administration and their relatives are affected by the GG-I project and might have lost their own 
land. Alternative riskscapes thus come into play through different identifications. 
For several international actors, the siltation riskscape asked for management responses 
broader than the siltation issue itself: integrated watershed management, a form of supra- local 
governance which gives central place to both land and water management. From the very outset, 
the GG-I project feasibility study (World Bank, 2007) indicated that the reservoir had a high 
potential for rapid siltation and underlined the need for integrated watershed management. In 2010, 
a task force, set up to reduce the siltation problem, was established and included a variety of non-
local stakeholders. The task force worked on coordinating efforts to reduce the siltation rate and 
was operational at the time fieldwork for this study was conducted.  
At the national level, based on expert recommendations, the government of Ethiopia 
(Ministry of Agriculture) has initiated national watershed management schemes under the 
Sustainable Land Management (SLM) program, focusing on soil and water conservation practices 
being implemented through community mobilization. In this context, the GG-I watershed has been 
given due emphasis. In addition to the SLM program, the Federal Ministry of Water, Irrigation 
and Electricity has allocated additional resources to overcome different forms of soil erosion, 
gullies, and landslides (Figure 7.3).  
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As part of wider integrated watershed management activities, a community development 
and knowledge management project for the Satoyama16 Initiative (COMDESKS) has also been 
running at the Gilgel Gibe-I catchment since 2012. The major purpose of the project is to support 
the activities of community-based organizations in areas of soil conservation activities and crop 
diversification, as well as eco-friendly and small-scale community enterprises such as apiculture, 
cattle fattening using the cut and carry system, and fisheries, all in order to diversify household 
income and relieve pressure on the fragile land. Economic and community development issues are 
thus seen as secondary to the central siltation issue. The ‘community base’ is also tenuous, as 
COMDESKS activities do not focus on households whose livelihoods depend on the buffer zone. 
The siltation riskscape and its actors remain entrenched. Meanwhile, farmers living around the 
buffer zone still use grazing land to fatten cattle, since there is no functional monitoring and 
enforcement mechanism on the ground.  
  
                                                          
16 The Santoyama Initiative is a global undertaking to promote the sustainable use and management of natural 
resources in socio-ecological production landscapes, with the aim of maintaining, rebuilding, and revitalizing them 
accordingly. 
Source: Picture taken during the fieldwork 
Figure 7. 3: Gully rehabilitation work (left) and rehabilitated gully (right) around the buffer zone 
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7.3.6. Management responses to riskscapes of the local communities  
Due to the relative powerlessness of the locals, and their relative weak access to rule-making, 
responses are often individual and informal. In sofar as one can speak of parallel local governance, 
with more attention given to other riskscapes, it is of the informal and risky character already 
mentioned: ignoring higher level imperatives by local government leaders, and coordinating with 
neighbors and those kebele leaders to establish local informal rules which minimize conflict around 
the use of lands in the buffer zone. One other response is that of households that can afford to 
access land outside the buffer zone through renting in and sharecropping arrangements (Intr. code 
no. 97, 2016). 
In order to deal with the tef head smut disease, farmers have come up with adaptation 
mechanisms of their own. This involves shifting the planting time and using an early maturing 
local variety of tef known as saye. Farmers call this practice geniso. They use short rains before 
the onset of the main rainy season and produce tef over a two-month period (Intr. code no. 85, 
2016), in order to escape from the high humidity when tef reaches maturity. The problem with 
geniso is that farmers cannot produce it on large plots of land. 
To deal with the risk of energy insecurity, farmers rely increasingly on vegetation in the 
areas surrounding their homesteads and farmland. Additionally, they also tend to plant more 
eucalyptus, due to its fast growth rate, to be used for fuel wood and house building; however, the 
law forbids planting eucalyptus trees on and around farmland. Using crop residues, especially 
maize and sorghum stover, as fuel is another mechanism that farmers use to overcome their energy 
insecurity.  
 
7.4. Discussion & conclusions 
The dependencies among the different sources of risk show that one risk is the result of another, 
which in turn creates a locked loop cycle. The riskscapes and interdependencies are shown in the 
following illustration (Figure 7.4). If the different actors follow only their own perspectives and 
continue to promote interventions targeting their own riskscapes, it might lead to a lose-lose 
situation with a substantial reduction in the nation’s power supply as well as continuous or even 
aggravated food insecurity in the GG-I project area. An actor’s responses to riskscapes thus affect 
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other riskscapes, for other actors and for the actor itself; in this case, all responses tend to aggravate 
all other riskscapes.  
Riskscapes of experts associated 
with the GG-I project 
Riskscapes of the local community affected by the GG-I project 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own sketch 
Figure 7.4: Riskscapes of landlessness, food and energy insecurity, and siltation   
 
The existing practices of different actors on the ground also highlights that they perceive 
only certain sources of risk, depending on their personal or organizational goals and 
responsibilities vested in them; for example, experts associated with protecting the GG-I dam focus 
mainly on immediate causes. The risk management strategies of state actors also target resolving 
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these immediate causes, without trying to address their underlying causes. However, the survival 
strategies of the project-affected communities have led to the increased siltation of the reservoir.  
For the project-affected communities, landlessness is the major source of food insecurity 
risk, and losing land has become a very real risk, because of the dam experience and scarce 
economic alternatives. In order to mitigate food insecurity, many people who lost their land in the 
buffer zone and reservoir area have had no choice but to cultivate crops in the buffer zone, which 
is prohibited. Those who have been displaced from their lands and left with some plots outside the 
project area have also intensified their farming operations on remaining plots of land. Some of the 
farmers cultivate marginal lands while others try to access land through sharecropping and land 
rental arrangements. In order to gain the maximum benefits from this sparse availability of land, 
these farmers have had to intensify their farming practices. The study conducted by Devi et al. 
(2008) indicated high levels of nutrients in the reservoir’s water, caused by the excessive use of 
chemical fertilizers as a result of intensive farming practices in the watershed. 
Similarly, the destruction of riparian forest in the project area triggered responses that have 
created new risks. It increased the pressure on vegetation around farms and residences, which in 
turn has increased run-off and the risk of siltation as well as household food insecurity. In a 
nutshell, the risk of landlessness, food and energy insecurity, and siltation are interconnected and 
interdependent, one causing the other. The actors, however, do often not understand this, and there 
are no tools (institutions) at hand, nor arena’s (a structured meeting for actors) where this can be 
brought to light. 
A piecemeal risk approach, as in the case of the GG-I project, would be like treating the 
symptoms of a disease, so what is really needed is a holistic approach to understand the broader 
perspective and the interconnected nature of the different sources of risk, and considering the 
whole set of interconnected sources of risk. In theoretical terms, this is an argument for a systems 
perspective, and in our case, such systems perspective is underpinning the risk governance ideas 
in -Luhmannian social systems theory (1995). 
In practical terms, what is needed is risk governance (distinct from entirely privatized risk 
management and distinct from top down state management), and in this case, likely a more 
participatory form of governance as such. Within practical risk governance, the concepts of 
riskscape and risk governance can be of use, opening up the discussion about differences in 
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riskscapes and about the connections between risk perception, assessment and management per 
riskscape. We mentioned earlier that opening up the diverse black boxes of risk perception, 
assessment and management through conversation and confrontation in governance can enable a 
reassessment of their connections, and for a re- interpretation of the situation and its required 
interventions. 
The case indicates that for clearly spatially situated risk, also most susceptible to a 
riskscape approach, spatial planning, or land use planning, might be an appropriate site and form 
of risk governance (Van Assche & Djanibekov, 2012). This seems the case because many things 
take place in place, and coordination of spatial organization can be a privileged site of policy 
deliberation and integration. It can be an appropriate place for riskscapes to encounter, to be 
analyzed, in their difference and internal linkages. For the Ethiopian case, a form of participatory 
land use planning might work to find a workable approach for the buffer lands around the dam, 
and for the lands farther away which became overused in the feedback loops after the dam 
displacements. These lands could therefore be subjected to a specialized, transitional form of 
governance, with more detailed land use regulations, more intense forms of deliberation and 
participation, and higher levels of policy integration (Van Assche et al, 2017b). The transition 
could last as long as the risk are perceived big enough to warrant the institutional exception. 
An evolutionary perspective on risk governance, however, would warn that such planning- 
focused form of risk governance would be unlikely to work if it ignores the context it lands in, and 
the historical dependencies marking that context (Beunen, Van Assche, & Duineveld, 2015; Van 
Assche & Hornidge, 2015; Valentinov, 2014). For the Ethiopian case, this would entail a careful 
interrogation of existing forms of spatial planning: Do they work? For whom? What are the most 
trusted tools (institutions)? What is the balance between participation and representation? Is the 
guidance for planning best coming from a formal land use plan or through other formal and 
informal institutions? These questions have to be addressed before choosing an institutional form 
of risk governance. 
For a general theory of risk governance, the Ethiopian dam story contains several valuable 
pointers.  
- First of all: Risk management in a complex multi-stakeholder context needs to be risk 
governance, with the double implication of being embedded in broader governance and 
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containing an internal diversity of actors, institutions, and forms of knowledge, leading to 
collectively binding decisions.  
- Under special conditions of grave risk and entangled forms of risk, one can consider giving risk 
governance a prominent place in governance, and even shaping local governance around risk. 
Spatial planning can be a form and site for such transitional governance. 
- Risk governance can be structured around the encounter, analysis and deliberation of riskscapes 
associated with different actors, their roles, their preferred institutional tools, and forms of 
knowledge and narratives.  
- The assessment of riskscapes and the search for common ground and risk mitigation strategies 
will be helped by an understanding of the internal complexity of riskscapes, especially the linkage 
between risk perceptions, assessment, and (envisioned) management responses.  
- In risk governance, the choice of solutions has to be inspired further by a deep understanding of 
broader governance evolutions, where every proposed new institution, new form of knowledge, 
new actor, or relation between them needs to be grounded in the existing configuration of actors, 
institutions, and power/knowledge.  
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8. Risk Perceptions and their Role in the Choice of Multiple Livelihood Strategies in 
Southwest Ethiopia 
 
8.1. Introduction 
Farmers’ perceptions of risk are basically the result of their exposure to different types of shocks 
and experiences with governance of these shocks (Barrett et al., 2000; Doss et al., 2008).  Because 
people behave according to their personal perception of risk, I believe that farmers’ perceptions of 
the different sources of food insecurity risk in turn influence their decisions to choose different 
livelihood strategies. These strategies could also be considered as their responses to perceived risk. 
Livelihood strategies represent a portfolio of activities and choices that people make to achieve 
their livelihood goals, including productive activities, investment strategies, reproductive choices, 
etc. (Jansen, Pender, Damon, Wielemaker, & Schipper, 2006; Adato & Meinzen-Dick, 2002; 
Norton & Foster, 2001a; Ellis, 1998). Several studies have analyzed the role of diversifying 
livelihoods in protecting households against food insecurity shocks (Barrett, Bezuneh, & Aboud, 
2000; Barrett & Reardon, 2000; Block & Webb, 2001; Ellis, 1998; Woldenhanna & Oskam, 2001). 
However, studies on the role of family farmers’ risk perception on the choice of alternative 
combination of different livelihood strategies are very limited. Understanding how risk perceptions 
influence the choice of different livelihood strategies helps in the design of different plans, 
policies, and strategies targeting improvements in food security through the promotion of 
alternative livelihood strategies. The purpose of this study is therefore to provide empirical 
evidence on the role of shocks and evolving governance on the risk perceptions of family farmers, 
and to investigate the influence of family farmers’ perceptions of different sources of food 
insecurity risk on the choice of alternative livelihood strategies. 
This empirical study contributes to the growing literature on livelihood diversification in 
the following ways. First, a theoretical framework developed in this study helps grasp how the 
exposure of family farmers to different biophysical shocks, evolving governance, and 
socioeconomic circumstances shapes their perceptions, assessment, and management of food 
insecurity risk. This is a framework revolving around the concepts of evolutionary risk governance 
and sustainable livelihoods, as well as the implications of the outcomes to household food security. 
Second, a system method of estimation that jointly determines the decision to choose multiple 
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types of livelihood strategies, such as crop, livestock, off-farm, and transfer income strategies, is 
applied. The likely correlations between the choice decisions across the different strategies for the 
same household are recognized and provide evidence as to whether livelihood strategies are used 
in a piecemeal way or in combination with other livelihood strategies. Third, empirical evidence 
on the complementarity of crop income strategy (which is important for farmers) with other 
livelihood strategies is provided in this study. Fourth, compared to most previous studies on the 
determinants of household choices, this study has the advantage that it not only looks at whether 
or not one participates in the choice, but it also analyzes the intensity of choice as measured by the 
number of livelihood strategies per family farmer. Such knowledge is important, because it can be 
used to formulate specific policies to enhance combinations of livelihood strategies. To the best of 
my knowledge, empirical evidence on the heterogeneous effect of farmers’ risk perceptions of the 
intensity of livelihood strategies is scarce, and discussions on the implications of such evidence 
are virtually non-existent. For this reason, this study aims to fill this gap in the literature. Utilizing 
very recent data from the smallholder family farming system in Ethiopia, I concentrate on the 
relative importance of farmers’ risk perceptions and various household, farm, and community 
characteristics on the probability and levels of livelihood strategies. The empirical exercise in this 
study is based on the potential of evolutionary risk governance framework, and the associated 
outcomes will help future policy and development actions to improve the livelihoods of family 
farmers and thereby alleviate the food insecurity problem. 
 
8.2. Empirical models and descriptive statistics  
The methodology used in the data collection process was presented in the second chapter of this 
study. The sampling procedure followed to select the sample households is also described in the 
second chapter. This section of the current chapter presents the empirical models used in data 
analysis, and a description of the dependent and explanatory variables.  
 
8.2.1.  Empirical model 
Because family farmers use a mix of livelihood strategies at the farm household level to deal with 
a multitude of food insecurity risks, this study applies the joint estimation model on the likelihood 
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and level of the decision made regarding the choice of livelihood strategies. Ignoring the 
interrelatedness of livelihood strategies means that decisions on choosing them are made 
exogenously, an approach that may underestimate or overestimate the influences of various factors 
on the final choice. In addition, the joint estimation could clarify the reality faced by decision-
makers, who are often faced with alternative livelihood strategies that may be used simultaneously 
as complements or substitutes. This implies that the choice in this regard is inherently multivariate, 
and attempting univariate modeling would exclude useful economic information about 
interdependent and simultaneous decisions (Dorfman, 1996; Belderbos et al., 2004). Accordingly, 
the econometric specification in this paper consists of two parts: In the first part, farmers’ choices 
of livelihood strategies are modeled using a multivariate probit model (MVP), while the second 
part analyzes the determinants of the combinations employed, using an ordered probit model.  
 
Multivariate probit model 
The MVP approach simultaneously models the influence of the set of explanatory variables on 
each of the different livelihood strategies, while allowing for potential correlations between 
unobserved disturbances of the different equations, as well as the relationship between the choice 
of livelihood strategies (Dorfman, 1996; Belderbos et al., 2004). One source of correlation may be 
because the same unobserved characteristics of farmers could influence the choice of different 
livelihood strategies. However, the univariate probit/logit models ignore the fact that the decision 
to choose a particular livelihood strategy may be conditional on the choice of another livelihood 
strategy due either to complementarities (positive correlation) or substitutability (negative 
correlation) between different strategies (Khanna, 2001). Failure to capture unobserved factors and 
interrelationships among choice decisions leads to bias and inefficient estimates (Greene, 2008). 
The observed outcome of choice of alternative livelihood strategies can be modeled in a 
random utility framework. Consider the 𝑖௧௛ family farmer (𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁) who is facing a decision 
on whether or not to choose alternative livelihood strategies. Let Uo represent the utility obtained 
from choosing none of the alternative livelihood strategies and 𝑈௞ represent the utility obtained 
from the choice of 𝑘௧௛ livelihood strategy, where k denotes crop income-generating livelihood 
strategies (C), livestock income-generating livelihood strategies (L), off-farm income-generating 
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activities (O), and transfer income-generating livelihood strategies (R). The family farming 
household decides to choose the 𝑘௧௛ livelihood strategy if the benefit of choosing it is higher than 
the choice of none of the strategies: 𝑌௜௞∗ = 𝑈௞ −  𝑈଴ > 0. The net benefit (𝑌௜௞∗ ) that the farm 
household derives from the 𝑘௧௛ livelihood strategy is a latent variable which is determined by 
observed household, institutional, and location characteristics, the perceptions of households of 
certain risks, farmer’s behavior in terms of averting certain risks, the unanticipated shocks that the 
farm household faces (𝑋௜), and unobserved characteristics(𝜀௜). 
 
𝑌௜௞∗ = 𝑋௜𝛽௜ + 𝜇௜  (k= C, L, O, and R)      (1) 
Using the indicator function, the unobserved preferences in equation (1) translate into the observed 
binary outcome equation for each choice as follows: 
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In the multivariate model, where choosing a number of livelihood strategies at a time is 
possible, the error terms jointly follow a multivariate normal distribution (MVN) with zero 
conditional mean and variance normalized to unity (for identification of the parameters), where 
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where   (rho) represents the pairwise correlation coefficient of the error terms corresponding to 
any two livelihood strategies equations to be estimated in the model. A positive correlation of   
is interpreted as a complementary relationship, while a negative relationship is interpreted as a 
substitute. The off-diagonal elements in the covariance matrix are of interest here, since they 
represent the unobserved correlation between the stochastic components of the different types of 
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livelihood strategies. This assumption means that equation (2) gives an MVP model that jointly 
represents decisions to adopt a particular livelihood strategy, which is explained by the 
hypothesized explanatory variables. This specification with non-zero off-diagonal elements allows 
for correlation across the error terms of several latent equations, which represent unobserved 
characteristics that affect the choice of alternative livelihood strategies. 
 
A model of intensity of livelihood strategies 
In addition to the pooled multivariate probit model, an ordered probit model is used to analyze the 
mix of alternative livelihood strategies. This is because, the former model only considers the 
probability of adopting alternative livelihood strategies and does not identify the intensity of 
alternatives chosen by individual households, or the intensity of adoption. The ordered probit 
model analyzes factors that influence the adoption of combination of livelihood strategies, or the 
number of strategies and individual strategies.  
Given the ordered nature of the dependent variable, I therefore adopt the model involving 
a different latent variable (C*), itself a function of observed heterogeneity (X) with unknown 
weights )(  and other unobserved characteristics )u( . The observed realization of (C*) is denoted 
by C, such that: 
iii uβXC          (4) 
defines the categorical outcome variable  mC i ,...,1 , indicating the number of strategies used 
by farmer i  and   is treated as a random coefficient. Estimations of (4) in a linear regression 
model may lead to biased estimates of the parameter vectors and hence misleading results. In this 
case, the discrete probability function, conditional on all explanatory variables, is commonly 
specified as an ordered probit model. The multinomial logit model with its multi-index structure 
is certainly another option. However, this model does not make any use of ordering information 
and therefore cannot be efficient (Boes & Winkelmann, 2006). 
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8.2.2. Descriptive statistics 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in this study are the four major livelihood strategies of family farming 
households, namely crop production, livestock production, off-farm work and transfer income. 
Crop production is the major source of livelihood for the family farmers in the study areas. I 
consider those farmers that cultivate different crops for household consumption or for market as 
obtaining income from crop production as far as they can cover their variable costs. Accordingly, 
95 percent of the family farmers had a crop income in 2015. 
Livestock income is derived from the sale of livestock, livestock products, and associated 
services. Though the foundation stock that reproduces and generates marketable surplus or 
consumable products and services within a given year could be obtained due to efforts in earlier 
years prior to the consumption year, I considered income obtained from these animals during the 
12-month period running from November 2014 to October 2015. Accordingly, about 77 percent 
of the sample households had livestock income during the specified time period, and the average 
size of livestock ownership was 5.2 TLU. Livestock such as cattle, sheep, goats, donkeys, horses, 
and mules as well as poultry, and honey bees are reared in the study areas. 
Off-farm income is generated through different activities outside of own farming 
operations. This could be farm and non-farm wage income, non-agricultural business activities, 
part-time salaried employment, and other income streams. The role of off-farm income-generating 
activities to the family farmers is indeterminate a priori, and they can complement crop and 
livestock production activities in terms of generating income for the purchase of inputs. Off-farm 
activities can also protect the food reserves of the family and livestock sales, by generating income 
that could be spent to meet compulsory household expenditures. On the other hand, participation 
in off-farm activities competes for household labor that could be used in crop and livestock 
production and may have a negative impact on the crop and livestock incomes. About 39 percent 
of the sample households reported that they received off-farm income in 2015. 
Transfer income in this study refers to remittances obtained either from abroad or 
domestically from household members or others, as well as safety net and food aid income and 
income obtained in the form of marriage gifts. The general argument about transfer incomes is that 
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they smooth consumption throughout the year (Andersson et al., 2011; Knowles & Anker, 1981; 
Miller et al., 2011; Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2010). Some studies have indicated that they 
promote livestock accumulation, income growth, and food security (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 
2010), while others (Andersson et al., 2011) have posited the positive impact of transfer incomes 
on tree holdings but no significant impact on livestock holdings. The general observation I made 
during the qualitative assessment was that family farming households tend to generate transfer 
income as one of their livelihood strategies by sending children abroad (Int. code no. 46, 2015) or 
helping household members find employment in different organizations. In 2015, about 12 percent 
of the sample households had transfer income, while this figure was eight percent in 2010.  
 
Explanatory variables 
I explored a rich body of literature on the choice and impact of livelihood diversification, in order 
to select a comprehensive set of drivers that are known to affect family farmers’ decisions (Hussein 
& Nelson, 1998; Abdulai & CroleRees, 2001; Block & Webb, 2001; Babulo et al., 2008; Doss et 
al., 2008; Binder & Schöll, 2009; Andersson et al., 2011; Sulewski & Kłoczko-Gajewska, 2014; 
Berman, Quinn, & Paavola, 2015). Based on these empirical works and economic theory, I have 
summarized household and farm characteristics in the empirical specifications. These include 
perception of the household of different sources of food insecurity risk, the risk preferences of 
farmers, access to input and output markets, socioeconomic variables including household and 
farm characteristics such as family size, age of the household head, education of the spouse, the 
social capital of the household, and household resources and constraints. Table 8.1 provides 
definitions of the variables used in the analysis and the mean values for the entire sample. Below, 
I focus on describing these variables. 
This study concentrates on the family farmers’ risk perceptions of of climate variables such 
as drought, floods, hailstorms; crop pests and diseases; agricultural inputs, outputs, and food 
prices; income failure; and robbery of assets. I derived these risk perceptions through three steps 
questions. In the first step, I asked if the farmer had encountered any shocks from the specified 
sources of risk in the past 10 years. Then, I asked if the farmer still feels this variable was a source 
of risk to her/his household food security. I finally used a risk ladder to probe the farmers’ risk 
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perceptions, by asking the following question: “How would you judge the importance of the 
different sources of risk in affecting your household food security?” The respective sources of risk 
were then read out one by one. The response options given were as follows: 1=least important, 
2=not as such important, 3=average, 4=important, and 5=most import. These were then converted 
into dummy variables for each source of risk. About 36 percent of the sample farmers perceived 
drought as an important source of food insecurity risk. Earlier studies (Webb & Von Braun, 1994; 
Hill & Porter, 2017) also found drought and famine shocks as the major causes of food insecurity 
in Ethiopia. I expect that households that perceived drought as important source of food insecurity 
risk will have a low propensity to choose crop income and a higher propensity to choose livestock 
and other livelihood strategies. Similarly, I expect that farmers that perceived flooding as an 
important source of food insecurity risk will have a low propensity to choose crop income 
strategies and a higher propensity to choose livestock and other income strategies.  
Crop pests are among the major issues limiting crop productivity and the income obtained 
from crop production. About 78 percent of the sample farmers perceived crop pests and diseases 
as important sources of food insecurity risk. I expect that perceptions of crop pests and diseases as 
important sources of food insecurity risk will have a negative impact on the choice of crop income 
strategies and a positive impact on the adoption of other livelihood strategies.  
Increasing input prices and decreasing output prices are the major challenges to family 
farming households. Accordingly, 44 percent and 62 percent of the sample farmers perceived high 
input prices and low maize prices, respectively, as important sources of food insecurity risk. I 
expect that those farmers that perceived high input prices (mainly due to the increasing prices of 
chemical fertilizer and certified seeds) will have a low propensity to choose crop production 
strategies and a high propensity to adopt livestock and other livelihood strategies. According to 
the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions conducted in the study areas (Int. code no. 66 
& 69, 2015; FGD code no. 12 & 14, 2015), all farmers are the victims of ever-increasing high 
input prices. However, resource-poor farmers that are usually short of cash and are not 
creditworthy enough to gain access to microfinance credit to buy fertilizer and improved seeds 
suffer the most from this problem. Such farmers usually get into the sharecropping land tenure 
arrangements in which they give up at least half of their harvest and eventually seek transfer 
incomes to gain access to cash/food. On the other hand, I expect that farmers that perceived 
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decreasing maize prices will have a low propensity to choose a crop production strategy and a 
larger propensity to adopt livestock, off-farm, and transfer income strategies.  
The perceived failure of household income as an important source of food insecurity risk 
is among those variables that I expect to influence households’ choices surrounding different 
livelihood strategies. I expect farmers that perceived the failure of household income may have a 
low propensity to choose off-farm income strategies and a high propensity to choose crop and 
livestock income strategies. As indicated in Table 8.1, about 30 percent of the sample households 
perceived this factor as an important source of food insecurity risk.  
Perceptions of the health and welfare of household members are among those variables 
expected to influence significantly farmers’ choices of livelihood strategies. I expect that farmers 
that perceived sickness of a household member will have less propensity to choose wage labor-
related off-farm income strategies and a high propensity to choose transfer and livestock 
production strategies. About 30 percent of the sample farmers perceived sickness of household 
members as an important source of food insecurity risk. 
Family farming is often sensitive to changing environmental stresses; however, ex ante 
risk-easing mechanisms, such as insurance markets, are not well developed in developing 
countries. One concern is that farmers’ choices of livelihood strategies are modified in response to 
the presence of these uncertain production environments. The nature and degree of this alteration 
is determined by the magnitude of the decision-maker’s preferences toward risk. Hence, I included 
questions in the survey to elicit farmers’ risk preferences. The approach in this regard was set up 
following Binswanger (1980) and Wik et al.’s (2004) experimental method, which can be 
conducted as a hypothetical or a real payoff situation and measures attitudes by observing the 
reactions of farmers to a set of actual gambles (Binswanger, 1980). In this study, respondents were 
presented with real lotteries (Xmax, Xmin, p), promising a real monetary prize for Xmax with 
probability p, or Xmin with probability of 1-p. The lotteries represented different farming 
conditions with six different pay-off levels for a given probability of a bad or a good outcome 
(such as harvesting). The sample farm households were presented with alternatives 1 to 6. Once 
the households selected one among the alternatives, they had a 50 percent probability of having 
bad harvest or good harvest pay-offs. The experimental method consisted of offering farmers a set 
of alternatives representing different risk aversion classes (extreme, severe, intermediate, 
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moderate, slight, and neutral) within which higher expected gain could only be obtained at the cost 
of higher variance, and thus a decline in risk aversion. However, for the simplicity of analysis, 
instead of the six classes, I used in this study a dummy variable in which the six risk aversion 
classes were summarized into two major categories. Those farmers whose risk preference lay from 
slight to extreme risk aversion were categorized as ‘risk averse’, and the rest as risk-neutral. 
Accordingly, about 76 percent of the sample farmers were found to be risk-averse and the rest 
were risk-neutral. 
Household characteristics such as family size, sex, age, and level of education of the 
household heads are usually considered to influence decisions to adopt different livelihood 
strategies (Abdulai & CroleRees, 2001; Barrett et al., 2001; Block & Webb, 2001; Smith et al., 
2001; Woldenhanna & Oskam, 2001). For instance, family size can have implications for the labor 
supply of the household and the need to satisfy food requirements and other basic necessities. This 
in turn can influence a household’s decision to adopt different livelihood strategies. Accordingly, 
the average family size in the study areas was seven persons. On the other hand, Block and Webb 
(2001) reported the importance of the gender of the household head in participating in off-farm 
income generation activities. I also considered the sex of household heads. In this study, I expect 
that male-headed households could be engaged in more diversified livelihood strategies than 
female-headed households. This is possibly because of the labor-intensive nature of some of the 
alternative livelihood strategies for which female-headed households are usually constrained. 
About 95 percent of the sample household heads are males. Apart from the sex of the household 
heads, I also hypothesize that a higher level of education of the household head can influence 
household’s decision to adopt more diverse livelihood strategies. This could be related to the better 
understanding of technologies by better-educated household heads.  
The ways in which individuals relate to wider social networks and the effects of these social 
capital networks on the choice of livelihood strategy are also considered in this stufy. In Ethiopia, 
where information is scarce and markets are ill-functioning, social networks and social spillover 
are considered means to facilitate the exchange of information, enable farmers to access inputs on 
schedule, and overcome credit constraints and shocks (Barrett, 2001; Fafchamps & Minten, 2002; 
Isham, 2002; Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Marenya & Barrett, 2007). Particularly for family farmers, 
local institutions play a pivotal role in building resilience and reducing the food insecurity risk 
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(Agrawal et al., 2009). In this study, two social networks and capital variables are distinguished: 
A household’s kinship network, defined as the number of close relatives living in the farmer’s 
village, and a household’s connection with local organizations, defined as whether a friend or a 
relative is in a leadership position in a government or non-government office. Such classification 
is important, as different forms of social capital and networks may affect the choice of different 
livelihood strategies in various ways, such as through information sharing, stable market outlets, 
labor sharing, the relaxing of liquidity constraints, and the mitigation of risk. However, there is 
also a dark side to social capital, as noted in DiFalco and Bulte (2011), where social capital may 
reduce incentives for hard work and induce inefficiency such that farmers may exert less effort 
investing in adaptation.  
Among the household resources, I looked into household ownership of livestock in tropical 
livestock units (TLUs), total farm size, and the total value of household assets. Livestock holding 
is expected to influence a household’s decision to adopt crop and other livelihood strategies in 
terms of the supply of farm traction power, manure, and cash for purchasing inputs for crop 
production and generating crop income. Livestock can also compete with crop production in terms 
of competition for land and with crop and off-farm activities in terms of household labor. As a 
result, I expect a negative influence of ownership of larger TLU on crop, off-farm, and transfer 
income strategies. On the other hand, the high value of household and farm assets is expected to 
influence positively the choice of crop, livestock, and off-farm strategies. Households with larger 
farm size are also expected to have a greater propensity to adopt crop and livestock activities and 
less propensity to adopt off-farm and transfer activities.  
I considered distance to the main market (in minutes of walking) as the market access proxy 
variable affecting the choice of different livelihood strategies. Market access variables are 
associated directly with the transaction costs that a farm household could face in input and output 
marketing activities, thereby influencing the availability of information, technologies, job 
opportunities, and support organizations. Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) defined transaction costs 
as the embodiment of barriers to market participation by resource-poor smallholders, and they 
have been used as a definitional characteristic of smallholders and as factors responsible for 
significant market failures in developing countries. The average walking distance to main markets 
is about 80 minutes. I expect that the farther the household is from the main market, the more the 
147 
 
likelihood of adopting crop and livestock production as the major livelihood strategies and the less 
the likelihood of adopting other strategies.  
In order to understand whether a farmer has access to a source of cash, I followed Feder et 
al.’s (1990) approach by constructing a credit access variable. This measure of credit tries to 
distinguish between farmers who choose not to use available credit and those who do not have 
access to credit. This idea is often valid on the ground that as many non-borrowers do not borrow 
because they actually have sufficient liquidity and not because they cannot obtain credit, while 
some cannot borrow because they are not creditworthy (Feder et al 1990; Doss 2006). In this study, 
the respondents were asked to respond to two sequential questions, namely whether or not credit 
is needed and, following a ‘yes’ response, whether or not credit is obtained for farming operations. 
The credit-constrained farmers are then defined as those who need credit but are unable to secure 
it (49 percent of the sample households). I expect an asymmetric effect of credit constraint on the 
choice of different livelihood strategies, whereby it negatively influences the choice of crop and 
livestock production and promotes the choice of transfer income and indeterminate a priori off-
farm work. In addition, the results of my qualitative assessment in the study areas show that 
constraints on gaining access to credit for farm operations compels farmers to share crop or 
rent/lease out their farmland. Accordingly, 55 percent of the sample households reported that they 
have income from leasing out their farmland. The average income obtained from land lease in 
2015 was 2,100 Ethiopian birr per household per year. 
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Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical models. 
Variable Variable description Mean SD 
Risk perceptions (perceived as important source of risk to food security) 
Drought risk 1=if perceived drought as important source of risk 0.36 0.48 
Flood risk 1=if perceived flood and too much rainfall 0.43 0.49 
Hail storm risk 1=if perceived hailstorm  0.33 0.47 
Crop pest risk 
1=perceived crop pest and diseases as important 
source of risk  
0.78 0.42 
Input price risk 1=if perceived increase in input prices 0.44 0.50 
Output (maize) price risk 1=if perceived decreases in maize price  0.62 0.49 
Income risk 1=if perceived failure of household income 0.30 0.45 
High food price 1=if perceived increases in food price risk 0.44 0.50 
Risk of robbery 1=if perceived robbery of assets 0.21 0.41 
Sickness of household member 1= if perceived sickness of the household member 0.30 0.45 
Risk preferences    
Risk averse 1= if risk averse 0.76 0.43 
Household characteristics 
Family size Family size 7.16 2.45 
Sex  1= if household head is male 0.95 0.22 
Age Age of household head in years 45.38 11.69 
Education  Years of education of the household head 2.69 3.10 
Social Capital     
Friends in leadership position 1= if friends/relatives in leadership position 0.36 0.48 
Number of relatives Number of relatives living in the village 5.14 9.80 
Household resources and constraints 
Farm size Total farm size in ha 1.82 1.86 
Asset  Value of farm and household assets in Eth. Birr 46,746.5 74,331.3 
Tlu Livestock ownership in Tropical livestock units  5.24 3.50 
Land rent Income from land lease/rent in Eth. Birr per year 2,124.78 3,683.03 
Market distance  walking distance to nearest main market in minutes  79.87 61.35 
Credit constraint 1= if credit constraint 0.50 0.50 
Source: Own computation from household survey data 
 
 
149 
 
8.3. Results 
8.3.1. Joint and marginal probabilities of adopting alternative livelihood strategies 
The joint and marginal probability distribution of different livelihood strategy choices among the 
sample households is presented in Table 8.2. Although each farmer in the study areas used at least 
one of the four (crop, livestock, off-farm and transfer) livelihood strategies, the majority (more 
than 80 percent) were dependent on more than one option. This reveals the fact that alternative 
combinations of livelihood strategies are common in the study areas. The most widely practiced 
livelihood strategy is crop production, both in isolation and in combination with other strategies, 
and about 15 percent of households choose it as their sole source of income. However, livestock 
production is commonly observed in combination with other strategies than in isolation. The same 
is true for the other strategies (i.e. off-farm work and transfer incomes). Only one percent of the 
households chose livestock, off-farm, or transfer incomes as their sole livelihood strategy. As 
expected, the highest proportion of the sample households (about 37 percent) are involved in joint 
crop and livestock production, showing complementarity between crop and livestock production, 
due to the synergies in crop and livestock systems. Still, a sizable proportion of the households (28 
percent) considered off-farm participation in combination with crop and livestock production as 
joint livelihood strategies. However, only four percent of the households were engaged in all the 
four options. Unsurprisingly, about two percent were dependent on non-agricultural livelihood 
strategies. About 0.44 percent of the sample households depended on off-farm works, 0.88 percent 
on transfer income, and 0.44 percent on both off-farm and transfer incomes.  
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Table 8.2: Joint and marginal probabilities of adopting alternative livelihood strategies (%) 
Percent adopting the livelihood strategies Joint 
probability 
Marginal probability 
Crop livestock off-farm transfer 
Crop only  15.35 15.35 -- -- -- 
Livestock only 0.88 -- 0.88 -- -- 
Off-farm only 0.44 -- -- 0.44 -- 
Transfer only 0.88 -- -- -- 0.88 
Crop and livestock 36.84 36.84 36.84 -- -- 
Crop and off-farm 3.95 3.95 -- 3.95 -- 
Crop and transfer 1.32 1.32 -- -- 1.32 
Livestock and off-farm 2.19 -- 2.19 2.19 -- 
Livestock and transfer -- -- -- -- -- 
Off-farm and transfer 0.44 -- -- 0.44 0.44 
Crop, livestock and off-farm 28.07 28.07 28.07 28.07 -- 
Crop, livestock and transfer 5.26 5.26 5.26 -- 5.26 
Crop, off-farm and transfer 0.44 0.44 -- 0.44 0.44 
Livestock, off-farm and transfer -- -- -- -- -- 
Crop, livestock, off-farm and transfer 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 
Total 100     
Source: Own computation from household survey data 
 
Though a smaller proportion of households adopted transfer income as a livelihood strategy, 
secondary sources of data show the numbers of those who use it as a strategy have increased over 
time. In 2010, about six percent of the households received a transfer income, but this number 
increased to 12 percent in 2015. According to in-depth interviews (Int. codes no. 41 and 42, 2015), 
households in the study areas try to send out their children to Sudan and Middle East countries, in 
order to generate additional income for the household. 
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8.3.2. Unconditional and conditional probabilities of adopting alternative livelihood 
strategies 
The unconditional and conditional probabilities of choosing alternative livelihood strategies are 
presented in Table 8.3. The unconditional probability of a crop production strategy is 95 percent, 
and this increases to 96 percent with the choice of livestock production strategy. This choice of 
crop production strategy increases further to 100 percent when combining livestock and transfer 
income strategies or choosing a combination of livestock, off-farm, and transfer income strategies. 
The result is in agreement with the result shown in Table 8.2 and suggests complementarity among 
these livelihood strategies. This may be due to resource sharing (in the form of cash, traction, 
manure) from these strategies, which is important for enhancing the productivity of crop 
production. However, one needs to note the complementarity effect of choosing a combination of 
livestock, off-farm, and transfer incomes on choosing crop production and what happens when the 
livestock component is not in the combination. The choice to combine off-farm income and 
transfer income decreases the probability of choosing crop income to 90 percent. This shows the 
strong complementarity of crop and livestock income strategies. It is also an indication of the 
indispensable role of livestock in family farmers’ livelihoods. The complementarity effect is also 
observed in the probability of off-farm work participation, which increases to 43 percent 
conditional on the choice of a combination of crop and livestock production strategies. This 
complementarity could be in terms of generating financial resources from crop and livestock 
production for petty trade, and non-agricultural business. However, individually, participation in 
off-farm work is substitutable with the choice of crop production strategy but complementary to 
the choice of livestock production strategy. For instance, the probability of choosing a crop 
production strategy decreases to 92 percent for a household participating in off-farm work, and the 
probability of participating in off-farm work decreases from 39 percent to 37 for a household that 
chooses a crop production strategy.  
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Table 8.3: Unconditional and conditional probabilities of adopting alternative livelihood 
strategies 
  Crop Livestock Off-farm Transfer 
P(YK=1) (unconditional) 0.95 0.77 0.39 0.12 
P(YK=1|YC=1) 1 0.78 0.37 0.11 
P(YK=1|YL=1) 0.96 1 0.44 0.11 
P(YK=1|YO=1) 0.92 0.87 1 0.11 
P(YK=1|YR=1) 0.88 0.74 0.37 1 
P(YK=1|YC=1, YL=1) 1 1 0.43 0.12 
P(YK=1|YC=1, YO=1) 1 0.88 1 0.11 
P(YK=1|YC=1, YR=1) 1 0.83 0.37 1 
P(YK=1|YL=1, YO=1 ) 0.94 1 1 0.10 
P(YK=1|YL=1, YR=1) 1.00 1 0.40 1 
P(YK=1|YO=1, YR=1) 0.90 0.80 1 1 
P(YK=1|YC=1, YL=1, YO=1 ) 1 1 1 0.11 
P(YK=1|YC=1, YL=1, YR=1) 1 1 0.40 1 
P(YK=1|YC=1, YO=1, YR=1) 1 0.89 1 1 
P(YK=1|YL=1, YO=1, YR=1) 1.00 1 1 1 
Source: Own computation from household survey data 
 
8.3.3. Adoption decisions behind alternative livelihood strategies 
The MVP model17 for the choice of different livelihood strategies is estimated using the maximum 
likelihood method on various family farmers’ risk perception variables. We run two different 
model specifications, the model of household risk perception with, and without other 
socioeconomic variables. The model specification without socioeconomic variables indicates 
which of the household’s risk perception variables are most significant and therefore require better 
understanding regarding which household types should be targeted when designing investment 
programs addressing the food insecurity risk due to various shocks. The model with socioeconomic 
variables contributes to our knowledge regarding which household risk perception variables are 
important in the presence of other conditioning socioeconomic circumstances. While the shorter 
                                                          
17The results are obtained with a Stata routine following Cappellari and Jenkins (2003). 
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version of the model is presented in Table 8.5, the extended model with specifications including 
various socioeconomics variables, together with household risk perception variables, is presented 
in Table 8.6. The results of the data analysis show that the Wald test [χ2(92)=1056.78, Prob. > 
χ2=0.000] of the hypothesis that all regression coefficients in each equation are jointly equal to 
zero is rejected, thereby indicating that the model fits the data very well. The log likelihood ratio 
[χ2(6)= 11.58, P=0.07] that tests the null hypothesis that the covariances of the error terms across 
equations are not correlated is also rejected. This is supported further by the significant pairwise 
coefficient between the error terms of equations for the three livelihood strategies. 
The pairwise correlation coefficients between the error terms in the equations for choosing 
different livelihood strategies, derived from the multivariate probit model, are presented in Table 
8.4. These correlation coefficients show the interdependence between the decisions to choose 
different  livelihood strategies, as indicated in the conditional and unconditional probabilities 
section above. The correlation coefficients are statistically significant in three out of the six 
possible combinations. Positive coefficients show the complementarity of the pairs of livelihood 
strategies, while the negative coefficients show their substitutability. Table 8.4 shows the choice 
of crop and livestock production strategies, and livestock production and participation in off-farm 
income activities are complementary to each other.  The choice of crop production and off farm 
work participation, crop production and transfer, livestock production and transfer, and off-farm 
work and transfer incomes are substitutes to each other.  
Table 8.4: Correlation coefficient of error terms obtained from the estimates of MVP model  
Pairs of livelihood strategies Correlation coefficient  
Crop and livestock  0.182(0.145) 
Crop and off-farm -0.040(0.149) 
Crop and transfer - 0.490(0.293)* 
Livestock and off-farm 0.327(0.149)** 
Livestock and transfer -0.167(0.150) 
Off-farm and transfer -0.437(0.173)** 
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01;  
Source: Own computation from household survey data 
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The results in Table 8.5 and Table 8.6 show that the parameter estimates of most of the risk 
perception variables maintain their signs and significance in both specifications. Household risk 
perceptions of food prices, loss of assets, and family member sickness have a statistically 
significant effect on a household’s choice in terms of different livelihood strategies in the shorter 
version of the model (Table 8.5). Household risk perceptions of flooding are statistically 
significant in the extended model but not in the shorter version. 
 
Table 8.5: The multivariate probit model estimation on the choice of different livelihood 
strategies (using risk perception variables only) 
  
Crop production 
Livestock 
production Off-farm work Transfer income 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Perceived drought risk -0.311 0.292 0.706*** 0.229 0.660*** 0.184 -0.28 0.254 
Perceived flood risk -0.201 0.307 0.31 0.221 0.02 0.193 0.118 0.245 
Perceived hail storm risk -0.32 0.294 -0.122 0.218 0.191 0.196 0.029 0.226 
Perceived crop pest risk -0.067 0.348 0.498** 0.248 0.338 0.259 -0.205 0.298 
Perceived high input price risk -0.238 0.581 0.806** 0.359 0.377 0.381 4.033*** 0.228 
Perceived low output price risk 0.663* 0.342 -0.131 0.231 -0.212 0.21 -0.143 0.246 
Perceived income risk -0.184 0.375 0.486** 0.246 -0.105 0.212 0.1 0.262 
Perceived high food price -0.591** 0.287 0.175 0.221 -0.081 0.191 0.131 0.202 
Perceived risk of robbery -0.236 0.528 -0.298 0.327 0.806** 0.33 -0.006 0.435 
Perceived sickness of hh member 1.076*** 0.378 -0.118 0.23 -0.383* 0.211 0.175 0.238 
Risk averse -0.272 0.371 0.633*** 0.221 -0.202 0.2 0.056 0.267 
χ2(6) 11.43        
Prob. > χ2(6) 0.07        
N 228        
Source: Own computation from household survey data 
 
The results of the MVP model presented in Table 8.6 show that risk perceptions of family farmers 
on climate-related variables have a negative effect on the probability of choosing crop production 
as a livelihood strategy. While farmers’ perceptions of drought as an important source of food 
insecurity have a significant and positive effect on the choice of livestock production and 
participation in off-farm income livelihood strategies, they have a statistically significant negative 
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effect on the choice of crop production and transfer income livelihood strategies. This implies that 
farmers often experience crop failures because of drought and hence such farmers are less likely 
to choose crop production as a livelihood strategy but instead will substitute this with livestock 
and/or off-farm income. The negative sign of the transfer income is in contrast to the long held 
belief that farmers that perceive drought risk may also seek transfer income such as food aid. This 
shows the fact that they seek transfers as a last resort, after they have exhausted all other options 
in livestock and off-farm activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
Table 8.6: The multivariate probit model estimation of adopting different livelihood strategies 
  
Crop income Livestock income Off-farm income Transfer income 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Risk perception 
        
Perceived drought risk -0.364 0.339 0.814*** 0.231 0.861*** 0.235 -0.233 0.4 
Perceived flood risk -0.807** 0.355 0.071 0.244 -0.18 0.304 0.179 0.366 
Perceived hail storm risk -0.425 0.332 -0.147 0.233 -0.047 0.266 0.103 0.351 
Perceived crop pest risk -0.053 0.387 0.593** 0.267 0.094 0.336 0.164 0.486 
Perceived high input price risk -0.625 0.526 0.999*** 0.385 -0.677 0.518 4.952*** 0.996 
Perceived low maize price risk 0.612* 0.336 -0.333 0.261 0.012 0.306 0.393 0.348 
Perceived income risk -0.014 0.409 0.571** 0.291 -0.195 0.338 0.245 0.338 
Perceived high food price -0.133 0.335 0.366 0.247 -0.169 0.274 0.335 0.324 
Perceived risk of robbery -0.399 0.631 -0.615 0.389 0.432 0.397 -0.323 0.621 
Perceived sickness of hh member 1.597*** 0.467 -0.122 0.253 -0.109 0.277 0.256 0.339 
Risk preference 
        
Risk avers -0.269 0.438 0.820*** 0.25 -0.401 0.314 0.051 0.35 
Household characteristics 
        
ln Family size 0.42 0.524 0.438 0.31 0.52 0.447 -0.516 0.513 
ln Age of household head -0.215 0.763 -1.135** 0.467 -1.500*** 0.548 1.982*** 0.638 
Education of head -0.019 0.045 -0.042 0.035 -0.043 0.039 -0.046 0.059 
Sex of household head 0.834 0.647 -0.77 0.484 0.656 0.572 -0.562 0.781 
Social capital 
        
Friends in leadership position 0.653* 0.376 0.555** 0.248 0.064 0.272 -0.418 0.342 
ln Number of relatives 0.263 0.245 0.235** 0.118 0.257* 0.156 -0.310* 0.176 
Household assets and constraints 
       
ln Total farm size 0.685*** 0.202 0.25 0.167 -0.495** 0.193 0.533** 0.257 
ln asset value -0.022 0.125 -0.142 0.106 -0.321** 0.135 0.261* 0.136 
ln Tropical livestock Units (tlu) -0.209 0.226 0.168 0.151 0.172 0.195 -0.181 0.247 
ln land leas/rent -0.057 0.044 0.03 0.028 0.400*** 0.037 0.450*** 0.125 
ln Distance from main market 0.510** 0.205 0.034 0.131 -0.341** 0.163 0.207 0.174 
Credit constraint -0.615** 0.278 -0.077 0.218 0.23 0.253 0.353 0.368 
χ2(6) 11.58 
       
Prob. > χ2(6) 0.072 
       
N 228 
       
Source: Own computation from household survey data 
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Results of the MVP model reveal that farmers that perceive flooding as an important source 
of food insecurity risk are less likely to choose crop production and off-farm income as livelihood 
strategies. The negative sign with off-farm income may imply the importance of farm wages from 
crop farming, which means that some households obtain wage income by being involved in wage 
labor activities on surrounding crop fields. However, if these are affected by flooding, this option 
will be in problem and farm wage may not be a feasible source of income.  
Results of the MVP model show that household risk perceptions of crop diseases and pests 
have a positive and statistically significant effect on the choice of livestock production as a 
livelihood strategy. As expected, farmers that perceive the risk of crop pests are less likely to be 
engaged in crop production as a livelihood strategy. 
Results of my analysis show that farmers’ perceptions of increasing high input prices have 
a significant and positive impact on the choice of livestock production and transfer income 
strategies but negative and insignificant effects on the choice of crop production and participation 
in off-farm activities. This means that family farmers that perceive the risk of high input prices 
tend to substitute crop production with livestock production and transfer income sources. The 
implications of farmers’ perceptions of high input prices on their choice of alternative livelihood 
strategies might be the gradual consequences of high input prices on food security of family 
farmers and the nation at large. High input prices that are not backed with reasonable increases in 
grain prices discourage farmers (Rashid et al., 2007; Rashid & Dorosh, 2009; Rashid & Negassa, 
2012; Franzel et al., 1989) and motivate them to shift away from crop production to other 
livelihood strategies, which eventually reduces the food production of the nation and causes food 
insecurity at a larger scale. The negative sign for the probability of adopting off-farm income 
activities could possibly be due to shortage of financial resources to be engaged in petty trade and 
other business activities.  
Results of the MVP model show that households that perceive the risk of low maize prices 
as an important source of food insecurity risk have a high propensity to adopt crop income 
strategies. This may show a tendencies for within crop income diversification in which farmers 
that perceive low maize price opt for other crops that fetch them better prices. For instance, farmers 
in the study areas tried to expand their production of pepper and Niger seed (Guizotia abyssinica), 
since maize prices were very low relative to the price of these crops. The negative sign for livestock 
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income strategies may possibly imply some form of expansion in crop production that 
compromises grazing land, which eventually compels households to decrease the size of their 
livestock holding and any associated benefits.  
Perceptions of the risk of income failure are one of the reason why our cohort chooses to 
diversify. Households tend to make trade-offs between a higher total income involving a greater 
probability of risk of failure and a lower total income involving a smaller probability of risk (Ellis, 
2000). As indicated earlier, the major source of livelihood for family farmers in the study areas is 
crop production. However, this source of livelihood strategy involves a high risk of failure because 
of the variability in climate variables, diseases and pests, and failure in output and input markets. 
Accordingly, the results of my analysis show a negative impact of risk perceptions in relation to 
income failure on the likelihood of choosing crop production strategies. This may explain the 
higher likelihood of income losses that farmers encounter, due to crop failure or when grain prices 
fail to cover the costs of even marketing products (Rashid et al., 2007). On the other hand, income 
from livestock production is the second most important source of income next to crop income. A 
significant positive impact of risk of income failure on the likelihood of adopting livestock income 
strategies signifies the choice of livelihood strategies with a lower probability of risk of failure in 
this regard (Ellis, 2000).  
Results of my analysis show that farmers that perceive the sickness of a family member as 
an important source of food insecurity risk have a high likelihood of choosing crop income 
strategies. On the other hand, it has a negative impact on the choice of off-farm and livestock 
income strategies, possiblly because of the effect of illness on labor supply (Sauerborn, Adams, & 
Hien, 1996). Sales of livestock are the main strategy employed to cope with the financial costs of 
healthcare (ibid). The negative sign for livestock production strategies could be because the risk 
perception of illness might be the result of repeated exposure to similar disasters in which their 
livestock resources might have dwindled in an effort to cover treatment costs.  
In addition to the risk perceptions, I also tried to capture how farmers’ risk preferences 
influence the likelihood of adopting different livelihood strategies. After a real pay-off risk 
experiment in which I let farmers choose from among alternative land/soil, weather, and crop 
scenarios, I was able to categorize them into risk-averse and risk-neutral. As shown in Table 8.6, 
being risk-averse has a statistically significant strong positive effect on the likelihood of choosing 
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livestock production activities as a livelihood strategy. However, such farmers have a low 
propensity to adopt crop income and off-farm income sources, possibly due to the risk of crop 
failure as a result of recurring fluctuations in climatic variables. The negative effect on the 
likelihood of choosing off-farm income might be due to the uncertainties involved in non-farm 
businesses, which risk-averse farmers might not wish to confront.  
The results of the MVP model also reveal the fact that older household heads opt to use 
transfer incomes. This result complies with the findings of Block and Webb (2001) and Barret and 
Reardon (2000), which indicated that relatively established households with a lower proportion of 
working adults derive a larger proportion of their income outside cropping. However, the results 
of this study show the tendency of being limited to transfer income rather than diversifying, as 
reported in Block and Webb (2001) and Barret and Reardon (2000). On the other hand, the age of 
the household head has negative and significant effects on the choice of crop and livestock 
production, and participation in off-farm work, which may be due to the lower labor capacity of 
older farmers. This result may require policymakers to develop a social security system that can 
support older farmers in rural Ethiopia.  
Social capital and network variables have mixed effects on the choice of different 
livelihood strategies. Farmers in developing countries face imperfect markets, including 
transaction costs and scarce information. For instance, Ethiopian farmers have inadequate 
information about insurance markets. Under these circumstances, social networks could facilitate 
the exchange of information, enable farmers to access inputs on schedule, and overcome credit 
constraints (Winters et al., 2001; World Bank, 2000). The results of the MVP model indicate that 
farmers with more relatives are less likely to engage in receiving transfer incomes, meaning they 
are more likely to choose crop and livestock production as livelihood strategies. Kinship networks 
can improve information flows about new opportunities and potential shocks and also confer other 
benefits such as better access to finance and inputs (Höllinger & Haller, 1990). They can also serve 
as an informal insurance mechanism in times of crisis (Quisumbing, 2003). The political 
connection variable has a positive incentive effect in the choice of crop and livestock production 
as important livelihood strategies. Connection with local administrators and agricultural officials 
may lead to better access to technologies, credit, and farm tools supplied by public institutions 
(Winters et al., 2001; Markussen & Tarp, 2014). The above results could imply that local rural 
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institutions and service providers need to be supported, because they can assist farmers effectively 
by providing credit, inputs, information, and stable market outlets. 
As is normally expected, households with larger farms have a high propensity to adopt crop 
income and less of a propensity to adopt off-farm income as their livelihood strategies. However, 
such farmers also have a high likelihood of adopting transfer income. This association between 
larger farm size and transfer income could possibly be because of the concentration of land in the 
hands of older farmers, who usually seek transfer income (Dercon, 1999). Results of this study 
also reveal that households that have relatively larger farm and household assets have more of a 
propensity to adopt transfer incomes and less of a propensity to adopt off-farm income compared 
to those with fewer assets in terms of value. This finding is also consistent with that of the age of 
household heads. Older household heads that have accumulated different assets during their 
working life have a higher propensity to seek transfer income, since they might not be able to 
engage in the other three livelihood strategies. 
Failure in the credit market is one of the motivations for households diversifying into off-
farm and transfer income strategies, in order to use the cash generated from these activities to 
procure agricultural inputs (Binswanger, 1983; Reardon et al., 1992; Ellis, 2000). However, 
because of the substitution between participating in off-farm activities and crop production, 
attempts to diversify livelihoods to off-farm and transfer income activities will reduce the 
likelihood of choosing crop production activities. Though it is not statistically significant, the 
results of the MVP model show that farmers facing credit constraints are more likely to choose 
off-farm and transfer income activities. However, there is a statistically significant negative 
propensity for these farmers to choose crop production strategies. On the other hand, farmers that 
face credit constraints often depend on sharecropping or have to rent out their farmland. As 
indicated earlier, 55 percent of the sample farmers reported they leased out their farmland and 
obtained about 2,100 ETB/year on average in 2015. About 50 percent of households that leased 
out their farmland in 2015 were credit-constrained farmers. The other 50 percent did so due to old 
age and shortage of labor. However, the results of the MVP model reveal that farmers who enjoy 
a larger income from leasing out their farmland have a high probability of choosing off-farm 
activities and transfer income, and a negative propensity to choose crop production as their 
livelihood strategies. This means that they have already leased out their land and may find it 
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difficult to get back into agriculture. This concern needs strong policy attention, in order to address 
the credit demands of poor family farmers. In a nutshell, the choice of off-farm and transfer income 
strategies is directly or indirectly related to credit constraints, as indicated by Ellis (2000).  
One of the constraints to the family farmers is the distance of their residence away from 
their main markets. In this regard, distance from residence to market has a significant positive 
impact on the likelihood of choosing crop production activities, while, on the contrary, there is a 
significant negative impact of this variable on participation in off-farm activities. These findings 
indicate the fact that farmers closer to the market are more likely to engage in off-farm activities 
than those located in more remote areas. This is in line with the findings of Abdulai and CroleRees 
(2001), in which they indicate that households with superior access to markets are in a better 
position to diversify their livelihood strategies to non-crop production activities. Barrett et al. 
(2005) also indicated an increase in the importance of crop and livestock livelihood strategies and 
decreasing diversification with increase in distance from the main market.  
 
8.3.4. Number of livelihood strategies adopted 
Table 8.7 presents the results of an ordered probit model. The result describes which factors 
influence how many livelihood strategies are chosen. Although the estimated parameters are not 
interpreted directly per se, the parameter estimates indicate that most of the household risk 
perceptions, and some socioeconomic characteristics, are statistically significant in explaining the 
intensity of livelihood strategies used at the farm household level.  
The estimation results show that as in the livelihood strategy choice decision, household 
risk perceptions of drought, pests, and input prices are positive to increase the number of livelihood 
strategies. Farmers who perceive these risks consider livelihood diversification as an ex-ante risk 
mitigation measure, and hence they increase their options. With household’s perceptions of these 
shocks, the marginal probability of choosing more than two livelihood strategies increases by 
about 10–20 percent. Table 8.7 also shows the importance of social capital network variables in 
explaining the intensity of livelihood strategies. A   kinship network has positive and significant 
effects on the likelihood of choosing more than two livelihood strategies. With a one percent 
increase in the number of relatives around a village, households are five percent more likely to 
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choose more than two livelihood strategies. This can help farmers provide contingency measures 
to deal with increasing risk and alleviate the consequences of food insecurity by providing advice 
and support on how to diversify accordingly. In a multi-country analysis, Wood et al. (2014) also 
showed that farmers who participate in social institutions are more likely to make changes in 
farming practices than those that are not members of such groups. 
Farm-related variables, such as land rent, as measured by income earned from renting land, 
have a positive impact on the number of livelihood strategies. A one percent increase in income 
from land rental increases the chance of choosing more than two livelihood strategies by about 
eight percent. With regard to household head characteristics, the results show the negative and 
significant effects of education on increasing the intensity of livelihood strategies. With additional 
years of household head’s education, the probability of choosing more than two options decreases 
by about two percent. Using farmers’ education level as a factor influencing livelihood strategies 
is common in the economics literature. This variable reflects the household’s human capital stock 
and may increase an individual’s ability to acquire, understand, and implement knowledge-
intensive strategies so that they can increase returns from using these practices relative to old 
strategies. However, as discussed above, education has a negative sign in the livelihood intensity 
model. The negative effect of education has been reported previously in other studies (Pender and 
Gebremedhin 2007; Kassie et al., 2012). Two reasons may be suggested in this regard: A higher 
level of education may increase the opportunity cost of staying on a farm or low skilled off-farm 
job, and hence it provides the opportunity for moving out from these livelihood strategies. 
Additionally, the education system may not be oriented to improve existing livelihood strategies. 
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Table 8.7: Coefficients of the ordered probit model and their marginal effects 
 
Variables 
Ordered probit Marginal Effects 
Coefficients SE Probe(Y=0/X) Prob(Y=1/X) Prob(Y=2/X) Prob(Y=3/X) Prob(Y=4/X) 
Perceived drought risk 0.403** 0.17 -0.00028 -0.0616* -0.0835* 0.137* 0.00828 
Perceived crop pest risk 0.359 0.221 -0.00043 -0.06720 -0.0520* 0.11500 0.00492 
Perceived input price risk 0.607* 0.34 -0.00136 -0.13600 -0.04290 0.175* 0.00575 
ln number of relatives 0.152* 0.087 -0.00012 -0.02490 -0.02850 0.05100 0.00261 
ln land leas/rent 0.226*** 0.025 -0.00018 -0.0371*** -0.0424*** 0.0758*** 0.00388* 
Education of head -0.062** 0.029 0.00005 0.0102* 0.0116* -0.0208* -0.00106 
Source: Own computation from household survey data 
 
8.4. Discussions and conclusions  
In this study, emphasis is given to the fact that the family farmers’ perceptions of food insecurity 
risk are the results of their exposure to different shocks and experiences in the governance of these 
shocks (Barrett et al., 2000; Doss et al., 2008). Taking this as a foundational concept, this chapter 
focuses on the linkage between risk perceptions and risk assessment and management strategies. 
More specifically, it takes this concept into the perspectives of family farmer’s decisions in the 
choice of different livelihood strategies. This is because family farmer’s responses to food 
insecurity risks are manifested in their choice of the different livelihood strategies. Taking this into 
account, I shed light on gaps in the conceptualization of risk perception and their linkage to the 
choice of different livelihood strategies in the sustainable livelihood framework.  
Analysis of the data in this study was made using a systems approach to determine jointly 
the decisions to choose multiple types of livelihood strategies. Accordingly, the results of the MVP 
model revealed the interdependence of various livelihood strategies. For example, the choices of 
crop and livestock production strategies, and livestock production and off-farm income generation 
activities, were complementary. Crop production is the largest source of livelihood, both in 
combination with other livelihood strategies and on its own. Adopting livestock production, and a 
combination of livestock production, off-farm, and transfer income strategies, were found to 
increase the choice of crop production activities. This shows the role of adoption of multiple 
livelihood strategies in re-enforcing the choice of crop production activities. This re-enforcement 
could be in terms of sharing resources among the different livelihood strategies in the form of cash 
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for investment in crop improvement, traction power, manure, and spreading risk among diversified 
livelihood strategies. Similarly, the choice of livestock production activities was found to increase 
with adopting crops only, a combination of crops and off-farm income, a combination of crop, off-
farm and transfer incomes, and off-farm income alone. This also shows the contribution of 
adopting different livelihood strategies to increase the choice of livestock production activities. 
This contribution could be in terms of sourcing cash for investment in livestock production 
activities and feed (crop residues). I understood that choosing off-farm income strategies increases 
with adopting livestock, a combination of crop and livestock, and a combination of crop, livestock, 
and transfer income strategies. This in turn could be through the generation of finance for  non-
farm businesses.  
Results of the MVP model revealed that farmers that perceive the risk of climate variables 
such as drought, flooding, and hailstorms,  crop pests, high input prices, income failure, and 
sickness of a household member have a low propensity to choose crop production strategies. This 
means the policies promoting the piecemeal adoption of livelihood strategies such as crops alone 
may not succeed in ensuring food security through increased crop production since most of the 
drivers behind the decision to choose crop production as a livelihood strategy are negative. 
However, policymakers and planners would need to use the notion of interdependence between 
the adoption decisions of farmers, i.e. it would be wise to look into the complementarity effect in 
the adoption decisions of family farmers. For instance, perceptions of drought risk have a positive, 
statistically significant impact on adopting livestock and off-farm livelihood strategies but a 
negative impact on choosing crop production strategies. However, as indicated earlier, adopting 
livestock income strategies increases the likelihood of choosing crop production strategies. This 
means that it is possible to encourage increased crop production activities by promoting 
interventions which support adopting livestock activities. The same is true for those farmers that 
perceive the risk of crop pests, which has a significant positive impact on the choice of livestock 
strategies and a statistically insignificant negative effect on crop strategies. However, since crop 
and livestock production are complementary, interventions promoting the adoption of livestock 
production will increase the likelihood of choosing crop production. Perceptions of high input 
prices also have a significant positive impact on adopting livestock and transfer strategies, but 
adopting a combination thereof increases the likelihood of choosing crop and off-farm income 
strategies.  
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In a nutshell, knowledge about the interdependence between the different livelihood 
strategies is a very useful input in preparing policies and plans to promote the food security of the 
nation in general and family farmers in the study areas in particular. In this regard, due 
consideration needs to be given to mechanisms to promote adopting a combination of multiple 
livelihood strategies rather than the piecemeal adoption of different livelihood strategies. Taking 
this into account, I have analyzed the drivers of adopting multiple livelihood strategies. 
Accordingly, the results of this study show that perceptions of drought, crop pests, and input prices 
as sources of food insecurity risk increase the marginal probability of choosing more than two 
livelihood strategies by about 12-20 percent. This means that farmers that perceive these sources 
of food insecurity risk consider livelihood diversification as an ex-ante risk mitigation measure 
and increase their number of livelihood strategies. More specifically, those farmers that perceive 
the danger posed to their food security by the specified risk have a higher likelihood of adopting 
multiple livelihood strategies than others. This implies the need to work on the awareness of 
farmers of different risks, so that they properly consider the past in order to prepare themselves for 
the future.  
Apart from the risk perception parameters, having a good social network in the village was 
found to increase the marginal probability of adopting multiple livelihood strategies. This means 
farmers that have better social networks are more likely to diversify and adopt multiple livelihood 
strategies. This implies the need to encourage strong social networks, since they can support the 
household through information sharing, mitigating risk, labor sharing, relaxing credit constraints, 
and enabling timely access to inputs (Barrett, 2001; Fafchamps & Minten, 2002; Isham, 2002; 
Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Marenya & Barrett, 2007).  
The higher age of household heads, farm size, and the value of farm and household assets 
were found to increase significantly the probability of adopting transfer income strategies. A closer 
look at these variables reveals the fact that they are more or less related to older age of household 
heads. Most of the larger farm plots in Ethiopia are found in the hands of older farmers, who had 
the opportunity to acquire land during the initial land distribution program in the mid-1970s. 
However, being older, such farmers might not be able to continue engaging in crop, livestock and 
off-farm livelihood activities; rather, they become more dependent on transfers as their age 
increases. Such households either try to send out family members to work abroad or get them 
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employed in off-farm jobs. In order to save those who do not have such options from being food 
insecure in old age, we recommend policy actions in terms of devising an appropriate social 
security system that will support this particular cohort. This might also be part of the solution for 
illegal human trafficking to the Middle East and other parts of the world.  
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9. Synthesis of the Theoretical Contributions  
 
9.1. Introduction 
This study focused on the perceptions, assessment, and management of food insecurity risk among 
smallholder family farming households in three woredas in the Oromia regional state, southwest 
Ethiopia. In the conceptual framework for this study, the term ‘risk’ was defined as “exposure to 
uncertain events that may have unfavorable consequences on human health, life and wellbeing, the 
built and natural environment” (Hardaker, 2000). However, after investigating how family farmers 
and other actors conceptualize the term risk, I also understood how people come to understand it. 
The evolutionary risk governance framework involves considering the evolutionary path of the 
different elements of governance and how people understand their contexts and conceptualize 
problems. Analysis of the evolutionary path in different parts of the thesis revealed that people try 
to maintain their narratives over generations and conceptualize different problems in terms of these 
narratives. On the other hand, the dominant narratives of people are the products of their history, 
identity, values, priorities, environment, goals, and expectations. Since conceptualizations of the 
problems are driven by the dominant narratives in a given society, any event or phenomenon that 
runs counter to these narratives, or things that tend to deviate the well-established narratives of 
society, might be taken as risk factors (Luhman, 1984). Basically, for any person with clear goals 
and expectations, risk is something that distracts her/him from achieving that goal or something 
that impedes the actor from achieving her/his expectations (Figure 9.1). For instance, for a family 
farmer striving to ensure the food security of her/his household, anything that impedes the 
achievement of this goal and exposes the household to food shortages is a source of food insecurity 
risk. What has to be emphasized here is that the goals and expectations might also be influenced 
by dominant narratives within society. According to Renn (2008), there is a difference between 
risk and hazards. “Hazards signify the internal characteristics of the risk agent (source of risk) to 
cause potential consequences that obstruct the achievement of expectations of people while risk is 
the potential effect that might happen on humans (their welfare), their belongings and the 
environment they want to maintain according to their dominant narratives.” The risk (potential) 
effect may happen, or not, depending on the level of exposure of people, their artifacts, or the built 
environment to hazards, the vulnerability of the target victims, and the level of resilience built to 
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tolerate the incident as a result of exposure to hazards. In this case, the term ‘exposure’ describes 
contact of the hazard-carrying agent with the subject/victim, while vulnerability to risk describes 
actually being hurt or attacked by the hazard (Aven & Renn, 2010). Resilience implies the capacity 
of the target or subject exposed to the hazard to protect himself or the system against the 
consequences of such exposure (ibid).  
Risk perception refers to the intuitive and subjective judgement of the likelihood of a 
specified type of accident happening and how concerned we are with the consequences (Paul 
Slovic, 1987; Sjöberg et al., 2004). Moreover, it is the likelihood of a risk causing agent against 
someone’s goals and expectations that are usually constructed out of the dominant narratives of 
society in which the person exists. According to this definition, perceiving risk involves evaluating 
the likelihood of the risk and intuitively judging the consequences (Sjöberg et al., 2004). At the 
rural household or community level, risk perception is the basis for assessing the severity and 
consequences of risk, and the management strategies taken in response to the potential risk.  
 
9.2. Evolutionary risk governance framework 
By governance, we mean a form of coordination involved in taking collectively binding decisions 
in a given community involving  diverse groups of government and non-government actors, as 
well as formal and informal institutions (Beunen et al., 2015; Nye & Donahue, 2000; Van Assche 
et al., 2013). Evolutionary governance theory (EGT) is a theoretical framework for explaining 
governance from an evolutionary perspective (Van Assche et al., 2013). It considers governance 
and its elements as constantly changing, and it emphasizes the co-evolution between discourses, 
actors, institution, power, and knowledge. According to Van Assche et al. (2013), EGT offers a 
perspective on the way institutions, markets, and societies evolve. ERGF is the application of the 
basic ideas and principles of EGT to the perceptions, assessment, and management of risk at the 
household and community levels. Furthermore, ERGF understands the fact that farming 
households are exposed to several ecological and socioeconomic risk/shocks (Suess-Reyes & 
Fuetsch, 2016) that may influence their dominant narratives, goals, and expectations. ERGF 
considers the importance of linkages between risk perception, risk assessment, and risk 
management. 
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The framework also underscores the fact that risk perception is the result of exposure to 
shocks (Gloede et al., 2015), socio-cultural, historical and political factors that may affect 
someone’s expectations and goals, which are rooted mainly in dominant narratives of society. 
These factors could be the result of the actions of global or local actors, or institutions or 
discourses. In this study, two aspects of risk perception (Figure 9.1) were considered: The general 
risk perceptions and perceptions of a certain risk in a specific location by different actors that are 
different from their own perspectives and thereby form different riskscapes (Müller-Mahn & 
Everts, 2013). In the latter case, each actor in a certain location can have his own riskscapes. These 
riskscapes can partially overlap or contradict each other. This means the response strategies 
developed by different actors can create new risks that may need new risk management strategies.  
Once a given farmer has developed perceptions based on exposure to different shocks and 
how these shocks can be managed at different times, these perceptions will serve as perspectives 
or lenses for assessment of similar risks that may happen in the future. This assessment could be 
in terms of the impact of the potential risk on food security, its predictability, likelihood of 
occurrence, whether it is possible to avoid this risk (avoidability), recoverability, or other 
dimensions. The perception of risk is also a basis for risk management strategies. This is because 
people learn from how similar shocks were managed in the past. They refer to stories about these 
risks, what aspects of their narratives (identities, their built environment, physical belongings, and 
social networks) the risk affected, who were the major victims, and how households and the 
community survived. In addition, people learn from how different actors responded to these 
shocks, how resources were utilized, and what formal and informal institutions effectively served 
to manage the situation. As the core aspect of a risk management strategy, I argue that a 
household’s choice of livelihood strategy is the result of its perception of risk. According to the 
sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF), the choice of livelihood strategy is influenced mainly 
by the household’s access to assets (Scoones, 1998; Norton & Foster, 2001). The SLF also stresses 
the importance of the vulnerability context in which people’s livelihoods and the availability of 
assets are affected by critical trends, shocks, and seasonality over which they have very limited 
control. The SLF emphasizes the role of transforming structures and processes (actors, institutions 
and culture) in shaping livelihoods by determining access to different capitals, the terms of 
exchange between the capitals and returns to any given livelihood strategy. However, the SLF does 
not indicate the role of these shocks, trends, seasonalities, actors, institutions, or the resulting 
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access to resources on the perceptions of people of the risk they may face and how they intend to 
overcome it, including their choice of different livelihood strategies. From the ERGF perspective, 
I argue that trends indicated in the SLF, shocks, and seasonality form the basis for the risk 
perception of households. The risk perception of households in turn plays a key role in the choice 
of different livelihood strategies, in order to achieve their livelihood outcomes, which can also be 
treated as a risk governance strategy.  
When risk management is a matter of community governance, of collectively binding 
decision-making, extending beyond a small circle, we speak of risk governance (Figure 9.1). If we 
see governance as co-evolving governance configurations, risk governance has to be understood 
as evolving, too, in that one has to understand current perceptions, assessments, and management 
forms as deriving from pre-existing sets of actors, institutions, and forms of knowledge. 
Knowledge includes here both local and expert knowledge, knowledge structured as narrative, and 
knowledge subtly embedded in narratives.  
Being a collectively binding decision-making process, evolutionary risk governance is a 
multilevel governance process that has to be evaluated against the basic principles of governance: 
Effectiveness, legitimacy, efficiency, fairness, coercion, and so on (Figure 9.1). As indicated in 
Figure 9.1, the ERGF involves the configuration and co-evolution of actors, power/knowledge 
relations, discourses, and institutions. In this study, institutions are understood to represent a 
system of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions (Hodgson, 2006). 
Institutions can be formal, informal, or dead (Van Assche et al., 2014). 
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Figure 9.1: Modified version of the evolutionary risk governance framework as a locked loop 
Formal institutions are “the rules that are considered as the one that are supposed to govern 
interaction in a given situation (Van Assche & Hornidge, 2015)”. According to North (1991), 
informal institutions are “social codes of conduct and socially acceptable behaviors that are 
transmitted through generations involving cooperation, collaborative learning and self-
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organization.” Basically, formality is the result of power relations in the society in which the most 
powerful actors define the social rules of the game that should be enforced throughout the system 
(Van Assche & Hornidge, 2015). This means that formal institutions are imposed from outside, 
while informal institutions are inherent to the local community (Stellmacher, 2007). Since 
formality is the result of power relations, a once formal institution may turn out to be informal 
with a shift in power relations (Stellmacher, 2007; Van Assche & Hornidge, 2015). In line with 
this notion, analysis of the evolutionary path in the last four major regimes reveals that formal 
institutions during the Gada administration for community governance were replaced by the formal 
centralist administration of the imperial regime. However, the local community maintained its 
local governance systems during the Gada system under the umbrella of the local self-help 
organizations known as rejis/idirs.  
Tridico (2004) describes informal institutions as carriers of history that have passed the test 
of historical time. For instance, the local community in the study areas associates the function of 
councils of elders, called jarsa biyya and shanee, with their ancestors, and these can be traced back 
to the Gada system. These institutions portray lots of history about how the community was 
governed by the shanee during the Gada system. Moreover, informal institutions are the results of 
an evolutionary process in which society develops its own codes of conduct, in order to overcome 
different challenges that may not be addressed fully by formal institutions. This means that the 
unpredictable nature of different risks makes it difficult to address them immediately through 
formal institutions. The results of the institutional analysis in this study, using an ERGF, show that 
informal institutions evolve depending on issues emerging in the community. In a rural 
community, these may include threats to the values, identities, environment, goals, and 
expectations that form the basis of the problem definition of society. For instance, one of the rules 
formulated in the shanees of the rural communities in Bako-tibe woreda restricts extravagant 
expenditure on wedding celebrations, dowries, and the amount of people accompanying the groom 
to take the bride. This was the reaction of the informal institution against the threat to the norms 
and values of the rural community which may devastate the livelihoods of people by depleting 
resources spent on unproductive events. Since the formal institution had no means of controlling 
such social concerns, the rural community legislated and implemented its institutions to control 
the social action through shanees. This means that the rural community relies on informal 
institutions to govern risk that might not be legitimate for formal institutions. 
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The effectiveness of informal institutions varies according to location and proximity to 
urban centers. The variation with location is because of the nature of problems in different 
locations which form the basis of social concerns that derive mechanisms to overcome them. For 
instance, the robbery of livestock was more of a severe problem and a source of food insecurity 
risk in Bako-Tibe woreda than in the Kersa and Omonana woredas. In places where the risk of 
livestock robbery was so serious, the rural community relied on informal institutions rather than 
the formal options. This is mainly because of the difficulty in finding readily available evidence 
about suspected robbers to take the case to a formal court, since robbery of livestock usually takes 
place in a very underground and shadowy manner. This made the rural community in such 
locations to rely on informal institutions, since they have very powerful tools to unravel evidence 
and trace lost property. These powerful tools are rooted in religion, traditional beliefs, and social 
sanctions. In order to handle the case without any form of partiality, the activities of the shanee 
start by swearing-in its serving members in religious and traditional beliefs that are highly 
respected and venerated in the area. In a similar way, everybody that will pass through the fact-
finding process of the shanee also swears not to hid any evidence on the issue under investigation. 
Those people who hid information they know about the case under investigation will be penalized 
by the community as collaborators of the robbers. The social sanction is the most powerful tool, 
since a person on the receiving end is excluded totally from the community. Proximity to urban 
centers, on the other hand, influences the effectiveness of informal institutions, since formal 
institutions are stronger in such areas due to the concentration of actors implementing the formal 
institutions. This means the effectiveness of formal institutions also varies according to proximity 
to urban centers. The farther one moves away from an urban center, the less effective the formal 
institution and the more effective the informal one. This implies the complementarity of formal 
and informal institutions, in that the latter fill the gaps where the implementations of the former 
become weaker.  
Both formal and informal institutions evolve alongside social dynamics, in order to address 
risk to livelihoods and the food insecurity of people. According to the observations I made at the 
study areas, evolving informal institutions serve as indicators of the social concerns of a rural 
community, which might be addressed later by formal institutions. In some cases, informal 
institutions may jump into cases that become too costly and time-consuming to go through a formal 
institution. For instance, the government has been working on creating public awareness to curtail 
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female genital mutilation and the health risks associated with this practice. Despite efforts made 
through the mass media and government structures, though, the mutilation practice has continued 
in rural areas for years. After all the efforts made through the formal institution were found to be 
of limited success, informal institution was legislated through the network of shanees (wirtu) 
against those who practice female genital mutilation.  
Sound rural governance needs the balanced interplay between formal and informal 
institutions (Stellmacher, 2007). This is because neither the formal nor informal institutions on 
their own can ensure sound rural governance. Unlike in urban areas, which depend largely on 
formal institutions, informal institutions play a much greater role in setting norms and social 
values, codes of conduct guiding social interactions, and peace and stability in rural areas. 
However, this does not mean that informal institutions are substitutes for formal institutions (ibid); 
rather, they can complement each other. However, because of power relations in society, formal 
institutions have a high tendency to suppress informal ones, or actors implementing formal 
institutions abuse informal institutions. This in turn signifies the presence of several different 
actor-institution and power-knowledge configurations, which influence local livelihoods and 
social interactions in rural areas. Since these configurations are the results of macro- and micro-
level social and administrative structures, it is mandatory to understand social organizations and 
the way they evolved over time. This is to understand how the community has operated in the past, 
which positive aspects of community operations have been carried over and currently serve good 
purposes. It is also important to understand what weaknesses have been felt in the past organization 
and functioning of the community, and how these have been improved and reshaped in the current 
organization of the community, or, alternatively, which ones still resonate. This is because 
important social organizations that have been effective in governance of different risks might still 
serve similar purposes with adjustments to socio-political dynamics in society. According to my 
observations in the study areas, the community preserves some past social organizations as 
legacies of their ancestors. Some of these social organizations are re-introduced to society when 
those in power find them useful for certain purposes.  
Since actors, institutions, and narratives (as forms of knowledge) co-evolve, this introduces 
dependencies in risk governance, which means that one cannot simply jump from one 
understanding to another one, from one tool or solution to a new one, just as one cannot copy ‘best 
175 
 
practice’ from other places without considering certain contextual issues. In other words, ERGF 
underscores that past shocks, and management strategies taken in response to these shocks, have 
evolved alongside the different institutional and political settings society has undergone. To make 
sure that past risks do not re-occur, or to create opportunities for timely interventions to control 
effectively if similar events happen again, there is a need to investigate past events and learn from 
them (Boin & Fishbacher-Smith, 2011). In other words, it is wise to understand the characteristics 
and major causes of past shocks, since they can have important implications on the present and 
future livelihoods of people, their identity, the achievement of their goals and expectations, and 
their environment. In order to understand the past, which may have an influence on current and 
future scenarios, ERGF involves the analysis of dependencies (path dependences, 
interdependences, and goal dependences) as well as power-knowledge and actor-institution 
configurations.  
Path dependencies refer to the legacies of the past that influence the present (North, 2005; 
Van Assche & Hornidge, 2015). This means that current actors, institutions, knowledge, power 
relations, and access to resources, to some extent, are influenced by their respective past 
institutions, actors and their actions, past knowledge, power relations, and the way resources have 
been managed. However, this does not mean that the governance path necessarily guides current 
governance in the same direction and at the same pace (Acallon 1991). Instead, one can learn from 
the past in order to nurture the experience of past strengths, in order to improve the current and 
learn from past failures and weaknesses in order not to repeat the same path of failure or develop 
appropriate timely interventions against similar risks (Boin & Fishbacher-Smith, 2011). Lack of 
willingness or a failure to understand the legacies of past risk governance may lead to production 
of new risks the impacts of which may outweigh the shocks that have been observed in the past. 
For instance, the imperial government of Ethiopia tried to hid the food insecurity and famine 
problems that happened in the early 1970s until foreign media exposed the catastrophic issue to 
the international community. About 250,000 people died because of hunger, as intervention came 
too late to rescue many lives (Webb & Von Braun, 1994). This famine, coupled with other 
problems, triggered public anger that led to the overthrow of the imperial regime (Aredo, 1990; 
Rahimato, 2009; Webb & Von Braun, 1994). A similar story was repeated in the 1980s. The 
Dergue government was busy establishing the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) and celebrating 
the 10th anniversary of the revolution, by keeping the news of famine and mass starvation secret 
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until October 3, 1984 (Jean, 2008). This late declaration of the famine situation delayed the 
coordination of international assistance to rescue lives. As a result, about a million souls were lost 
through starvation and associated disease. It is believed that this famine also contributed to the 
downfall of the Dergue regime. This exemplifies the fact that disregard for evolutionary paths 
creates a way to produce new risks that may cost more than one expects. In other words, the desired 
outcome of a new form of risk governance is often a new institution, a new policy, a plan or a law, 
and evolutionary risk governance would warn that this might work if it fully takes into account 
current dependencies. Otherwise, a new institution is unlikely to link to current actors, institutions, 
and knowledge in such a way that the outcome comes close to the intention. The outcomes of new 
risk management and governance become more unpredictable, and the risk strategy may become 
a new risk in itself. On the other hand, any analysis of governance paths should not just blame the 
past for all the weaknesses in the current governance, because evolution never stops, and 
everything, including actors, institutions, discourses, and resources, evolve continuously. That is, 
path dependency does not mean that “one past leads to one future, nor that the present organization 
of the community is only viable one, nor that similar cultures always end up in the same situation” 
(Van Assche & Hornidge, 2015).  
Interdependence in the governance path refers to interdependence between different actors, 
different institutions, and between actors and institutions in a governance process (Van Assche, et 
al., 2013). It is also a matter of understanding the implications or impact of institutions and/or 
actors on one another, the potential synergetic effects, or the potential contradictions among the 
different factions in this regard. Interdependence could also be interpreted in terms of 
interdependence between different types of risk. Such risks can interact and exacerbate the effect 
of each other. For instance, the results of the analysis in this study reveal that three major categories 
of risk, namely climate-related , crop and livestock disease, and institutions related to markets, 
influence household food security among family farming households. These risks are 
interdependent, with one exacerbating the effects of the other. The impacts of certain risks also 
signpost local inequalities among family farmers. The risk of high crop input prices was found to 
make the management of climate-related risk unaffordable, which calls for the need to have an 
inclusive (holistic) approach when analyzing evolutionary paths and designing plans, policies, and 
strategies in response to different risks.  
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As indicated in Figure 9.1, the results of evolutionary governance could be new institutions and 
new actors created in the governance process, new resources brought into the system, new linkages 
between institutions, new expertise, new plans, policies and laws, or new interpretations of 
institutions. The results of risk governance could also be a new riskscape, which may need new 
strategies, and this may in turn create new narratives. These new narratives again add up to the 
already established narratives of society and form the basis for the conceptualization of problems 
completing the cycle.  
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10. Conclusions and recommendations 
10.1. General 
In this study, an evolutionary risk governance framework was employed to investigate the sources 
of food insecurity risk among family farming households. The evolutionary risk governance 
framework is an application of the basic principles of evolutionary governance theory to risk 
governance, and it promotes investigation of the food insecurity risk from different perspectives. 
This is because it considers the current risk governance strategies of family farming households as 
results of exposure of the farmers to different food insecurity shocks, response strategies of 
different actors as well as their access to resources. This chapter presents the major empirical 
findings drawn from analysis using ERGF, and their implications. 
 
10.2.  Major empirical conclusions 
10.2.1. Evolution of institutions in rural areas 
The analysis of governance in rural communities in Chapter 5 reveals that some community 
governance systems within the framework of the formal institution have been disrupted by power 
shifts in society. Despite the dynamics in the formality of these institutions, the rural community 
ensured the continuity of these institutions in the form of informal institutions. The important 
institution of note in this case is the informal body implemented by the council of elders, known 
as a shanee. Shanee was the formal local governance structure during the Gada administration. 
However, it turned out to be informal after the inclusion of Oromo land in the central government 
system of Emperor Menelik II. Despite the shift in the power structure, and an end to the role of 
shanees in the formal government system, the community sheltered it in the informal rural self-
help organizations known as rejis. Reji has two distinct councils known as afres and shanees. The 
latter is the council of elders that run the informal institutions serving informal community 
governance together with jarsa biyya (different levels of councils of elders). The roles of the 
shanee and jarsa biyya involve not only implementing the informal institutions, but also legislating 
them through their network known as Wirtu.  
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The co-evolution of informal institutions with the social dynamics and evolution of events 
in society is reflected in the legislation of new customary laws of the rural community, 
promulgated to handle new developments that put peace, stability, and welfare of the rural 
community at stake. Shanees and jarsa biyyas use the powers of religion, traditional beliefs, and 
social sanctions as important mechanisms to enforce informal institutions. Since jarsa biyyas, 
shanees and their networks are concerned with informal local governance and deal with the day-
to-day challenges of the community, they can be considered sensory tools of the local community 
that seek and then fix social concerns. This means that informal institutions could be taken as 
indicators for the gaps in formal institutions. In other words, informal institutions serve to 
complement rather than substitute for formal institutions. Interestingly, however, location, 
proximity to urban centers, and the nature of social problems were found to shake the effectiveness 
of informal institutions. They were found to be more effective in locations where there is poor 
implementation of the formal institutions. People tend to rely more on formal institutions than the 
informal alternative in areas closer to urban centers, where there is strong enforcement of the 
former. Moreover, rural households rely on informal institutions to handle cases for which there 
is no readily available evidence that could go forward to a formal institution. In a nutshell, I found 
that informal institutions co-evolve with social dynamics and complement their formal 
counterparts. This means there is a kind of interdependence between formal and informal 
institutions. Furthermore, since informal institutions are powerful in mobilizing the local 
community, actors running formal institutions rely on the shanees for mobilization purposes. 
Informal institutions also rely on formal institutions for protection against aggressive members of 
the community when handling certain important cases. 
 
10.2.2. Re-emergence of social organizations 
The results in Chapter 5 reveal that apart from the council of elders, the term shanee signifies the 
next form of social organization after households in the Gada system. Five households form a 
shanee, and five shanees form an olla. The local community calls coordinators of the community 
activities during both the imperial and the Dergue regimes as shanees. However, the purpose of 
shanees during the imperial and Dergue regimes was different from their role during the 
administration under the Gada system. The same type of shanee with the name one-in-five, but 
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similar both in the size of membership and principles of organization to the shanee re-emerged 
during the current EPRDF government. This social network is now the basis for the new extension 
approach, known as the participatory extension system (PES). However, since the re-emergence 
of this social organization in 2010 was politically motivated (for implementation of election 
campaign) and its leaders were preferably those affiliated with the ruling party, it was considered 
among the young generation a system imported from outside. The elders, on the other hand, 
explained that “one-in-five is the legacy of their ancestors.” The tendency of resistance or 
externalization of one-in-five social networks is because of a lack of proper contextualization and 
legitimization in a way the new generation can understand the origin and history of the one-in-five 
system. 
 
10.2.3. Farmer typology and the knowledge-power relationship 
With the objective of promoting competition among farmers and targeting different types of 
farmers with extension packages that suit their reception capacity, there is a periodic ranking of 
farmers into three categories. As intended, the ranking exercise might create a certain level of 
competition among farmers. However, this practice has never considered the knowledge-power 
relationship, created because of a lack of access to finance by Type C farmers. There is also the 
oversight in the meantime of the widening gap created between the extension system and these 
farmers. Most Type C farmers are not eligible for micro-finance credit and cannot afford to buy 
agricultural inputs, which compels them to share or lease out their land to Type A and Type B 
farmers. This means that such farmers are becoming poorer while Type A and Type B farmers are 
becoming wealthier. Type A farmers have better political participation. The increased acceptance 
of Type A farmers in the political circle and their influential role in society, is widening the gap in 
the knowledge-power relationship in rural areas.  
 
10.2.4. Dependencies among institutions 
As indicated earlier in the evolution of institutions (Chapter 5), there is interdependence between 
formal and informal institutions implemented in rural areas. Moreover, analysis of governance 
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paths in rural development policies and strategies (formal instructions), using the evolutionary risk 
governance framework, reveals some path dependences. The most important path dependencies 
relevant to the livelihoods and food security of family farmers are path dependencies among: i) 
contradictions in land policies, ii) agricultural market stabilization policies, and iii) conditions for 
access to credit. The imperial government promoted the development of large commercial farms 
by undermining smallholder farming in the central and southern highlands of the country at the 
end of the 1960s. This policy caused the displacement of many smallholder farmers as a result. 
Since land in the country belongs to landlords (and ultimately the state), no compensation was paid 
to the tenant smallholder farmers. This contributed to public discontent and mass demonstrations 
against the imperial regime. The current government also promotes the development of 
smallholder farming and large commercial farms (since 2002). Currently, the ultimate owner of 
all types of land is the government. Farmers have use rights on land, and when a certain piece is 
needed for large investments or public services, the holder of the right is obliged to leave by taking 
compensation determined by law. However, the displacement of smallholder farmers to create 
space for large commercial farms is again creating public discontent. The problem is that 
compensation rates set by law are not enough to offset damages to the livelihoods of the victims.  
The 1984 famine, which claimed the lives of about one million people in Ethiopia, was 
associated partly with the agricultural market stabilization policy of the Dergue government, which 
caused entitlement failure to producers and consumers. This policy was characterized by nationally 
fixed grain prices, the quota-based supply of grain imposed on smallholder farmers and state farms 
at fixed prices, restrictions on grain movement between markets, and overall control of the market 
by the government. There is a relative deregulation of agricultural markets by the current 
government. However, the market stabilization policy is still not abandoned, due to different 
reasons,—the government is still involved in rationing imported wheat grain at subsidized prices, 
and there is a ban on exporting certain crops such as maize, whatever the comparative price of the 
grain in international markets. These measures have been taken with the intention of protecting 
domestic consumers from the effects of inflation and maintaining a stable grain market. However, 
family farmers, the major producers of food grains, use subsidy-free inputs to produce these crops, 
and they compete with imported grain injected into the market at subsidized rates. Moreover, there 
is systematic price fixing by the Ethiopian Grain Enterprise. For food grains such as maize, for 
which exports are already banned and domestic prices systematically suppressed, family farmers 
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express their desperation to eventually decrease production. This was the case in 2002, when the 
production of cereal decreased by 52 percent, due to the late onset of rainfall, the decreased use of 
chemical fertilizer, and certified seed being discouraged by the prevailing market prices. The 
results of this study show that market stabilization policies may discourage the use of improved 
inputs because of ever-increasing high prices and the challenges farmers face in this regard. The 
effect of such tendencies of family farmers, because of a lack of market incentives (both inputs 
and output markets), may drastically harm the production of food grains and also result in 
entitlement failure for producers and consumers.  
One of the challenges that limited the success of the comprehensive package programs 
during the third five-year development plan of the imperial government was the failure of the credit 
service to reach out to smallholder tenant farmers. The main reason for this failure was the 
requirement of the tenants to provide group collateral and the consent of landlords as conditions 
to access credit. As a result, the major beneficiaries of the credit service, originally intended to 
benefit smallholder tenant farmers, were the landlords and large, financially able farmers. 
Currently, different micro-finance institutions provide rural credit services. The major criterion for 
family farmers is provision of group collateral. However, the results of this study show that most 
Type C farmers fail to provide group collateral because of their low level of credibility, bad credit 
history, and lack of assets such as livestock. In other words, the beneficiaries of the credit service 
are better off farmers that have greater credibility and creditworthiness. This compels poor farmers 
(those categorized as Type C) to sharecrop or leasing out their plots of land, thereby making them 
vulnerable to the bad effects of food insecurity. This means that a lack of access to credit continues 
to be a major source of food insecurity risk in the study areas, mainly because of the path dependent 
pre-conditions for access to the service. If appropriate policy measures are not taken to overcome 
this problem, this may drag already resource-poor farmers into deeper levels of poverty and expose 
them to the worst effects of food insecurity.  
Land policies, market stabilization, and credit policies are not only path-dependent, but 
also interdependent, with each one exacerbating the effects of the other. This means the partial 
solutions might not help to bring the desired improvements in livelihoods and household food 
security. These interdependent challenges need holistic measures to disentangle their effects on 
family farmers. 
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10.2.5. The different sources of risk and their interdependence 
The major sources of food insecurity risk, as indicated in Chapter 6, fall into three categories: 
sources related to changes in climate variables, sources related to crop pests and livestock diseases, 
and institution related sources. Family farming households in the study areas use different risk 
mitigation measures and long-term adaptation strategies against different sources of food 
insecurity risk. However, use of these strategies depends, among others, on the level of knowledge 
and experience of the farmers, the level of uncertainty and predictability of the anticipated risk, 
the availability of inputs for implementation of the adaptation measures, and the financial and 
technical capability of the farmers. While some of the sources of risk (e.g. changes in climate 
variables) cause food insecurity, thereby compelling farmers to follow certain adaptation strategies 
such as using early-maturing crop varieties, institution-related sources of risk re-enforce the 
problem through impeding the adaptation strategies of family farmers. The effect of the latter 
sources of risk is through the inflation of input prices and making adaptation strategies 
unaffordable. This implies that overcoming food insecurity risk needs not only focus on certain 
sources of risk, but also a broader understanding of the contexts and the pursuance of holistic 
policies and plans that can address the system rather than the piecemeal approach. 
There are significant differences between households in different wealth categories 
(poorly- and well-endowed households) in terms of their risk perceptions, assessment, and 
management. More proportion of poorly endowed households perceive the high impact of most 
risk sources on household food security. However, they fall short of being able to access resources 
to redress the balance. This means that the impacts of different sources of food insecurity risk 
highlight local inequalities among family farmers. The local inequalities among family farmers in 
terms of the level of impact of the different sources of food insecurity risk reveals the need for 
careful understanding of local contexts. 
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10.2.6. The riskscapes of the Gilgel Gibe-I hydroelectricity dam 
The results of the analysis in Chapter 7 reveal that the Gilgel Gibe-I hydroelectricity dam is at risk 
of being totally silted up after just one-third of its designed service life. The project displaced 2,476 
households, out of which 562 moved to resettlement sites. The remaining households became 
landless and food and energy insecure. They were living in the surroundings of the reservoir and 
farming inside the buffer zone. Due to the scarcity of land, the community living nearby the buffer 
zone engages in intensive farming, which is aggravating the siltation problem and further 
shortening the service life of the dam. There are different sources of risk in this area: the risk of 
landlessness, food and energy insecurity, as well as siltation. One risk is the result of the other, and 
the dependencies among the different sources of risk have created a locked loop cycle. If the 
different actors only follow their own perspectives and continue promoting interventions targeting 
their own riskscapes, it might lead to a lose-lose situation with a substantial reduction in the 
nation’s power supply as well as continuous or even aggravated food insecurity in the GG-I project 
area. In a nutshell, the risks of landlessness, food and energy insecurity, and siltation are inter-
connected and interdependent, with one causing the other. The actors, however, often do not 
understand this notion, and there are no tools (institutions) or arenas (a form of governance actor, 
a form of organization) where this can be brought to light. A piecemeal risk management approach 
in this case would be like treating the symptoms of a disease, so what is needed is a holistic 
approach to understanding the broader perspectives and the interconnected nature of the different 
sources of risk, by considering the whole set of interconnected sources, i.e. a risk governance 
(participatory risk governance) approach. 
 
10.2.7. Linkages between risk perception and risk governance 
The basic tenet of this research revolves around the premise that the perceptions of family farming 
households about food insecurity risk are framed by their exposure to related shocks and the 
governance of these shocks at different times. The study also emphasizes the fact that the risk 
perceptions of family farmers drive their risk assessment and management strategies. It is also 
indicated clearly that the risk management strategies of farmers are expressed in terms of their 
decision to choose different livelihood strategies. The results of the analysis in Chapter 8  reveal 
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that family farmers in the study areas choose one or a combination of two or more of the four broad 
livelihood strategies (crop production, livestock production, off-farm, and transfer incomes). The 
analysis carried out in this study also establishes that household decisions to choose from among 
these livelihood strategies are not mutually exclusive; rather, there are interdependencies in this 
regard. For example, the choices of crop and livestock and livestock and off-farm income strategies 
were found to be complementary, with one supporting the choice of the other. Crop production is 
the largest source of income on its own and in combination with other livelihood strategies. The 
choice of livestock production, or a combination of livestock production, off-farm, and transfer 
income strategies, was found to increase the choice of crop production activities. Similarly, the 
choice of livestock production activities was found to increase when adopting crops only, a 
combination of crops and off-farm, a combination of crops, off-farm, and transfer incomes, and 
off-farm income alone. These impacts of choosing one or a combination of livelihood strategies, 
on the likelihood of choosing the other livelihood strategy, show the role of adopting multiple 
livelihood strategies in re-enforcing the choice of different livelihood strategies. Interdependence 
could be seen in terms of generating cash income for investment in the other, the provision of 
traction power, and sharing by-products such as manure and crop residues as input in the 
production of the other. These complementarities and interdependencies also show that policies 
and plans targeting the improvement of livelihoods and food security need to look into these 
dimensions, in order to trigger enhancement in the different livelihood strategies. This being a 
background in the continuum, those farmers that perceive the risk of drought, crop pests and 
diseases, high input prices, and failure of household income as sources of food insecurity risk have 
a high propensity to choose livestock production strategies and a low propensity to choose crop 
production strategies. This means that if one follows a piecemeal approach to promoting crop 
production and neglecting other livelihood strategies in a community threatened by different 
sources of food insecurity, food production (which is mainly crop production in the study areas) 
will be in trouble. However, if one takes into account the interdependence of the different 
livelihood strategies, it is possible to trigger crop production through the promotion of livestock 
production and other livelihood strategies that are complementary to crop production strategies.  
Knowledge of the factors that favor adopting multiple livelihood strategies at a time is also 
an important input when preparing plans and policies. In this regard, the results of this study show 
that farmers who perceive the risks of drought, crop pests and high input prices as sources of food 
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insecurity are 12-20 percent more likely to adopt multiple livelihood strategies than other farmers. 
This means farmers that perceive these risks have more tendency to diversify their livelihood 
strategies than others. This could be because of the bad experiences they had relying on a single 
livelihood strategy when they faced similar risks in the past and how these risks were managed. In 
a similar way, farmers that have larger social networks (more of relatives in the area) have more 
likelihood for diversification. With a one percent increase in the number of relatives, households 
are five percent more likely to choose multiple livelihood strategies. This signifies the role of social 
networks in risk governance, due to their role in sharing information, finance, labor, knowledge, 
and security among the members of the network.  
Among the socioeconomic determinants of the choice of livelihood strategy, the effects of 
age and related factors need special attention. The results of this study reveal that older farmers 
have a high propensity to choose transfer income rather than other livelihood strategies, and they 
become more dependent on transfers as their age increases. Such households either try to send 
family members to work abroad or get them employment in an off-farm job.  
 
10.3. Recommendations 
The re-emergence of some social organizations (one-in-five, gare and gott) was observed as being 
very much politicized and highly marginalized among the youth and urbanities as superimposed 
structures imported from outside. This was mainly because of the way these social organizations 
re-emerged into society. While the government declared that it was successful in using such social 
organizations as social networks, their history and origin were not clearly explained or 
contextualized. I therefore recommend explaining the history of these social organizations and 
their origin, as well as their purpose during the Gada administration, in order to ensure their 
internalization among the young generation and to make use of their strong power in social 
networking for the future development of the country. 
Formal and informal institutions were found to be interdependent, with one complementing 
the other in governing rural areas. It is therefore recommended to support and encourage the 
activity of councils of elders and local organizations in legislating and implementing informal 
institutions rather than interfering in their activities. Where possible, it is recommended to build 
187 
 
the capacity of local organizations and councils of elders in the principles of rural governance, in 
order to enable them to enforce those principles accordingly. 
There is a need to consider the path-dependent land policies of the country, to reduce the 
level of suffering felt by land use rights owners. This would be in terms of revisiting the laws and 
policies that determine what compensation is paid to those who leave their holding to make way 
for large-scale investment or public services. The holders of land use rights need to receive either 
land of equivalent value or a sufficient amount of compensation that will make up for the damage 
inflicted to their livelihoods. The compensation needs also to take into account the 
intergenerational dimension, since the holders of land use rights have the right to transfer the land 
to their legitimate heirs.  
Agricultural market stabilization policies might be needed to create stable macro-economic 
conditions by suppressing food price inflation. However, these market stabilization policies and 
subsequent measures need to balance the short-term benefits of grain price stabilization and their 
long-term implications on the food production and entitlement of producers and consumers. This 
is because stabilization measures may have more adverse effects on the food security situation in 
the country. As observed during the Dergue regime, the ultimate impact of grain market 
stabilization policy was the worst famine ever, mainly because it discouraged the use of inputs and 
increasing production, which eventually led to entitlement failure to producers and consumers and 
exposed the vast majority of the population to famine. Current market stabilization policies focus 
on distributing imported food grain at subsidized rates and systematically suppressing domestic 
grain prices. However, the increasing high input prices and relatively low grain prices for crops 
such as maize discourage use of inputs and may cause stagnant or decreasing production. I 
therefore recommend balancing the short- and long-term benefits of the stabilization policy and 
focusing on production-enhancing measures that encourage producers and increase domestic 
output. In this regard, there is a need to shift subsidies on imported grains gradually to input 
subsidies, to encourage domestic producers. This may result in medium- to long-term increases in 
food production and prevent entitlement failure of both producers and consumers. 
Being a path-dependent policy, the current conditions for access to micro-finance credit in 
rural Ethiopia compel farmers to provide proof of group collateral, among other requirements, to 
gain access to credit. However, since poor farmers categorized as Type C do not have assets and 
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are not creditworthy, they were observed failing to get group collateral. The requirement to provide 
group collateral is excluding this cohort and making the rural credit service available only to better 
off farmers. I therefore recommend creating special social security programs that can help poor 
farmers build up their assets, in order to make them eligible to access finance. In this regard, 
experiences with household asset building programs in drought-prone might help in handling the 
case of resources poor farmers in the ‘surplus-produceing areas’ of the country.   
It might be difficult to have comprehensive, all-encompassing policies, but the design of 
policies and plans that look to enhance livelihoods and food security among family farmers should 
not follow a piecemeal approach or be shortsighted. Rather, policymakers and planners need to 
look into the performance of similar policies and plans in the past, as well as their interaction and 
interdependence with other policies and plans that may have possible outcomes in the future. There 
is a need to look into both the positive and negative effects of path dependence and 
interdependence. This is because the implementation of a certain policy or plan practically affects, 
or is affected by, other policies and plans. 
The results of this study (in Chapter 6) show that family farmers have derived certain 
adaptation strategies in response to food insecurity risks, due to a crop disease known as tef head 
smut. Farmers in Jimma call this practice Geniso, which involves adjusting the planting date of an 
early-maturing local variety of tef known as saye and growing it before the weather becomes 
conducive for head smut disease. However, since geniso tef matures during the rainy season, 
harvesting and threshing large plots of tef is still a challenge, and so farmers do not use it on a 
larger scale. This calls for intervention from the research system on how to scale up geniso and 
support a community that is moving away from tef production, due to the disease.  
The results of this study (Chapter 6) reveal that some sources of risk, such as changes in 
climate variables (e.g. late onset and early cessation of rainfall), cause crop failures and expose 
family farmers to food insecurity. Farmers tend to use different adaptation strategies such as early-
maturing varieties of maize. However, other sources of food insecurity risk, such as risk of high 
input and low output prices, make using these adaption strategies unaffordable, which means that 
the governance of food insecurity risk needs a holistic rather than a piecemeal approach. It is 
therefore recommended to use the systems approach and consider all sources of risk and their 
dimensions of influence when designing policies and plans in response to food insecurity risk. 
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The analysis in Chapter 7 reveals that the Ethiopian government and its development 
partners are taking different measures to reduce the siltation problem at the Gilgel Gibe-I 
hydroelectricity dam. These measures focus on different soil conservation practices and income 
generation schemes to improve the livelihoods of family farmers in the GG-I watershed. The 
coordinated efforts of the different stakeholders through the forum created for this purpose are 
highly appreciated. However, sustainable solutions to the existing problem need careful 
identification and a focus on the root causes of very rapid siltation in the reservoir. Accordingly, 
the current watershed level interventions might overlook the real causes of the problem. The results 
of this study reveal that one of the root causes of rapid siltation is the landlessness of the project-
affected family farming households living in the surroundings of the reservoir. Intensive crop 
farming in areas surrounding the buffer zone, and cultivation of the buffer zone itself, emanate 
from serious landlessness. Preventing these landless households from farming the buffer zone has 
not brought the desired results. It is therefore, recommended to implement participatory spatial 
planning that leads to participatory governance of the land delineated as the buffer zone. The 
participatory governance of the buffer zone entails developing land use plans in a way that 
promotes the sustainable protection against siltation and ensures economic returns for people 
evicted from the site in a legally binding form. 
Analysis of the decision to choose alternative livelihood strategies as family farmers’ 
responses to different sources of food insecurity risk (Chapter 8) reveals that their decisions to 
choose from among the major livelihood strategies are interdependent. The decision to choose 
some of the livelihood strategies are complementary to each other. In addition, the choice of 
combining some livelihood strategies was found to enhance the likelihood of adopting another 
livelihood strategy. Moreover, some socioeconomic variables and perceptions of certain sources 
of food insecurity risk were found to increase the likelihood of adopting a certain livelihood 
strategy while decreasing the likelihood of adopting a certain livelihood strategy. Taking these 
interdependencies into account, the development of policies and plans to reduce food insecurity 
needs to consider the complementarity and substitution effects of household decisions to choose 
different livelihood strategies. It is also crucial to consider the effect of promoting the combination 
of different livelihood strategies to boost food production, enhance household income, and 
ultimately ensure household food security. Moreover, results of the analysis in Chapter 8 reveal 
the fact that the perceptions of family farmers on the risk of drought, crop pests, and increased 
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input prices enhance the choice of multiple livelihood strategies. This means proper 
communication and mass awareness of these risks alert family farmers to diversify. It is therefore 
recommended to focus on the provision of an early warning information system and raise public 
awareness on the impacts of these sources of risk. 
Households that have better social networks (especially those who have more relatives) have 
a higher likelihood of adopting multiple livelihoods than others. This means that interventions 
encouraging social networks, e.g. farmers’ groups of different types, enhance the probability of 
adoption of multiple livelihood strategies. On the other hand, older farmers are more likely to 
choose transfer incomes than other livelihood strategies. This could be due mainly to the lack of 
physical labor available for production activities and off-farm work. This implies the need to 
consider social security programs that will take care of old-aged farmers, people with physical 
disabilities and those who are not able to do physical agricultural work. 
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Annex 1: A chronology of food shortages and famine in Ethiopia  
Date Region Affected Attributed causes and severity 
253-242 
BC 
Ethiopia Deduced from low Nile floods 
1066-1072 Ethiopia and Egypt Deduced from low Nile and Egyptian famine 
1131-1145 Ethiopia Severity unrecorded 
1252 Ethiopia First of seven famine years during next 30 years 
1258-1259 Ethiopia Severity unrecorded 
1272-1275 Ethiopia Severity unrecorded 
1314-1344 Ethiopia Severity unrecorded 
1435-1436 Ethiopia Severity unrecorded 
1454-1468 Ethiopia Severity unrecorded 
1543-1562 Ethiopia Attribute to God’s anger at murder of Emperor 
Gelawdewos  
1618 North Ethiopia Emperor forced to evacuate headquarters  
1772-1774 Ethiopia Wide spread human suffering 
1796 North Ethiopia Famine triggered by locust invasion 
1800 Ethiopia Large human and livestock death toll 
1812-1816 Tigray Severity unrecorded 
1826-1827 Ethiopia Failure of cotton and grain crops 
1828-1829 Shewa Much human mortality 
1831 Tigray Severity unrecorded 
1835-1838 Tigray and Eritrea Drought, cholera epidemic; high human and cattle 
loss 
1864-1866 Tigray and Gondar Heavy human death toll 
1876-1878 Tigray and Awash Valley Heavy livestock death toll 
1880 Tigray and Gondar Much loss of livestock  
1888-1892 Ethiopia Drought and spread of rinderpest caused loss of 90 
percent cattle and one-third human population 
1895-1896 Ethiopia Minor drought. Loss of livestock and human lives 
1899-1900 Ethiopia Drought deduced from levels of Lake Rudolf and 
low Nile floods 
1913-1914 North Ethiopia Lowest Nile floods since 1695. Grain prices said 
to have risen thirty fold 
1920-1922 Ethiopia Moderate drought, similar to 1895-1896 
1932-1934 Ethiopia Deduced from low level of Lake Rudolf in 
Northern Kenya 
1953 Tigray and Wollo Severity unrecorded 
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1957-1958 Tigray and Wollo Rain failure in 1957 with locusts and epidemic in 
1958 Complete failure of rain; no more than 10 
rainy days in 1957; accompanied by outbreak of 
locusts and epidemics; about one million people 
affected in Tigray alone; some 100,000 people 
died  
1962-1963 Western Ethiopia Very severe 
1964-1965 Ethiopia as a whole About 25 percent of the Awraja in the country 
were under famine 
1965-1966 Wollo, Tigray and south 
central and western parts 
Rain failed in five of the eight Awrajas of Tigray, 
and eight of the 12 Awrajas of Wollo 
1969 Eritrea Estimated 1.7 million people suffering food 
shortage 
1971-1973 Northern. Southern and 
eastern Parts; particularly 
Wollo and Tigray 
Below average rainfall throughout the country; 
about 400,000 to one million people affected in 
Tigray alone, and more than 100,000 in Wollo. 
Some 200,000people died in Tigray, Wollo and 
northern Shewa; roughly 80 percent of cattle, 50 
percent of sheep and 30 percent of goats perished; 
55 percent of Awrajas in the country under famine 
in 1973 
1971-1975 Ethiopia Sequence of rain failures. Estimated 0.25 million 
dead. Fifty percent of livestock lost in Tigray and 
Wollo 
1975-1976 Wollo and Tigray region Below average kiremt rains in Wollo and Tigray; 
2-3 million people affected in total; about 52 
percent of Awrajas in the country under famine in 
1975 
1978-1979 Southern Ethiopia Belg rains failed; below average kiremt rains 
throughout the country; about 4.3 million and 4.5 
million people were affected in 1978 and 1979, 
respectively 
1982 Northern Ethiopia Below average rainfall; delay onset of kiremt 
rains; about 3.5 million people affected 
1983-1985 Most parts of Ethiopia Complete failure of belg rains; below average 
kiremt rains; about 7.9 million people affected  
1987 Northern Ethiopia; Most of 
Shewa; most of Hararghe 
and the Rift Valley region 
Below average rainfall throughout the country; 
delayed kiremt rains; total crop failure in Tigray 
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1987-1988 Ethiopia Drought of undocumented severity in peripheral 
regions 
1990-1992 Northern, eastern, and 
southwestern Ethiopia 
Rain failure and regional conflicts. Estimated 4 
million people suffering food shortage 
1993-1994 Tigray, Wollo, Addis 4 million people requiring food assistance, 
including demobilized army and Somali refugees. 
New droughts 
1999-2000 Somali Region Drought overlapped with Ethiopia-Eritrea war 
72,000 to 123,000 lives lost in Somali region  
2002-2003 Ethiopia Late onset of rainfall caused crop failure and over 
13 million people were in need of food aid 
2011 Afar and Somali regions 4.6 million people were in need of food aid 
2015-2016 North, northeast and eastern 
parts of Ethiopia including 
all the pastoral areas 
El Nino induced drought caused about 10.2 
million people in need of food aid 
Source: Webb & Von Braun (1994); Bewket (2009); and own compilation 
 
